Formation of a new system of international relations. International relations at the present stage Characteristic features of international relations and foreign policy of states in modern times

The global scale and radical nature of the changes taking place in our days in the political, economic, spiritual areas of the life of the world community, in the field of military security allow us to put forward an assumption about the formation of a new system of international relations, different from those that have functioned over the past century, and in many respects even since from the classical Westphalian system.

In the world and domestic literature, a more or less stable approach to the systematization of international relations has developed, depending on their content, composition of participants, driving forces and patterns. It is believed that international (interstate) relations proper originated during the formation of national states in the relatively amorphous space of the Roman Empire. The end of the “Thirty Years’ War” in Europe and the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is taken as a starting point. Since then, the entire 350-year period of international interaction up to the present day is considered by many, especially Western researchers, as the history of a single Westphalian system of international relations. The dominant subjects of this system are sovereign states. There is no supreme arbiter in the system, therefore the states are independent in conducting domestic policy within their national borders and are in principle equal in rights. Sovereignty implies non-interference in each other's affairs. Over time, States developed a set of rules based on these principles governing international relationships, - international law.

Most scholars agree that the main driving force behind the Westphalian system of international relations was rivalry between states: some sought to increase their influence, while others tried to prevent this. Collisions between states were determined by the fact that national interests perceived as vital by some states came into conflict with the national interests of other states. The outcome of this rivalry, as a rule, was determined by the balance of power between states or alliances that they entered to achieve their foreign policy goals. The establishment of a balance, or balance, meant a period of stable peaceful relations, the violation of the balance of power ultimately led to war and its restoration in a new configuration, reflecting the strengthening of the influence of some states at the expense of others. For clarity and, of course, with a large degree of simplification, this system is compared with the movement of billiard balls. States collide with each other in changing configurations and then move again in an endless struggle for influence or security. The main principle in this case is self-interest. The main criterion is strength.

The Westphalian era (or system) of international relations is divided into several stages (or subsystems), united by the general patterns indicated above, but differing from each other in features characteristic of a particular period of relations between states. Historians usually distinguish several subsystems of the Westphalian system, which are often considered as independent: the system of predominantly Anglo-French rivalry in Europe and the struggle for colonies in the 17th - 18th centuries; the system of the "European concert of nations" or the Congress of Vienna in the 19th century; the more geographically global Versailles-Washington system between the two world wars; finally the system cold war, or, by the definition of some scientists, Yalta-Potsdam. Obviously, in the second half of the 80s - early 90s of the XX century. cardinal changes have taken place in international relations, which allow us to speak of the end of the Cold War and the formation of new system-forming patterns. The main question today is what are these regularities, what are the specifics of the new stage compared to the previous ones, how does it fit into the general Westphalian system or differ from it, how can a new system of international relations be defined.

The majority of foreign and domestic international experts take the wave of political changes in the countries of Central Europe in the autumn of 1989 as a watershed between the Cold War and the current stage of international relations, and consider the fall of the Berlin Wall as a clear symbol of it. In the titles of most monographs, articles, conferences, and training courses devoted to today's processes, the emerging system of international relations or world politics is designated as belonging to the post-cold war period. Such a definition focuses on what is missing in the current period compared to the previous one. The obvious distinguishing features of the emerging system today compared to the previous one are the removal of the political and ideological confrontation between "anti-communism" and "communism" due to the rapid and almost complete disappearance of the latter, as well as the curtailment of the military confrontation of the blocs that were grouped during the Cold War around two poles - Washington and Moscow. This definition does not adequately reflect new essence world politics, just as the formula “after the Second World War” did not reveal a new quality of the emerging patterns of the Cold War. Therefore, when analyzing today's international relations and trying to predict their development, one should pay attention to qualitatively new processes emerging under the influence of the changed conditions of international life.

IN Lately one can increasingly hear pessimistic lamentations that the new international situation is less stable, less predictable and even more dangerous than in previous decades. Indeed, the sharp contrasts of the Cold War are clearer than the multiplicity of undertones of new international relations. In addition, the Cold War is already a thing of the past, an era that has become the object of unhurried study of historians, and a new system is just emerging, and its development can only be predicted on the basis of a still small amount of information. This task becomes all the more complicated if, in analyzing the future, one proceeds from the regularities that characterized the past system. This is partly confirmed by the fact

The fact that, in essence, the entire science of international relations, operating with the methodology of explaining the Westphalian system, was unable to foresee the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the change of systems does not occur instantly, but gradually, in the struggle between the new and the old. Apparently, the feeling of increased instability and danger is caused by this variability of the new, as yet incomprehensible world.

New political map of the world

In approaching the analysis of the new system of international relations, apparently, one should proceed from the fact that the end of the Cold War completed in principle the process of forming a single world community. The path traversed by humanity from the isolation of continents, regions, civilizations and peoples through the colonial gathering of the world, the expansion of the geography of trade, through the cataclysms of two world wars, the massive entry into the world arena of states liberated from colonialism, the mobilization of resources by opposite camps from all corners of the world in opposition to the Cold War, the increase in the compactness of the planet as a result of the scientific and technological revolution, finally ended with the collapse of the "iron curtain" between East and West and the transformation of the world into a single organism with a certain common set of principles and patterns of development of its individual parts. The world community is increasingly becoming such in reality. Therefore, in recent years, increased attention has been paid to the problems of interdependence and globalization of the world, the common denominator of the national components of world politics. Apparently, the analysis of these transcendental universal tendencies can make it possible to more reliably imagine the direction of change in world politics and international relations.

According to a number of scholars and politicians, the disappearance of the ideological stimulus of world politics in the form of the confrontation "communism - anti-communism" allows us to return to the traditional structure of relations between nation states, characteristic of the earlier stages of the Westphalian system. In this case, the disintegration of bipolarity presupposes the formation of a multipolar world, the poles of which should be the most powerful powers that have thrown off the restrictions of corporate discipline as a result of the disintegration of two blocs, worlds or commonwealths. The well-known scientist and former US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, in one of his last monographs Diplomacy, predicts that international relations emerging after the Cold War will increasingly resemble the European politics of the 19th century, when traditional national interests and the changing balance of power determined the diplomatic game, education and the collapse of alliances, changing spheres of influence. A full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, E. M. Primakov paid considerable attention to the phenomenon of the emergence of multipolarity. It should be noted that the supporters of the doctrine of multipolarity operate with the former categories, such as "great power", "spheres of influence", "balance of power", etc. The idea of ​​multipolarity has become one of the central ideas in the programmatic government documents China, although the emphasis in them is rather not on an attempt to adequately reflect the essence of a new stage in international relations, but on the task of counteracting real or imaginary hegemonism, preventing the formation of a unipolar world led by the United States. In Western literature, and in some statements by American officials, there is often talk of "the sole leadership of the United States", i.e. about unipolarity.

Indeed, in the early 90s, if we consider the world from the point of view of geopolitics, the map of the world has undergone major changes. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance put an end to the dependence of the states of Central and Eastern Europe on Moscow, turned each of them into an independent agent of European and world politics. The collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally changed the geopolitical situation in the Eurasian space. To a greater or lesser extent and at different speeds, the states formed in the post-Soviet space fill their sovereignty with real content, form their own complexes of national interests, foreign policy courses, not only theoretically, but also in essence become independent subjects of international relations. The fragmentation of the post-Soviet space into fifteen sovereign states changed the geopolitical situation for neighboring countries that previously interacted with the united Soviet Union, for example

China, Turkey, countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Scandinavia. Not only have the local “balances of power” changed, but the multivariance of relations has also sharply increased. Of course, the Russian Federation remains the most powerful state entity in the post-Soviet, and indeed in the Eurasian space. But its new, very limited potential compared to the former Soviet Union (if such a comparison is at all appropriate), in terms of territory, population, share of the economy and geopolitical neighborhood, dictates a new model of behavior in international affairs, if viewed from the point of view of multipolar "balance of power".

Geopolitical changes on the European continent as a result of the unification of Germany, the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the obvious pro-Western orientation of most countries of Eastern and Central Europe, including the Baltic states, are superimposed on a certain strengthening of Eurocentrism and independence of Western European integration structures, a more prominent manifestation of sentiments in a number of European countries, not always coinciding with the US strategic line. The dynamics of China's economic growth and the increase in its foreign policy activity, Japan's search for a more independent place in world politics, befitting its economic power, are causing shifts in the geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific region. The objective increase in the share of the United States in world affairs after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union is to some extent leveled by the increase in the independence of other "poles" and a certain strengthening of isolationist sentiments in American society.

Under the new conditions, with the end of the confrontation between the two "camps" of the Cold War, the coordinates of the foreign policy activities of a large group of states that were previously part of the "third world" have changed. The Non-Aligned Movement has lost its former content, the stratification of the South has accelerated and the differentiation of the attitude of the groups and individual states formed as a result of this towards the North, which is also not monolithic.

Another dimension of multipolarity can be considered regionalism. For all their diversity, different rates of development and degree of integration, regional groupings introduce additional features into the change in the geopolitical map of the world. Supporters of the "civilizational" school tend to view multipolarity from the point of view of the interaction or clash of cultural and civilizational blocs. According to the most fashionable representative of this school, the American scientist S. Huntington, the ideological bipolarity of the Cold War will be replaced by a clash of multipolarity of cultural and civilizational blocs: Western - Judeo-Christian, Islamic, Confucian, Slavic-Orthodox, Hindu, Japanese, Latin American and, possibly, African. Indeed, regional processes are developing against different civilizational backgrounds. But the probability of a fundamental division of the world community precisely on this basis into this moment seems to be very speculative and is not yet supported by any concrete institutional or policy-forming realities. Even the confrontation between Islamic "fundamentalism" and Western civilization loses its sharpness over time.

More materialized is economic regionalism in the form of a highly integrated European Union, other regional entities of varying degrees of integration - the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Commonwealth of Independent States, ASEAN, the North American Free Trade Area, similar entities emerging in Latin America and South Asia. Although in a somewhat modified form, regional political institutions, such as the Organization of Latin American States, the Organization of African Unity, and so on, retain their significance. They are complemented by such interregional multifunctional structures as the North Atlantic partnership, the US-Japan linkage, the North America-Western Europe-Japan trilateral structure in the form of the G7, to which the Russian Federation is gradually joining.

In short, since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical map of the world has undergone obvious changes. But multipolarity explains the form rather than the essence of the new system of international interaction. Does multipolarity mean the restoration in full of the action of the traditional driving forces of world politics and the motivations for the behavior of its subjects in the international arena, which are characteristic to a greater or lesser extent for all stages of the Westphalian system?

The events of recent years do not yet confirm such a logic of a multipolar world. First, the United States is behaving much more restrained than it could afford under the logic of the balance of power given its current position in the economic, technological, and military fields. Secondly, with a certain autonomization of the poles in the Western world, the emergence of new, somewhat radical dividing lines of confrontation between North America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific region is not visible. With some increase in the level of anti-American rhetoric in the Russian and Chinese political elites, the more fundamental interests of both powers are pushing them to further develop relations with the United States. NATO expansion has not strengthened the centripetal tendencies in the CIS, which should be expected under the laws of a multipolar world. An analysis of the interaction between the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the G8 shows that the field of convergence of their interests is much wider than the field of disagreement, despite the outward drama of the latter.

Based on this, it can be assumed that the behavior of the world community is beginning to be influenced by new driving forces, different from those that traditionally operated within the framework of the Westphalian system. In order to test this thesis, one should consider new factors that are beginning to influence the behavior of the world community.

Global Democratic Wave

At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the global socio-political space changed qualitatively. The refusal of the peoples of the Soviet Union, most other countries of the former "socialist community" from the one-party system of state structure and central planning of the economy in favor of market democracy meant the end of the basically global confrontation between antagonistic socio-political systems and a significant increase in the share of open societies in world politics. A unique feature of the self-liquidation of communism in history is the peaceful nature of this process, which was not accompanied, as was usually the case with such a radical change in the socio-political structure, by any serious military or revolutionary cataclysms. In a significant part of the Eurasian space - in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the territory of the former Soviet Union, a consensus in principle has developed in favor of a democratic form of socio-political structure. In case of successful completion of the process of reforming these states, primarily Russia (due to its potential), into open societies in most of the northern hemisphere - in Europe, North America, Eurasia - a community of peoples will be formed, living according to similar socio-political and economic principles, professing similar values, including in approaches to the processes of global world politics.

A natural consequence of the end of the main confrontation between the "first" and "second" worlds was the weakening and then the cessation of support for authoritarian regimes - clients of the two camps that fought during the Cold War in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Since one of the main advantages of such regimes for East and West was, respectively, "anti-imperialist" or "anti-communist" orientation, with the end of the confrontation between the main antagonists, they lost their value as ideological allies and, as a result, lost material and political support. The fall of individual regimes of this kind in Somalia, Liberia, and Afghanistan was followed by the disintegration of these states and civil war. Most other countries, such as Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Zaire, have begun to move, albeit at different rates, away from authoritarianism. This further reduced the world field of the latter.

The 1980s, especially their second half, witnessed a large-scale process of democratization on all continents, not directly related to the end of the Cold War. Brazil, Argentina, Chile have moved from military-authoritarian to civilian parliamentary forms of government. Somewhat later, this trend spread to Central America. Indicative of the outcome of this process is that the 34 leaders who attended the December 1994 Americas Summit (Cuba did not receive an invitation) were democratically elected civilian leaders of their states. Similar processes of democratization, of course, with Asian specifics, were observed at that time in the Asia-Pacific region - in the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand. In 1988, an elected government replaced the military regime in Pakistan. A major breakthrough towards democracy, not only for the African continent, was South Africa's rejection of the policy of apartheid. Elsewhere in Africa, the move away from authoritarianism has been slower. However, the fall of the most odious dictatorial regimes in Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, a certain progress in democratic reforms in Ghana, Benin, Kenya, and Zimbabwe indicate that the wave of democratization has not bypassed this continent either.

It should be noted that democracy has quite different degrees of maturity. This is evident in the evolution of democratic societies from the French and American revolutions to the present day. Primary forms of democracy in the form of regular multi-party elections, for example, in a number of African countries or in some newly independent states in the territory of the former USSR, differ significantly from the forms of mature democracies, say, of the Western European type. Even the most advanced democracies are imperfect, according to Lincoln's definition of democracy: "government by the people, elected by the people and carried out in the interests of the people." But it is also obvious that between the varieties of democracies and authoritarianism there is also a demarcation line that determines the qualitative difference between internal and foreign policy communities on either side of it.

The global process of changing socio-political models took place in the late 80s and early 90s in different countries from different starting positions, had an unequal depth, its results are in some cases ambiguous, and there are not always guarantees against the recurrence of authoritarianism. But the scale of this process, its simultaneous development in a number of countries, the fact that for the first time in history the field of democracy covers more than half of humanity and territory the globe, and most importantly, the most powerful states in economic, scientific, technical and military terms - all this allows us to conclude that there is a qualitative change in the socio-political field of the world community. The democratic form of organization of societies does not cancel the contradictions, and sometimes even acute conflict situations between the respective states. For example, the fact that parliamentary forms of government are currently functioning in India and Pakistan, in Greece and Turkey, does not exclude dangerous tension in their relations. The considerable distance traveled by Russia from communism to democracy does not cancel disagreements with European states and the United States, say, on NATO expansion or the use of military force against the regimes of Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic. But the fact is that throughout history, democracies have never been at war with each other.

Much, of course, depends on the definition of the concepts of "democracy" and "war". A state is usually considered democratic if the executive and legislative powers are formed through competitive elections. This means that at least two independent parties participate in such elections, at least half of the adult population is eligible to vote, and there has been at least one peaceful constitutional transfer of power from one party to another. Unlike incidents, border clashes, crises, civil wars international wars are military actions between states with combat losses of the armed forces over 1000 people.

Studies of all hypothetical exceptions to this pattern throughout world history from the war between Syracuse and Athens in the 5th century. BC e. up to the present time, they only confirm the fact that democracies are at war with authoritarian regimes and often start such conflicts, but they have never brought contradictions with other democratic states to war. It must be admitted that there are certain grounds for skepticism among those who point out that during the years of the existence of the Westphalian system, the field of interaction between democratic states was relatively narrow and their peaceful interaction was influenced by the general confrontation of a superior or equal group of authoritarian states. It is still not entirely clear how democratic states will behave towards each other in the absence or qualitative reduction in the scale of the threat from authoritarian states.

If, nevertheless, the pattern of peaceful interaction between democratic states is not violated in the 21st century, then the expansion of the field of democracy taking place in the world now will also mean an expansion of the global zone of peace. This, apparently, is the first and main qualitative difference between the new emerging system of international relations and the classical Westphalian system, in which the predominance of authoritarian states predetermined the frequency of wars both between them and with the participation of democratic countries.

A qualitative change in the relationship between democracy and authoritarianism on a global scale gave grounds to the American researcher F. Fukuyama to proclaim the final victory of democracy and, in this sense, to announce the “end of history” as a struggle between historical formations. However, it seems that the massive advance of democracy at the turn of the century does not yet mean its complete victory. Communism as a socio-political system, although with certain changes, has been preserved in China, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, and Cuba. His legacy is felt in a number of countries of the former Soviet Union, in Serbia.

With the possible exception of North Korea, all the other socialist countries are introducing elements of a market economy; they are somehow drawn into the world economic system. The practice of relations of some surviving communist states with other countries is governed by the principles of "peaceful coexistence" rather than "class struggle". The ideological charge of communism is focused more on domestic consumption, and pragmatism is increasingly gaining the upper hand in foreign policy. Partial economic reform and openness to international economic relations generate social forces that require a corresponding expansion of political freedoms. But the dominant one-party system works in the opposite direction. As a result, there is a "seesaw" effect moving from liberalism to authoritarianism and vice versa. In China, for example, it was a move from the pragmatic reforms of Deng Xiaoping to the forceful suppression of student protests in Tiananmen Square, then from a new wave of liberalization to tightening the screws, and back to pragmatism.

Experience of the 20th century shows that the communist system inevitably reproduces a foreign policy that conflicts with the politics generated by democratic societies. Of course, the fact of a radical difference in socio-political systems does not necessarily lead to the inevitability of a military conflict. But equally justified is the assumption that the existence of this contradiction does not exclude such a conflict and does not allow one to hope for the achievement of the level of relations that are possible between democratic states.

There are still a significant number of states in the authoritarian sphere, the socio-political model of which is determined either by the inertia of personal dictatorships, as, for example, in Iraq, Libya, Syria, or by an anomaly of the prosperity of medieval forms of Eastern rule, combined with technological progress in Saudi Arabia, the states of the Persian Gulf , some Maghreb countries. At the same time, the first group is in a state of irreconcilable confrontation with democracy, and the second is ready to cooperate with it as long as it does not seek to shake the socio-political status quo established in these countries. Authoritarian structures, albeit in a modified form, have taken root in a number of post-Soviet states, for example, in Turkmenistan.

A special place among authoritarian regimes is occupied by the countries of "Islamic statehood" of an extremist persuasion - Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan. The unique potential of influencing world politics is given to them by the international movement of Islamic political extremism, known under the not quite correct name “Islamic fundamentalism”. This revolutionary ideological trend that rejects Western democracy as a way of life of society, allowing terror and violence as a means of implementing the doctrine of "Islamic statehood", received in last years widespread among the population in most countries of the Middle East and other states with a high percentage of the Muslim population.

Unlike the surviving communist regimes, which (with the exception of North Korea) are looking for ways of rapprochement with democratic states, at least in the economic field, and whose ideological charge is fading, Islamic political extremism is dynamic, massive and really threatens the stability of the regimes in Saudi Arabia. , countries of the Persian Gulf, some states of the Maghreb, Pakistan, Turkey, Central Asia. Of course, when assessing the scale of the challenge of Islamic political extremism, the world community should observe a sense of proportion, take into account opposition to it in the Muslim world, for example, from secular and military structures in Algeria, Egypt, the dependence of the countries of the new Islamic statehood on the world economy, as well as signs of a certain erosion extremism in Iran.

The persistence and possibility of an increase in the number of authoritarian regimes does not exclude the possibility of military clashes both between them and with the democratic world. Apparently, it is in the sector of authoritarian regimes and in the zone of contact between the latter and the world of democracy that the most dangerous processes fraught with military conflicts may develop in the future. The “gray” zone of states that have moved away from authoritarianism, but have not yet completed democratic transformations, also remains non-conflicting. However, the general trend that has clearly manifested itself in recent times still testifies to a qualitative change in the global socio-political field in favor of democracy, and also to the fact that authoritarianism is waging historical rearguard battles. Of course, the study of further ways of developing international relations should include a more thorough analysis of the patterns of relations between countries that have reached different stages of democratic maturity, the impact of democratic predominance in the world on the behavior of authoritarian regimes, and so on.

Global economic organism

Proportionate socio-political changes in the world economic system. The fundamental rejection of centralized economic planning by most former socialist countries meant that in the 1990s the large-scale potential and markets of these countries were included in the global market economy system. True, it was not about ending the confrontation between two approximately equal blocs, as was the case in the military-political field. The economic structures of socialism have never offered any serious competition to the Western economic system. At the end of the 1980s, the share of the CMEA member countries in the gross world product was about 9%, and that of the industrially developed capitalist countries was 57%. Much of the Third World economy was oriented towards the market system. Therefore, the process of including the former socialist economies in the world economy had rather a long-term significance and symbolized the completion of the formation or restoration of a single global economic system at a new level. Its qualitative changes were accumulating in the market system even before the end of the Cold War.

In the 1980s, there was a broad breakthrough in the world towards the liberalization of the world economy - reducing state guardianship over the economy, granting greater freedoms to private entrepreneurship within countries and abandoning protectionism in relations with foreign partners, which, however, did not exclude state assistance in entering the world markets. It was these factors that primarily provided the economies of a number of countries, such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, with unprecedented high growth rates. The crisis that has recently hit a number of countries in Southeast Asia, according to many economists, was the result of the "overheating" of the economies as a result of their rapid rise while maintaining archaic political structures that distort economic liberalization. Economic reforms in Turkey contributed to the rapid modernization of this country. In the early 1990s, the process of liberalization extended to countries Latin America- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico. The rejection of strict state planning, the reduction of the budget deficit, the privatization of large banks and state-owned enterprises, and the reduction of customs tariffs allowed them to sharply increase their economic growth rates and take second place in this indicator after the countries of East Asia. At the same time, similar reforms, albeit of a much less radical nature, are beginning to make their way in India. The 1990s are reaping the tangible benefits of opening China's economy to the outside world.

The logical consequence of these processes was a significant intensification of international interaction between national economies. The growth rate of international trade exceeds the world rate of domestic economic growth. Today, more than 15% of the world's gross domestic product is sold in foreign markets. Involvement in international trade has become a serious and universal factor in the growth of the well-being of the world community. The completion in 1994 of the GATT Uruguay Round, which provides for a further significant reduction in tariffs and the spread of trade liberalization to service flows, the transformation of GATT into the World Trade Organization marked the entry of international trade to a qualitatively new frontier, an increase in the interdependence of the world economic system.

In the last decade, a significantly intensified process of internationalization of financial capital has developed in the same direction. This was especially evident in the intensification of international investment flows, which since 1995 have been growing faster than trade and production. This was the result of a significant change in the investment climate in the world. Democratization, political stabilization and economic liberalization in many regions have made them more attractive to foreign investors. On the other hand, there has been a psychological turning point in many developing countries, which have realized that attracting foreign capital is a springboard for development, facilitates access to international markets and access to the latest technologies. This, of course, required a partial renunciation of absolute economic sovereignty and meant increased competition for a number of domestic industries. But the examples of the "Asian tigers" and China have prompted most developing countries and states with economies in transition to join the competition to attract investment. In the mid-90s, the volume of foreign investment exceeded 2 trillion. dollars and continues to grow rapidly. Organizationally, this trend is reinforced by a noticeable increase in the activity of international banks, investment funds and stock exchanges. Another facet of this process is a significant expansion of the field of activity of transnational corporations, which today control about a third of the assets of all private companies in the world, and the volume of sales of their products is approaching the gross product of the US economy.

Undoubtedly, promoting the interests of domestic companies in the world market remains one of the main tasks of any state. With all the liberalization of international economic relations, interethnic contradictions, as often violent disputes between the United States and Japan over trade imbalances or with the European Union over its subsidization of agriculture, persist. But it is obvious that with the current degree of interdependence of the world economy, almost no state can oppose its selfish interests to the world community, since it risks becoming a global pariah or undermining the existing system with equally deplorable results not only for competitors, but also for its own economy.

The process of internationalization and strengthening of the interdependence of the world economic system proceeds in two planes - in the global and in the plane of regional integration. Theoretically, regional integration could spur interregional rivalry. But today this danger is limited to some new properties of the world economic system. First of all, the openness of new regional formations - they do not erect additional tariff barriers along their periphery, but remove them in relations between participants faster than tariffs are reduced globally within the WTO. This is an incentive for further, more radical reduction of barriers on a global scale, including between regional economic structures. In addition, some countries are members of several regional groupings. For example, the USA, Canada, Mexico are full members of both APEC and NAFTA. And the vast majority of transnational corporations simultaneously operate in the orbits of all existing regional organizations.

The new qualities of the world economic system - the rapid expansion of the market economy zone, the liberalization of national economies and their interaction through trade and international investment, the cosmopolitanization of an increasing number of subjects of the world economy - TNCs, banks, investment groups - have a serious impact on world politics, international relations. The world economy is becoming so interconnected and interdependent that the interests of all its active participants require the preservation of stability not only in the economic but also in the military-political sense. Some scholars who refer to the fact that a high degree of interaction in the European economy at the beginning of the 20th century. did not prevent unraveling. First World War, they ignore a qualitatively new level of interdependence of today's world economy and the cosmopolitanization of its significant segment, a radical change in the ratio of economic and military factors in world politics. But the most significant, including for the formation of a new system of international relations, is the fact that the process of creating a new world economic community interacts with democratic transformations of the socio-political field. In addition, recently the globalization of the world economy has increasingly played the role of a stabilizer in world politics and the security sphere. This influence is especially noticeable in the behavior of a number of authoritarian states and societies moving from authoritarianism to democracy. The large-scale and growing dependence of the economy, for example, China, a number of newly independent states on world markets, investments, technologies makes them adjust their positions on the political and military problems of international life.

Naturally, the global economic horizon is not cloudless. The main problem remains the gap between industrialized countries and a significant number of developing or economically stagnant countries. The processes of globalization cover primarily the community of developed countries. In recent years, the trend towards a progressive widening of this gap has intensified. According to many economists, a significant number of countries in Africa and a number of other states, such as Bangladesh, are “forever” behind. For a large group of emerging economies, in particular Latin America, their attempts to approach world leaders are nullified by huge external debt and the need to service it. A special case is presented by economies that are making the transition from a centrally planned system to a market model. Their entry into the world markets for goods, services, and capital is especially painful.

There are two opposing hypotheses regarding the impact of this gap, conventionally referred to as the gap between the new North and South, on world politics. Many internationalists see this long-term phenomenon as the main source of future conflicts and even attempts by the South to forcibly redistribute the economic welfare of the world. Indeed, the current serious lag behind the leading powers in terms of such indicators as the share of GDP in the world economy or per capita income will require, say, from Russia (which accounts for about 1.5% of the world gross product), India, Ukraine, several decades of development at rates several times higher than the world average in order to approach the level of the United States, Japan, Germany and keep up with China. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that today's leading countries will not stand still. Similarly, it is difficult to assume that in the foreseeable future any new regional economic grouping - the CIS or, say, emerging in South America- will be able to approach the EU, APEC, NAFTA, each of which accounts for over 20% of the gross world product, world trade and finance.

According to another point of view, the internationalization of the world economy, the weakening of the charge of economic nationalism, the fact that the economic interaction of states is no longer a zero-sum game, give hope that the economic divide between North and South will not turn into a new source of global confrontation, especially in a situation where, although lagging behind the North in absolute terms, the South will nevertheless develop, increasing its well-being. Here, the analogy with the modus vivendi between large and medium-sized companies within national economies is probably appropriate: medium-sized companies do not necessarily antagonistically clash with leading corporations and seek to close the gap between them by any means. Much depends on the organizational and legal environment in which the business operates, in this case the global one.

The combination of liberalization and globalization of the world economy, along with obvious benefits, also carries hidden threats. The goal of competition between corporations and financial institutions is profit, not the preservation of the stability of the market economy. Liberalization reduces restrictions on competition, while globalization expands its scope. As shown by the recent financial crisis in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Russia, which affected the markets of the whole world, the new state of the world economy means the globalization of not only positive, but also negative trends. Understanding this makes the world financial institutions save the economic systems of South Korea, Hong Kong, Brazil, Indonesia, and Russia. But these one-time transactions only underline the continuing contradiction between the benefits of liberal globalism and the cost of maintaining the stability of the world economy. Apparently, the globalization of risks will require the globalization of their management, the improvement of such structures as the WTO, the IMF and the group of seven leading industrial powers. It is also obvious that the growing cosmopolitan sector of the global economy is less accountable to the world community than national economies are to states.

Be that as it may, the new stage of world politics definitely brings its economic component to the fore. Thus, it can be assumed that the unification of a greater Europe is ultimately hindered, rather, not by conflicts of interests in the military-political field, but by a serious economic gap between the EU, on the one hand, and the post-communist countries, on the other. Similarly, the main logic of the development of international relations, for example, in the Asia-Pacific region is dictated not so much by considerations of military security as by economic challenges and opportunities. Over the past years, such international economic institutions as the G7, the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, the governing bodies of the EU, APEC, NAFTA, are clearly compared in terms of their influence on world politics with the Security Council, the UN General Assembly, regional political organizations, military alliances and often exceed them. Thus, the economization of world politics and the formation of a new quality of the world economy are becoming another main parameter of the system of international relations that is being formed today.

New parameters of military security

No matter how paradoxical, at first glance, the assumption about the development of a trend towards the demilitarization of the world community in the light of the recent dramatic conflict in the Balkans, tension in the Persian Gulf, the instability of the regimes for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it nevertheless has grounds for serious consideration in the long term. .

The end of the Cold War coincided with a radical change in the place and role of the military security factor in world politics. In the late 1980s and 1990s, there was a massive reduction in the global potential for Cold War military confrontation. Since the second half of the 1980s, global defense spending has been steadily declining. Within the framework of international treaties and in the form of unilateral initiatives, an unprecedented reduction in history of nuclear missile and conventional weapons and personnel of the armed forces is being carried out. The significant redeployment of the armed forces to national territories, the development of confidence-building measures and positive cooperation in the military field contributed to the decrease in the level of military confrontation. A large part of the world's military-industrial complex is being converted. The parallel intensification of limited conflicts on the periphery of the central military confrontation of the Cold War, for all their drama and "surprise" against the backdrop of peaceful euphoria, characteristic of the late 1980s, cannot be compared in scale and consequences with the leading trend in the demilitarization of world politics.

The development of this trend has several fundamental reasons. The prevailing democratic monotype of the world community, as well as the internationalization of the world economy, reduce the nutritional political and economic environment of the global institution of war. An equally important factor is the revolutionary significance of character, irrefutably proven throughout the course of the Cold War nuclear weapons.

The creation of nuclear weapons meant in a broad sense the disappearance of the possibility of victory for any of the parties, which throughout the entire previous history of mankind was an indispensable condition for waging wars. Back in 1946. The American scientist B. Brody drew attention to this qualitative characteristic of nuclear weapons and expressed his firm conviction that in the future its only task and function would be to deter war. Some time later this axiom was confirmed by A.D. Sakharov. Throughout the Cold War, both the US and the USSR tried to find ways around this revolutionary reality. Both sides made active attempts to get out of the nuclear stalemate by building up and improving nuclear missile potentials, developing sophisticated strategies for its use, and finally, approaches to creating anti-missile systems. Fifty years later, having created about 25 thousand strategic nuclear warheads alone, the nuclear powers came to the inevitable conclusion: the use of nuclear weapons means not only the destruction of the enemy, but also guaranteed suicide. Moreover, the prospect of a nuclear escalation has sharply limited the ability of the opposing sides to use conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons made the Cold War a kind of " forced peace» between nuclear powers.

The experience of nuclear confrontation during the Cold War years, the radical reductions in the US and Russian nuclear missile arsenals in accordance with the START-1 and START-2 treaties, the renunciation of nuclear weapons by Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine, the agreement in principle between the Russian Federation and the United States on further deeper reductions in nuclear charges and their means of delivery, the restraint of Great Britain, France and China in the development of their national nuclear potentials allow us to conclude that the leading powers recognize, in principle, the futility of nuclear weapons as a means of achieving victory or an effective means of influencing world politics. Although today it is difficult to imagine a situation where one of the powers could use nuclear weapons, the possibility of using them as a last resort or as a result of a mistake still remains. In addition, the retention of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, even in the process of radical reductions, increases the "negative significance" of the state possessing them. For example, fears (regardless of their justification) regarding the safety of nuclear materials on the territory of the former Soviet Union further increase the attention of the world community to its successors, including the Russian Federation.

On the path of universal nuclear disarmament faces several fundamental obstacles. The complete renunciation of nuclear weapons also means the disappearance of their main function - the deterrence of war, including conventional war. In addition, a number of powers, such as Russia or China, may consider the presence of nuclear weapons as a temporary compensation for the relative weakness of their conventional weapons capabilities, and, together with Britain and France, as a political symbol of great power. Finally, the fact that even minimal nuclear weapons potentials can serve effective tool deterrence of war, have also been adopted by other countries, especially those in a state of local cold wars with their neighbors, for example, Israel, India, Pakistan.

The testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in the spring of 1998 reinforces the stalemate in the confrontation between these countries. It can be assumed that the legalization of the nuclear status by long-standing rivals will force them to more energetically seek ways to resolve the long-standing conflict in principle. On the other hand, the not quite adequate reaction of the world community to such a blow to the non-proliferation regime may give rise to a temptation for other “threshold” states to follow the example of Delhi and Islamabad. And this will lead to a domino effect, whereby the likelihood of an unauthorized or irrational detonation of a nuclear weapon may outweigh its deterrent capabilities.

Some dictatorial regimes, taking into account the results of the wars for the Falklands, in the Persian Gulf, in the Balkans, not only realized the futility of confrontation with the leading powers, which have a qualitative superiority in the field of conventional weapons, but also came to the understanding that the possession of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, two medium-term tasks are really coming to the fore in the nuclear sphere - strengthening the system of non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and, at the same time, determining the functional parameters and the minimum sufficient size of the nuclear potentials of the powers possessing them.

Tasks in the field of preserving and strengthening non-proliferation regimes today are pushing aside in terms of priority the classic problem of reducing strategic arms of the Russian Federation and the United States. The long-term task remains to continue to clarify the expediency and search for ways to move towards a nuclear-free world in the context of a new world policy.

The dialectical link connecting the regimes of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile means of their delivery, on the one hand, with the control over strategic arms of "traditional" nuclear powers, on the other, is the problem of anti-missile defense and the fate of the ABM Treaty. The prospect of creating nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as medium-range missiles, and in the near future intercontinental missiles by a number of states, puts the problem of protection against such a danger at the center of strategic thinking. The United States has already outlined its preferred solution - the creation of a "thin" anti-missile defense of the country, as well as regional theater anti-missile systems, in particular, in the Asia-Pacific region - against North Korean missiles, and in the Middle East - against Iranian missiles. Such anti-missile capabilities, deployed unilaterally, would devalue the nuclear and missile deterrence potentials of the Russian Federation and China, which could lead to the latter's desire to compensate for the change in the strategic balance by building up their own missile and nuclear capabilities. nuclear weapons with the inevitable destabilization of the global strategic situation.

Another topical problem is the phenomenon of local conflicts. The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a noticeable intensification of local conflicts. Most of them were rather domestic than international, in the sense that the contradictions that caused them were related to separatism, the struggle for power or territory within one state. Most of the conflicts were the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, the aggravation of national-ethnic contradictions, the manifestation of which was previously restrained by authoritarian systems or the bloc discipline of the Cold War. Other conflicts, such as in Africa, were the result of weakening statehood and economic ruin. The third category is long-term "traditional" conflicts in the Middle East, in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, around Kashmir, which survived the end of the Cold War, or flared up again, as happened in Cambodia.

With all the drama of local conflicts at the turn of the 80s - 90s, over time, the severity of most of them subsided somewhat, as, for example, in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and finally in Tajikistan . This is partly due to the gradual realization by the conflicting parties of the high cost and futility of a military solution to problems, and in many cases this trend was reinforced by peace enforcement (this was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Transnistria), other peacekeeping efforts with the participation of international organizations - the UN, OSCE, CIS. True, in several cases, for example, in Somalia and Afghanistan, such efforts have not yielded the desired results. This trend is reinforced by significant moves towards a peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, and between Pretoria and the "front-line states". The respective conflicts served nutrient medium instability in the Middle East and South Africa.

On the whole, the global picture of local armed conflicts is also changing. In 1989 there were 36 major conflicts in 32 districts, and in 1995 there were 30 such conflicts in 25 districts. Some of them, such as the mutual extermination of the Tutsi and Hutu peoples in East Africa, take on the character of genocide. A real assessment of the scale and dynamics of the "new" conflicts is hampered by their emotional perception. They broke out in those regions that were considered (without sufficient reason) to be traditionally stable. In addition, they arose at a time when the world community believed in the absence of conflict in world politics after the end of the Cold War. An impartial comparison of the “new” conflicts with the “old” ones that raged during the Cold War in Asia, Africa, Central America, the Near and Middle East, despite the scale of the latest conflict in the Balkans, allows us to draw a more balanced conclusion about the long-term trend.

More relevant today are armed operations that are undertaken under the leadership of leading Western countries, primarily the United States, against countries that are considered to violate international law, democratic or humanitarian norms. The most illustrative examples are operations against Iraq to stop aggression against Kuwait, enforcement of peace at the final stage of the internal conflict in Bosnia, and the restoration of law in Haiti and Somalia. These operations were carried out with the sanction of the UN Security Council. A special place is occupied by a large-scale military operation undertaken by NATO unilaterally without agreement with the UN against Yugoslavia in connection with the situation in which the Albanian population found itself in Kosovo. The significance of the latter lies in the fact that it calls into question the principles of the global political and legal regime, as it was enshrined in the UN Charter.

The global reduction in military arsenals more clearly marked the qualitative gap in armaments between the leading military powers and the rest of the world. The Falklands conflict at the end of the Cold War, and then the Gulf War and operations in Bosnia and Serbia, clearly demonstrated this gap. Progress in miniaturization and increasing the ability to destroy conventional warheads, improvement of guidance, control, command and reconnaissance systems, means of electronic warfare, and increased mobility are justifiably considered the decisive factors of modern warfare. In Cold War terms, the balance of military power between North and South has shifted further in favor of the former.

Undoubtedly, against this background, the growing material capabilities of the United States to influence the development of the situation in the field of military security in most regions of the world. Abstracting from the nuclear factor, we can say: financial capabilities, high quality of weapons, the ability to quickly transfer large contingents of troops and weapons arsenals over long distances, a powerful presence in the oceans, the preservation of the main infrastructure of bases and military alliances - all this has turned the United States into a militarily the only global power. The fragmentation of the military potential of the USSR during its collapse, a deep and prolonged economic crisis that painfully affected the army and the military-industrial complex, the slow pace of reforming the weapons forces, the virtual absence of reliable allies limited the military capabilities of the Russian Federation to the Eurasian space. The systematic, long-term modernization of China's armed forces suggests a serious increase in its ability to project military power in the Asia-Pacific region in the future. Despite attempts by some Western European countries to play a more active military role outside NATO's area of ​​responsibility, as was the case during the Gulf War or during peacekeeping operations in Africa, the Balkans, and as proclaimed for the future in the new NATO strategic doctrine, the parameters The military potential of Western Europe proper, without American participation, remains largely regional. All other countries of the world, for various reasons, can only count on the fact that the military potential of each of them will be one of the regional factors.

The new situation in the field of global military security is generally determined by the trend towards limiting the use of war in the classical sense. But at the same time, new forms of the use of force are emerging, such as "operation for humanitarian reasons." In combination with changes in the socio-political and economic fields, such processes in the military sphere have a serious impact on the formation of a new system of international relations.

Cosmopolitanization of world politics

The change in the traditional Westphalian system of international relations today affects not only the content of world politics, but also the range of its subjects. If for three and a half centuries states have been the dominant participants in international relations, and world politics is mainly interstate politics, then in recent years they have been crowded out by transnational companies, international private financial institutions, non-governmental public organizations that do not have a specific nationality, are largely cosmopolitan.

Economic giants, which were previously easily attributed to the economic structures of a particular country, have lost this link, since their financial capital is transnational, managers are representatives of different nationalities, enterprises, headquarters and marketing systems are often located on different continents. Many of them can raise not the national flag, but only their own corporate flag on the flagpole. To a greater or lesser extent, the process of cosmopolitanization, or "offshorization", has affected all the major corporations in the world. Accordingly, their patriotism in relation to a particular state has decreased. The behavior of the transnational community of global financial centers is often as influential as the decisions of the IMF, the G7.

Today, the international non-governmental organization Greenpeace effectively fulfills the role of the “global environmental policeman” and often sets priorities in this area that most states are forced to accept. Public organization Amnesty International has much more influence than the UN interstate center for human rights. The television company CNN has abandoned the use of the term "foreign" in its broadcasts, since most of the world's countries are "domestic" for it. The authority of world churches and religious associations is expanding and growing significantly. An increasing number of people are born in one country, have the citizenship of another, and live and work in a third. It is often easier for a person to communicate via the Internet with people living on other continents than with housemates. Cosmopolitanization has also affected the worst part of the human community - organizations of international terrorism, crime, drug mafia do not know the fatherland, and their influence on world affairs remains at an all-time high level.

All this undermines one of the most important foundations of the Westphalian system - sovereignty, the right of the state to act as the supreme judge within national borders and the sole representative of the nation in international affairs. The voluntary transfer of a part of sovereignty to interstate institutions in the process of regional integration or within the framework of such international organizations as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, etc., has been supplemented in recent years by the spontaneous process of its “diffusion” on a global scale.

There is a point of view according to which the international community is reaching a higher level of world politics, with a long-term perspective of the formation of the United States of the World. Or, to put it modern language, is moving towards a system similar in spontaneous and democratic principles of construction and operation to the Internet. Obviously, this is too fantastic a forecast. The European Union should probably be considered as a prototype of the future system of world politics. Be that as it may, it can be asserted with full confidence that the globalization of world politics, the growth of the share of the cosmopolitan component in it in the near future will require states to seriously reconsider their place and role in the activities of the world community.

Increasing the transparency of borders, strengthening the intensification of transnational communication, the technological capabilities of the information revolution lead to the globalization of processes in the spiritual sphere of the life of the world community. Globalization in other areas has led to a certain erasure national characteristics everyday look life, tastes, fashion. The new quality of international political and economic processes, the situation in the field of military security opens up additional opportunities and stimulates the search for a new quality of life in the spiritual realm as well. Already today, with rare exceptions, the doctrine of the priority of human rights over national sovereignty can be considered universal. The end of the global ideological struggle between capitalism and communism made it possible to take a fresh look at the spiritual values ​​that dominate the world, the relationship between the rights of an individual and the welfare of society, national and global ideas. Recently, criticism has been growing in the West negative traits consumer society, a culture of hedonism, a search is being made for ways to combine individualism and a new model of moral revival. The directions of the search for a new morality of the world community are evidenced, for example, by the call of the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, to revive “a natural, unique and inimitable sense of the world, an elementary sense of justice, the ability to understand things in the same way as others, a sense of increased responsibility, wisdom, good taste, courage, compassion and faith in the importance of simple actions that do not pretend to be the universal key to salvation.

The tasks of the moral renaissance are among the first on the agenda of world churches, the policies of a number of leading states. Of great importance is the result of the search for a new national idea that combines specific and universal values, a process that goes on, in essence, in all post-communist societies. There are suggestions that in the XXI century. the ability of a state to ensure the spiritual flourishing of its society will be no less important for determining its place and role in the world community than material well-being and military power.

Globalization and cosmopolitanization of the world community are determined not only by the opportunities associated with new processes in its life, but also by the challenges of recent decades. First of all, we are talking about such planetary tasks as the protection of the world ecological system, the regulation of global migration flows, the tension that periodically arises in connection with population growth and the limited natural resources of the globe. Obviously - and this has been confirmed by practice - that the solution of such problems requires a planetary approach adequate to their scale, mobilization of efforts not only of national governments, but also of non-state transnational organizations of the world community.

Summing up, we can say that the process of forming a single world community, a global wave of democratization, a new quality of the world economy, radical demilitarization and a change in the vector of the use of force, the emergence of new, non-state, subjects of world politics, the internationalization of the spiritual sphere of human life and challenges to the world community give grounds for the assumption of the formation of a new system of international relations, different not only from the one that existed during the Cold War, but in many respects from the traditional Westphalian system. To all appearances, it was not the end of the Cold War that gave rise to new trends in world politics; it only strengthened them. Rather, it was the new, transcendental processes in the field of politics, economics, security, and the spiritual sphere that emerged during the Cold War that blew up the old system of international relations and are shaping its new quality.

In the world science of international relations, there is currently no unity regarding the essence and driving forces of the new system of international relations. This, apparently, is explained by the fact that today's world politics is characterized by a clash of traditional and new, hitherto unknown factors. Nationalism fights against internationalism, geopolitics - against global universalism. Such fundamental concepts as "power", "influence", "national interests" are being transformed. The range of subjects of international relations is expanding and the motivation for their behavior is changing. The new content of world politics requires new organizational forms. It is still premature to speak of the birth of a new system of international relations as a completed process. It is perhaps more realistic to talk about the main trends in the formation of the future world order, its growth out of the former system of international relations.

As with any analysis, in this case it is important to observe the measure in assessing the relationship between the traditional and the newly emerging. Roll in any direction distorts the perspective. Nevertheless, even a somewhat exaggerated emphasis on new trends in the future that is being formed today is now methodologically more justified than fixation on attempts to explain emerging unknown phenomena exclusively with the help of traditional concepts. There is no doubt that the stage of a fundamental demarcation between new and old approaches must be followed by a stage of synthesis of the new and the unchanged in modern international life. It is important to correctly determine the ratio of national and global factors, the new place of the state in the world community, to balance such traditional categories as geopolitics, nationalism, power, national interests, with new transnational processes and regimes. States that have correctly determined the long-term perspective of the formation of a new system of international relations can count on greater effectiveness of their efforts, and those who continue to act on the basis of traditional ideas risk being at the tail end of world progress.

Gadzhiev K. S. Introduction to geopolitics. - M., 1997.

Global social and political changes in the world. Materials of the Russian-American seminar (Moscow, October 23 - 24 / Editor-in-chief A. Yu. Melville. - M., 1997.

Kennedy P. Entering the twenty-first century. - M., 1997.

Kissinger G. Diplomacy. - M., 1997. Pozdnyakov E. A. Geopolitics. - M., 1995.

Huntington S. Clash of Civilizations // Polis. - 1994. - No. 1.

V.Yu. Peskov

postgraduate student of the Department of International Relations, World Economy and International Law, PSLU

V.V. Degoev Doctor of Historical Sciences, MGIMO (U)

Main trends in modern international relations

Until now, we have considered politics within the boundaries of nation-states, where individuals, social groups (classes, layers), parties, movements pursuing individual and group interests acted as its subjects. However, the independent states themselves do not develop in a vacuum, they interact with each other and act as subjects of a higher-level policy - international.

If at the beginning of the XX century. there were only 52 independent states in the world, then by the middle of the century there were already 82, and today their number exceeds 200. All these states and the peoples inhabiting them interact in various spheres of human life. States are not isolated, they must build relationships with their neighbors. The relations that develop between states are usually called international. International relations are a set of economic, political, ideological, legal, military, informational, diplomatic and other ties and relationships between states and systems of states, between the main social, economic and political forces, organizations and movements on the world stage.

International politics is the core of international relations. It represents the political activity of the subjects of international law (states, etc.) associated with the resolution of issues of war and peace, ensuring issues of general security, protection environment overcoming backwardness and poverty, hunger and disease.

1 R8y [email protected] STEPS

Thus, international politics is aimed at solving the issues of survival and progress of human society, developing mechanisms for coordinating the interests of the subjects of world politics, preventing and resolving global and regional conflicts, and creating a just world order. It is an important factor of stability and peace, development of equality in international relations.

Political scientists distinguish 4 groups of subjects of international relations:

1. Nation states. These are the main subjects of foreign policy activity. They enter into various relationships with each other at the global and regional levels.

2. Interstate associations. This includes coalitions of states, military-political blocs (for example, NATO), integrated organizations (for example, the European Union), political associations (for example, the League of Arab States, the Association of American States). These associations on an interstate basis play an extremely important role in modern politics.

3. Interstate governmental organizations. This is a special type of association, which includes representatives of most countries of the world with often divergent political interests. Such organizations are created to discuss problems of general importance and to coordinate the activities of the world community (for example, the UN).

4. Non-government / non-government international organizations and movement. They are active subjects of world politics. These include international associations political parties, professional associations (for example, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), associations of youth, students, pacifist movements (for example, the Peace Movement).

Relations between states can take various forms: allied relations, when states are partners, actively

cooperate in various fields and enter into alliances; neutral relations, when business contacts are established between states, but they do not result in allied relations; conflict relations, when states come up with territorial and / or other claims against each other and take active steps to satisfy them.

In the mid 1970s. XX century in Helsinki in the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Currently, this international structure is called the OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) formulated the basic principles of modern international relations: the sovereign equality of states; inviolability of established boundaries; non-use of force or threat of force in interstate relations; territorial integrity of states; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equality and the right of peoples to control their own destiny; cooperation between States and the faithful fulfillment by States of their obligations under international law.

Modern international relations are built on a bilateral or multilateral basis, are global or regional in nature.

Previously, in the theory of international relations, the concept of "foreign policy" was used to denote interaction between sovereign states. Foreign policy is the general course of the state in international affairs. The foreign policy activity of states is a kind of means of their adaptation to specific external conditions. These conditions do not depend on the will, desires and intentions of an individual state and do not always correspond to its interests and motivational guidelines. Therefore, states in the process of implementing their foreign policy function have to adjust their

needs, goals and interests determined by their internal development, with objective conditions in the system.

The main objectives of foreign policy are: ensuring the security of this state; striving to increase the material, political, military, intellectual and other potential of the country; the growth of its prestige in international relations.

In addition, the goal and result of the interaction of members of the world community is the coordination of efforts to establish mutually beneficial ties between the subjects of world politics.

There are many theories of foreign policy. Of the specific foreign policy theories, the most famous is the theory of the American political scientist G. Morgenthau. He defines foreign policy primarily as a policy of force, in which national interests rise above any international norms and principles, and therefore force (foreign, economic, financial) becomes the main means of achieving the set goals. From this follows his formula: "The goals of foreign policy must be determined in the spirit of national interests and supported by force."

To the question "Is there a relationship between foreign and domestic policy?" one can find at least three points of view on this problem. The first point of view identifies domestic and foreign policy. G. Morgenthau, a professor at the University of Chicago, believed that “the essence of international politics is identical to domestic politics. Both domestic and foreign policy is a struggle for power, which is modified only by various conditions that develop in the domestic and international spheres.

The second point of view is represented by the works of the Austrian sociologist L. Gumplovich, who believed that foreign policy determines domestic policy. Based on the fact that the struggle for existence is the main factor social life, L. Gumplovich formulated a system of laws

international politics. The main law: neighboring states are constantly fighting with each other because of the border line. Secondary ones follow from the main law. One of them is this: any state must prevent the strengthening of the power of its neighbor and take care of the political balance; in addition, any state strives for profitable acquisitions, for example, to gain access to the sea as a means of acquiring maritime power. Finally, the third law: domestic policy must be subordinated to the goals of building up military power, with the help of which resources are provided for the survival of the state. Such, according to L. Gumpilovich, are the basic laws of international politics.

The third point of view is represented by Marxism, which believes that foreign policy is determined by domestic and is a continuation of intra-social relations. The content of the latter is due to the economic relations prevailing in society and the interests of the ruling classes.

Relations between states in the international arena have never been equal. The role of each state was determined by its economic, technological, military, information capabilities. These possibilities determined the nature of relations between states and, consequently, the type of system of international relations. The typology of international relations is of practical importance, since it makes it possible to identify those global factors that influenced the development of both the world community and a particular country.

In the world, integration processes are becoming increasingly important, which are manifested in the creation of international interstate organizations (such as the UN, NATO, ILO, WHO, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, SCO, etc.), confederations (the European Union, strengthening its position Russia and Belarus). The largest confederation of states in modern times is the European Union (EU). This

confederations of states: 1) the formation of a close union of the peoples of Europe, the promotion of economic growth by creating a space without internal borders, the creation of a single currency; 2) conducting a joint foreign and security policy; 3) development of cooperation in the field of justice (creation and signing of the European Constitution, etc.) and internal affairs, etc. The EU bodies are: 1) the European Council; 2) European Parliament; 3) Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers); 4) European Commission; 5) European Court.

Today, the EU is no longer just a group of countries united in a customs union or a common market - it is incomparably more. Being the undisputed leader of not only European, but also world integration, he lays down the main trends in the functioning of world politics. This, in turn, leads to closer political, economic, scientific and cultural ties between participating countries. In the modern international system, the Russian Federation and the EU act as independent and at the same time actively interacting agents of the global political process, the foundation of which is the basic principles of international law and the UN Charter. The partnership between Russia and the EU was legally formalized in 1994 by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force on December 1, 1997. Russia-EU summits are periodically held to discuss topical issues international politics and economic cooperation.

The current situation in the world, connected with the crisis of the neoliberal scenario of globalization, which was based on the idea of ​​sole domination of the US international policy, required the Russian Federation to develop new principles on which its foreign policy will be built. These principles-positions were once announced by D.A. Medvedev. Let's call them:

The first position is international law. Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law that determine relations between civilized peoples.

The second position is that the world should be multipolar. Medvedev considers unipolarity unacceptable. Russia "cannot accept such a world order in which all decisions are made by one country, even one as serious as the United States," the president said. He believes that "such a world is unstable and threatens with conflicts."

The third position is that Russia does not want a confrontation with any country. “Russia is not going to isolate itself,” Medvedev said. “We will develop as much as possible our friendly relations with Europe and the US and other countries of the world.”

The fourth position, which D. Medvedev called the unconditional priority of the country's foreign policy, is the protection of the life and dignity of Russian citizens, "wherever they are." “We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad,” the President stressed. “And it should be clear to everyone that everyone who commits aggression will receive an answer.”

The fifth position is Russia's interests in its friendly regions. “Russia, like other countries of the world, has regions in which there are privileged interests,” Medvedev explained. “These regions are countries with which friendly relations are connected.” And Russia, according to the president, will "work very carefully in these regions." Medvedev clarified that this is not only about the border states.

The American sociologist L. Kerbo argues that it is impossible to understand any modern society without finding out its place in the world system, which is influenced by economic growth, urbanization, and demography.

The world system can be viewed as a set of relations between states, similar to the relations between groups in society. E. Giddens defines world system as a social system

global scale, linking all societies into a single global social order.

One of the theories of the world system was developed by I. Wallerstein. The world system is based on economic relations. In the modern world, all states are interconnected. But the economic roles of each state are different both in specialization and in the degree of influence. In a sense, the world is an international system of stratification "from the class position" of each state according to the degree of wealth and power. Similarly, there will be a class struggle in the world struggle: some want to hold their positions, others want to change.

In this regard, the following types of states with their inherent characteristic features can be distinguished:

Center: economically developed, with broad specialization. A complex professional structure with a skilled workforce. They influence others, but they themselves are independent.

Periphery: focused on the extraction and export of raw materials. International corporations use unskilled labor. Weaker state institutions, unable to control the internal and external situation. Reliance on the army, the secret police to maintain social order.

Semi-periphery: states develop industry in a broad sense, but lag far behind the center. In other respects, they also occupy an intermediate position.

Center states, according to Western researchers, have the following advantages: wide access to raw materials; cheap labor; high returns on direct investment; market for export; skilled labor force through migration to the center.

If we talk about the connections of these three types of states, then the center has more connections than other states; periphery tied

only with the center; the semi-periphery is connected to the center and other semi-peripheral countries, but not to the peripheral ones.

According to Sh. Kumon, the 21st century will be marked by the information revolution. Potential conflicts will arise over the control of communications. The world-system will be characterized by the following trends: along with the growth of the influence of local government, global system requiring the management of transport, communications, trade, etc.; the development of a common world economy will lead to a weakening of market mechanisms; the role will grow common system knowledge and culture.

Peskov V.Yu., Degoev V.V. The main trends of modern international relations. The article deals with the problem of development vectors of the global political process.

Key words: international relations, world politics, foreign policy. Peskov V.U., Degoev M.M. The main trends of modern international relations. The problem of vectors of world politics.

Keywords: international relations, world politics, foreign policy.

Since ancient times, international relations have been one of the important aspects of the life of any country, society and even an individual. The formation and development of individual states, the emergence of borders, the formation of various spheres of human life has led to the emergence of numerous interactions that are implemented both between countries and with interstate unions and other organizations.

In modern conditions of globalization, when almost all states are involved in a network of such interactions that affect not only the economy, production, consumption, but also culture, values ​​and ideals, the role of international relations is overestimated and becomes more and more significant. There is a need to consider the question of what these international relations are, how they develop, what role the state plays in these processes.

The origins of the concept

The appearance of the term "international relations" is associated with the formation of the state as a sovereign entity. The formation of a system of independent powers in Europe at the end of the 18th century led to a decrease in the authority of reigning monarchies and dynasties. A new subject of relations appears on the world stage - the nation state. The conceptual basis for the creation of the latter is the category of sovereignty, formed by Jean Bodin in the middle of the 16th century. The thinker saw the future of the state in separating it from the claims of the church and provided the monarch with all the fullness and indivisibility of power on the territory of the country, as well as its independence from other powers. In the middle of the 17th century, the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, which consolidated the established doctrine of sovereign powers.

By the end of the 18th century, the western part of Europe was an established system of nation-states. Interactions between them as between peoples-nations received the appropriate name - international relations. This category was first introduced into scientific circulation by the English scientist J. Bentham. His vision of the world order was far ahead of its time. Even then, the theory developed by the philosopher assumed the abandonment of colonies, the creation of international judicial bodies and an army.

The emergence and development of the theory

Researchers note that the theory of international relations is contradictory: on the one hand, it is very old, and on the other, it is young. This is explained by the fact that the origins of the emergence of studies of international relations are associated with the emergence of states and peoples. Already in ancient times, thinkers considered the problems of wars and ensuring order, peaceful relations between countries. At the same time, as a separate systematized branch of knowledge, the theory of international relations took shape relatively recently - in the middle of the last century. In the post-war years, a reassessment of the world legal order takes place, attempts are made to create conditions for peaceful interaction between countries, international organizations and unions of states are formed.

The development of new types of interactions, the emergence of new subjects in the international arena led to the need to single out the subject of science that studies international relations, freeing itself from the influence of such related disciplines as law and sociology. The sectoral variety of the latter is being formed to this day, studying certain aspects of international interactions.

Basic paradigms

Speaking about the theory of international relations, it is necessary to turn to the works of researchers who devoted their work to considering relations between powers, trying to find the foundations of the world order. Since the theory of international relations took shape as an independent discipline relatively recently, it should be noted that its theoretical provisions developed in line with philosophy, political science, sociology, law and other sciences.

Russian scientists identify three main paradigms in the classical theory of international relations.

1. Traditional, or classical, the ancestor of which is considered the ancient Greek thinker Thucydides. The historian, considering the causes of wars, comes to the conclusion that the main regulator of relations between countries is the factor of force. States, being independent, are not bound by any specific obligations and can use force to achieve their goals. This direction was developed in their works by other scientists, including N. Machiavelli, T. Hobbes, E. de Vattel and others.
2. Idealistic, the provisions of which are presented in the works of I. Kant, G. Grotius, F. de Vittoria and others. The emergence of this trend was preceded by the development of Christianity and Stoicism in Europe. The idealistic vision of international relations is based on the idea of ​​the unity of the entire human race and the inalienable rights of the individual. Human rights, according to thinkers, are a priority in relation to the state, and the unity of mankind leads to the secondary nature of the very idea of ​​a sovereign power, which in these conditions loses its original meaning.
3. The Marxist interpretation of relations between countries proceeded from the idea of ​​the exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie and the struggle between these classes, which would lead to unity within each and the formation of a world society. Under these conditions, the concept of a sovereign state also becomes secondary, since national isolation will gradually disappear with the development of the world market, free trade and other factors.

IN modern theory international relations, other concepts have appeared that develop the provisions of the presented paradigms.

History of international relations

Scientists associate its beginning with the appearance of the first signs of statehood. The first international relations are those that developed between the most ancient states and tribes. In history, you can find many such examples: Byzantium and Slavic tribes, the Roman Empire and German communities.

In the Middle Ages, a feature of international relations was that they did not develop between states, as is the case today. Their initiators were, as a rule, influential persons of the then powers: emperors, princes, representatives of various dynasties. They concluded agreements, assumed obligations, unleashed military conflicts, replacing the interests of the country with their own, identifying themselves with the state as such.

As society developed, so did the features of interactions. The turning point in the history of international relations is the emergence of the concept of sovereignty and the development of the nation state in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. During this period, a qualitatively different type of relations between countries was formed, which has survived to this day.

concept

The modern definition of what constitutes international relations is complicated by the multitude of connections and spheres of interaction in which they are implemented. An additional obstacle is the fragility of the division of relations into domestic and international. Quite common is the approach, which at the heart of the definition contains subjects that implement international interactions. Textbooks define international relations as a certain set of various connections-relationships both between states and between other entities operating on the world stage. Today, in addition to states, their number began to include organizations, associations, social movements, social groups, etc.

The most promising approach to the definition seems to be the selection of criteria that make it possible to distinguish this type of relationship from any others.

Features of international relations

Understanding what international relations are, understanding their nature will allow consideration of the characteristic features of these interactions.

1. The complexity of this kind of relationship is determined by their spontaneous nature. The number of participants in these relationships is constantly growing, new subjects are being included, which makes it difficult to predict changes.
2. Recently, the position of the subjective factor has strengthened, which is reflected in the growing role of the political component.
3. Inclusion in relations of various spheres of life, as well as the expansion of the circle of political participants: from individual leaders to organizations and movements.
4. The absence of a single center of influence due to the many independent and equal participants in the relationship.

All the variety of international relations is usually classified on the basis of various criteria, including:

• spheres: economics, culture, politics, ideology, etc.;
• intensity level: high or low;
• in terms of tension: stable/unstable;
• geopolitical criterion for their implementation: global, regional, sub-regional.

On the basis of the above criteria, the concept under consideration can be designated as a special type of social relations that goes beyond the framework of any territorial entity or intra-social interactions that have developed on it. Such a formulation of the question requires a clarification of how international politics and international relations are related.

Relationship between politics and international relations

Before deciding on the relationship between these concepts, we note that the term "international politics" is also difficult to define and is a kind of abstract category that allows us to single out their political component in relations.

Speaking about the interaction of countries in the international arena, people often use the concept of "world politics". It is an active component that allows you to influence international relations. If we compare world and international politics, then the first one is much wider in scope and is characterized by the presence of participants at various levels: from the state to international organizations, unions and individual influential entities. While the interaction between states is more accurately revealed with the help of such categories as international politics and international relations.

Formation of the system of international relations

At different stages of the development of the world community, certain interactions develop between its participants. The main subjects of these relations are several leading powers and international organizations capable of influencing other participants. The organized form of such interactions is the system of international relations. Its goals include:

• ensuring stability in the world;
• cooperation in solving world problems in various fields of activity;
• creating conditions for the development of other participants in relations, ensuring their security and maintaining integrity.

The first system of international relations was formed back in the middle of the 17th century (Westphalian), its appearance was due to the development of the doctrine of sovereignty and the emergence of nation-states. It lasted three and a half centuries. Throughout this period, the main subject of relations in the international arena is the state.

In the heyday of the Westphalian system, interactions between countries are formed on the basis of rivalry, the struggle to expand spheres of influence and increase power. The regulation of international relations is implemented on the basis of international law.

A feature of the twentieth century was the rapid development of sovereign states and the change in the system of international relations, which underwent a radical restructuring three times. It should be noted that none of the previous centuries can boast of such radical changes.

The last century brought two world wars. The first led to the creation of the Versailles system, which, having destroyed the balance in Europe, clearly marked two antagonistic camps: the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.

The second led to the formation of a new system, called the Yalta-Potsdam. During this period, the split between imperialism and socialism intensifies, opposing centers are identified: the USSR and the USA, which divide the world into two opposing camps. The period of existence of this system was also marked by the collapse of the colonies and the emergence of the so-called "third world" states.

The role of the state in the new system of relations

The modern period of development of the world order is characterized by the fact that a new system is being formed, the predecessor of which collapsed at the end of the 20th century as a result of the collapse of the USSR and a series of Eastern European velvet revolutions.

According to scientists, the formation of the third system and the development of international relations have not yet ended. This is evidenced not only by the fact that today the balance of forces in the world has not been determined, but also by the fact that new principles of interaction between countries have not been worked out. The emergence of new political forces in the form of organizations and movements, the unification of powers, international conflicts and wars allow us to conclude that a complex and painful process of forming norms and principles is now underway, in accordance with which a new system of international relations will be built.

Special attention of researchers is drawn to such a question as the state in international relations. Scientists emphasize that today the doctrine of sovereignty is being seriously tested, since the state has largely lost its independence. Strengthening these threats is the process of globalization, which makes the borders more and more transparent, and the economy and production more and more dependent.

But at the same time, modern international relations put forward a number of requirements for states that only this social institution can do. In such conditions, there is a shift from traditional functions to new ones that go beyond the usual.

The role of the economy

International economic relations play a special role today, since this type of interaction has become one of the driving forces of globalization. The emerging world economy today can be represented as a global economy that combines various branches of specialization of national economic systems. All of them are included in a single mechanism, the elements of which interact and are dependent on each other.

International economic relations existed before the emergence of the world economy and linked industries within continents or regional associations. The main subjects of such relations are states. In addition to them, the group of participants includes giant corporations, international organizations and associations. The regulatory institution of these interactions is the law of international relations.

Lecture 1. Basic parameters modern system international relations

1. Order in the international system at the turn of the 21st century

The end of the Second World War marked an important milestone in the development of the international system in its movement from the plurality of the main players in international politics to a decrease in their number and a tightening of the hierarchy - i.e. subordination relations between them. The multipolar system that took shape during the Westphalian Settlement (1648) and continued (with modifications) for several centuries before World War II, was transformed as a result of it into a bipolar world dominated by the USA and the USSR . This structure, having existed for more than half a century, in the 1990s gave way to a world in which one "complex leader" survived - the United States of America.

How to describe this new organization of international relations in terms of polarity? Without clarifying the differences between multi-, bi-, and unipolarity, it is impossible to correctly answer this question. Under The multipolar structure of international relations is understood as the organization of the world, which is characterized by the presence of several (four or more) most influential states, comparable to each other in terms of the total potential of their complex (economic, political, military-force and cultural-ideological) influence on international relations.

Respectively, for bipolar structure only two members of the international community (in the post-war years, the Soviet Union and the United States) separated from all other countries of the world in terms of this aggregate indicator for each of the powers. Consequently, if there was a gap between not two, but only one world power in terms of the potential of its complex influence on world affairs, i.e. the influence of any other countries is not-comparably less than the influence of a single leader, then such international structure must be considered unipolar.

The modern system has not become the "American world" - Pax Americana. The United States realizes its leadership ambitions in it without feeling in a completely discharged international environment . Washington politics is influenced by seven other important actors in international politics, in whose environment American diplomacy operates. The circle of seven partners of the United States included Russian Federation- although de facto even then with limited rights. Together, the United States with its allies and the Russian Federation formed the G8, a prestigious and influential informal interstate entity. The NATO countries and Japan form groups of "old" members in it, and Russia was the only new one, as it seemed then. However, since 2014, the G8 has again turned into a G7.

The international system is significantly influenced by a non-G8 member China, which since the mid-1990s began to seriously declare itself as a leading world power and achieved at the beginning of the XXI century. impressive economic results.

Against the backdrop of such a balance of opportunities between the leading world powers, it is obvious that one can speak of serious restrictions on American dominance with a certain degree of conventionality. Certainly, modern international system inherent pluralism — key international decisions are worked out in it not only by the United States. A relatively wide range of states have access to the process of their formation, both within and outside the UN. But taking into account the levers of US influence, the pluralism of the international political process does not change the meaning of the situation.:The United States has gone into isolation from the rest of the international community in terms of the totality of its capabilities, the consequence of which is the trend towards the growth of American influence on world affairs.

It is appropriate to assume a deepening of tendencies towards building up the potential of other world centers - China, India, Russia, united Europe if the latter is destined to become a political unity. If this trend grows in the future, a new transformation of the international structure is possible, which, it is not excluded, will acquire a multipolar configuration. In this sense, one should understand the official statements of the leading figures of the Russian Federation about the movement of the modern world towards true multipolarity, in which there will be no place for the hegemony of any one power. But today we have to state something else: the international structure Vmiddle of the first decade of the 21st century. was structuresOuchpluralistic, but unipolar world.

The evolution of international relations after 1945 took place within the framework of two successive international orders - first bipolar (1945-1991), then pluralistic-unipolar, which began to take shape after the collapse of the USSR . First known in the literature as Yalta-Potsdam- by the names of two key international conferences(in Yalta on February 4-11 and in Potsdam on July 17-August 2, 1945), at which the leaders of the three main powers of the anti-Nazi coalition (USSR, USA and Great Britain) agreed on basic approaches to the post-war world order.

Second — does not have a common name . Its parameters were not agreed upon at any universal international conference. This order was formed de facto on the basis of a chain of precedents that represented the steps of the West, the most important of which were:

The decision of the US administration in 1993 to promote the spread of democracy in the world (the doctrine of "expansion of democracy");

The expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the east through the inclusion of new members, which began with the Brussels session of the NATO Council in December 1996, which approved the schedule for the admission of new members to the alliance;

The decision of the Paris session of the NATO Council in 1999 on the adoption of a new strategic concept of the Alliance and the expansion of its area of ​​responsibility beyond the North Atlantic;

The US-British war of 2003 against Iraq, which led to the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein.

In Russian literature, there was an attempt to name the post-bipolar international order Malto-Madrid- according to the Soviet-American summit on the island of Malta in December 1989. It was generally accepted that the Soviet leadership confirmed its lack of intentions to prevent the Warsaw Pact countries from independently deciding whether to follow or not follow the "path of socialism" , and the NATO Madrid session in July 1997, when the first three countries seeking admission to the Alliance (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) received an official invitation from NATO countries to join them.

Whatever the name, the essence of the current world order is the implementation of the world order project based on the formation of a single economic, political-military and ethical-legal community of the most developed countries of the West, and then spreading the influence of this community to the rest of the world.

This order has actually existed for more than twenty years. Its distribution is partly peaceful: through the dissemination in various countries and regions of modern Western standards of economic and political life, patterns and models of behavior, ideas about ways and means of ensuring national and international security , and in a broader sense - about the categories of good, harm and danger - for their subsequent cultivation and consolidation there. But Western countries are not limited to peaceful means to achieve their goals.. In the early 2000s, the United States and some of its allied countries actively used force to establish elements of an international order that was beneficial to them - in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in 1996 and 1999, in Afghanistan - in 2001-2002, in Iraq - in 1991,1998 and 2003. , in Libya in 2011

Despite the confrontation inherent in world processes, the modern international order is shaping up asthe order of the global community, in the literal sense, the global order. Far from complete, imperfect and traumatic for Russia, he took the place of the bipolar structure , which first appeared in the world after the end of World War II in the spring of 1945.

The post-war world order was supposed to be based on the idea of ​​cooperation between the victorious powers and maintaining their agreement in the interests of such cooperation. The role of the mechanism for developing this consent was assigned to the United Nations, whose Charter was signed on June 26, 1945 and entered into force in October of the same year. . He proclaimed the goals of the UN not only to maintain international peace, but also to promote the realization of the rights of countries and peoples to self-determination and free development, to encourage equal economic and cultural cooperation, to cultivate respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual. The UN was destined to play the role of a world center for coordinating efforts in the interests of excluding wars and conflicts from international relations by harmonizing relations between states .

But the UN was faced with the inability to ensure the compatibility of the interests of its leading members - the USSR and the USA due to the severity of the conflict between them. That's why on the main function of the UN, which she successfully coped with in the framework of the Yalta-Potsdam order, was not the improvement of international reality and the promotion of morality and justice, but prevention of an armed clash between the USSR and the USA, the stability of relations between which was the main condition for international peace.

The Yalta-Potsdam order had a number of features.

Firstly, it did not have a solid contractual and legal basis. The agreements underlying it were either verbal, not officially recorded and remained secret for a long time, or fixed in a declarative form. Unlike the Versailles Conference, which formed a powerful legal system, neither the Yalta Conference nor the Potsdam Conference led to the signing of international treaties.

This made the Yalta-Potsdam principles vulnerable to criticism and made their effectiveness dependent on the ability of the parties concerned to ensure the actual implementation of these agreements not by legal, but by political methods and means of economic and military-political pressure. That is why the element of regulating international relations through the threat of force or through its use was more pronounced in the post-war decades and had greater practical significance than was typical, say, for the 1920s, with their typical emphasis on diplomatic agreements. and an appeal to legal regulations. Despite legal fragility, the “not quite legitimate” Yalta-Pot-Sdam order existed (unlike Versailles and Washington) more than half a century and collapsed only with the collapse of the USSR .

Secondly, The Yalta-Potsdam order was bipolar . After the Second World War, the USSR and the USA sharply separated from all other states in terms of the totality of their military, political and economic capabilities and the potential for cultural and ideological influence. If for the multipolar structure of international relations an approximate comparability of the combined potentials of several main subjects of international relations was typical, then after the Second World War only the potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States could be considered comparable.

Third, the post-war order was confrontational . By confrontation is meant a type of relationship between countries in which the actions of one side are systematically opposed to those of the other . Theoretically, the bipolar structure of the world could be both confrontational and cooperative - based not on confrontation, but on cooperation between the superpowers. But in fact, from the mid-1940s to the mid-1980s, the Yalta-Potsdam order was confrontational. Only in 1985-1991, during the years of "new political thinking" M. S. Gorbachev, it began to transform into a cooperative bipolarity , which was not destined to become stable due to the short duration of its existence.

Under the conditions of confrontation, international relations acquired the character of tense, at times sharply conflicted, interaction, permeated with the preparation of the main world rivals - the Soviet Union and the United States - to repel a hypothetical mutual attack and ensure their survival in the expected nuclear conflict. This spawned in the second half of the 20th century. an arms race of unprecedented scale and intensity .

Fourth, The Yalta-Potsdam order took shape in the era of nuclear weapons, which, while introducing additional conflict into world processes, simultaneously contributed to the emergence in the second half of the 1960s of a special mechanism for preventing a world nuclear war - the “confrontational stability” model. Its unspoken rules, which developed between 1962 and 1991, had a restraining effect on international conflicts at the global level. The USSR and the USA began to avoid situations that could provoke an armed conflict between them. During these years a new and in its own way original concept of mutual nuclear deterrence and the doctrines of global strategic stability based on it on the basis of the “balance of fear” have emerged. Nuclear war has come to be regarded only as the most extreme means of resolving international disputes.

Fifth, post-war bipolarity took the form of a political and ideological confrontation between the "free world" led by the United States (the political West) and the "socialist camp" led by the Soviet Union (the political East). Although international contradictions were most often based on geopolitical aspirations, outwardly the Soviet-American rivalry looked like a confrontation between political and ethical ideals, social and moral values. The ideals of equality and egalitarian justice - in the "world of socialism" and the ideals of freedom, competition and democracy - in the "free world". Acute ideological controversy brought additional irreconcilability in disputes to international relations.

It led to the mutual demonization of the images of rivals - Soviet propaganda attributed to the United States plans for the destruction of the USSR in the same way that American propaganda convinced the Western public of Moscow's intention to spread communism to the whole world, destroying the United States as the basis of the security of the "free world". Ideologization had its strongest effect on international relations in the 1940s and 1950s.

Later, the ideology and political practice of the superpowers began to diverge in such a way that, at the level of official attitudes, the global goals of rivals were still interpreted as irreconcilable, and at the level of diplomatic dialogue, the parties learned to negotiate using non-ideological concepts and operating geopolitical arguments. Nevertheless, until the mid-1980s, ideological polarization remained an important feature of the international order.

At sixth, The Yalta-Potsdam order was distinguished by a high degree of controllability of international processes. As a bipolar order, it was built on the agreement of the opinions of only two powers, which simplified the negotiations. The USA and the USSR acted not only as separate states, but also as group leaders - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Block discipline allowed the Soviet Union and the United States to guarantee the fulfillment of "their" part of the obligations assumed by the states of the corresponding bloc, which increased the effectiveness of decisions made in the course of American-Soviet agreements. .

The listed characteristics of the Yalta-Potsdam order determined the high competitiveness of international relations that developed within its framework. Thanks to mutual ideological alienation, this in its own way natural competition between the two strongest countries was in the nature of deliberate hostility. From April 1947 in the American political lexicon at the suggestion of a prominent American businessman and politician Bernard Baruch the expression "cold war", which soon became popular thanks to numerous articles by an American publicist who fell in love with him Walter Lippmann. Since this expression is often used to characterize international relations in 1945-1991, it is necessary to clarify its meaning.

The word "cold war" is used in two senses..

In wide — as a synonym for the word "confrontation" and is used to characterize the entire period of international relations from the end of World War II to the collapse of the USSR .

In the narrow sm-sle concept "cold war" implies a particular type of confrontation, its most acute form in the form of confrontation on the brink of war. Such a confrontation was characteristic of international relations in the period approximately from the first Berlin crisis in 1948 to the Caribbean crisis in 1962. The meaning of the expression "cold war" is that the opposing powers systematically took steps hostile to each other and threatened each other with force, but at the same time made sure that they did not actually find themselves in a position with each other real, "hot" war .

The term "confrontation" is broader and more "universal" in meaning. High-level confrontation was, for example, inherent in the situations of the Berlin or Caribbean crises. But how confrontation of low intensity it took place during the years of international detente in the mid-1950s, and then in the late 1960s and early 1970s . The term "cold war" is not applicable to periods of detente and is generally not used in the literature. On the contrary, the expression "cold war" is widely used as an antonym for the term "détente". That's why the entire period 1945-1991. using the concept of "confrontation" can be described analytically correct , and with the help of the term "cold war" - no.

Certain discrepancies exist in the question of the time of the end of the era of confrontation ("cold war"). Most scientists believe that the confrontation actually ended during the "perestroika" in the USSR in the second half of the 80s of the last century. Some - try to specify more accurate dates:

- December 1989 when, during the Soviet-American meeting in Malta, US President George W. Bush and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR MS Gorbachev solemnly proclaimed the end of the Cold War;

Or October 1990 G. when the unification of Germany took place.

The most reasonable date for the end of the era of confrontation is December 1991 G. : with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conditions for confrontation of the type that arose after 1945 disappeared.

1. Transition period from bipolar system

At the turn of two centuries - XX and XXI - there is a grandiose transformation of the system of international relations . Transitional period in its development— since the mid 1980s when the course towards a radical renewal of the country (“perestroika”), launched by the leadership of the USSR headed by M.S. Gorbachev, is supplemented by a policy of overcoming confrontation and rapprochement with the West (“new thinking”).

The main content of the transition period is overcoming the bipolar dichotomy in international relations, the Cold War as such a way of organizing them, which for about four previous decades dominated the East-West area - more precisely, along the lines of "socialism (in its Soviet interpretation) versus capitalism".

The algorithm of this method of organizing international relations, which was formed almost immediately after the end of World War II, was total mutual rejection of countries with opposite social systems. It had three main components:

a) ideological intolerance towards each other,

b) economic incompatibility and

c) military-political confrontation.

Geopolitically, it was a confrontation between two camps, in which support groups (allies, satellites, fellow travelers, etc.) formed around the leaders (USA and USSR), which competed with each other both directly and in the struggle for influence in the world.

In the 1950s there is idea of ​​"peaceful coexistence" , which becomes a conceptual justification for cooperative relations between socialist and capitalist countries (competing with the thesis of the antagonistic contradictions separating them). On this basis, relations along the East-West line are periodically warming.

But the “new thinking” proclaimed by the Soviet Union and the corresponding reaction of the Western countries to it marked not a situational and tactical, but a principled and strategically oriented overcoming of confrontational mentality and confrontational politics. Bipolar international political system such a development shattered in the most fundamental way.

1) WITHa severe blow to this system was dealt by the collapse of the "socialist community", which happened by historical standards in a phenomenally short time - its the 1989 “velvet revolutions” in countries that were satellite allies of the USSR became the culmination . The fall of the Berlin Wall and then the unification of Germany (1990) were universally perceived as a symbol of overcoming the division of Europe, which was the epitome of bipolar confrontation. The self-liquidation of the Soviet Union (1991) drew a final line under bipolarity, since it meant the disappearance of one of its two main subjects.

Thus, initial phase of transition turned out to be compressed in time up to five to seven years. The peak of change falls on the turn of the 1980-1990s when a wave of turbulent changes - both in the international arena and in the internal development of the countries of the socialist camp - turn out to be absorbed by the main attributes of bipolarity.

2) It took much more time for them to be replaced by new entities - institutions, models of foreign policy behavior, principles of self-identification, structuring the international political space or its individual segments. The gradual formation of new elements in the 1990s and 2000s was often accompanied by severe turbulences . This process is the content next phase of the transition period. It includes a number of events and phenomena, the most important of which are the following.

In the former socialist camp, the dismantling of the Yalta system is at the center of the unfolding changes. , which occurs relatively quickly, but still not all at once. The formal termination of the activities of the Department of Internal Affairs and the CMEA was not enough for this . In a vast segment of the international political space, which is made up of former members of the socialist camp, necessary , as a matter of fact, create a new infrastructure for relations both between the countries of the region and with the outside world .

For the impact on the international political orientation of this space, there is sometimes a hidden, and sometimes an open struggle. - moreover Russia participated in it energetically and proactively (although it could not achieve the desired results). Various possibilities regarding the status of this zone are discussed: refusal to join the military-political structures, the revival of the “middle Europe” formula, etc. Gradually it turns out that the countries of the region are not eager to declare neutrality or become a "bridge" between Russia and the West. That they themselves aspire to become part of the West. That they are ready to do it at the institutional level by joining the WEU, NATO, the EU. And that they will achieve this even despite the opposition of Russia.

The three new Baltic states also sought to overcome Russian geopolitical dominance, heading towards joining Western structures. (including military and political). The formula of "inviolability" of the former Soviet area - which Moscow never officially proclaimed, but very interested in promoting in the international discourse - turned out to be practically unrealizable.

Throughout the 1990s-2000s reveals the inapplicability to the new international political realities of some ideas that seemed quite attractive . Among these "failed" models - dissolution of NATO, the transformation of this alliance into a purely political organization, a radical change in its nature with the transformation into a structural framework of pan-European security, the creation of a new organization to maintain security on the continent and so on.

During the transition period, the first acute problematic situation arises in Moscow's relations with both Western countries and former Eastern European allies. This has become line on the inclusion of the latter in NATO . EU enlargement also causes political discomfort in Russia - although expressed in a much milder form. In both cases, not only the ruined instincts of bipolar thinking work, but also the fear of a possible marginalization of the country. However, in a broader sense distribution of these Western (according to genesis and political characteristics) structures to a significant part of the European international political space marks the emergence of a fundamentally new configuration in the region .

On the wave of overcoming bipolarity in the transitional period, important changes also occur within these structures. in NATO the scale of military preparations is reduced and at the same time the difficult process of searching for a new identity and new tasks begins in the conditions when the main reason the emergence of an alliance is a “threat from the East”. The symbol of the transition period for NATO was the preparation of a new strategic concept for the alliance, which was adopted in 2010.

WEIGHT the transition to a new quality was planned with the adoption of a “constitution for Europe” (2004), but this project did not receive approval at a referendum in France (and then in the Netherlands) and required painstaking work to prepare its “abbreviated” version (Treaty about reform, or Treaty of Lisbon, 2007).

As a kind of compensation, there has been significant progress towards building the EU's own capacity to deal with the challenges of crisis management. Generally The transition period for the EU turned out to be full of extremely serious changes, the main of which were:

a) a two and a half times increase in the number of participants in this structure (from 12 to almost three dozen) and

b) extension of integration interaction to the sphere of foreign and security policy.

During the disintegration of bipolarity and in connection with this process for almost two decades dramatic events are unfolding in the territorial area former Yugoslavia. The phase of a multi-layered military confrontation with the participation of state entities and sub-state actors that emerged from its bosom completed only in the 2000s. This marked the most important qualitative shift in the structuring of this part of the international political space. More certainty has also become in how it will fit into the global configuration.

3) A line will be drawn under the transition period with the completion of the work of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the settlement of relations along the Serbia-Kosovo line, and the emergence of a practical prospect for the entry of post-Yugoslav countries into the EU.

However, the significance of post-Goslav events goes beyond the regional context . Here for the first time since the end of the Cold War both the possibilities and the limits of the influence of an external factor on the development of ethno-confessional conflicts were demonstrated . Here there was a rich and very ambiguous experience of peacekeeping in the new international conditions . Finally, the echo of events in the region is detected post-factum in a wide variety of contexts - either in Russia's attitude towards NATO, or in the vicissitudes around the issue of the EU's military dimension, or in the Caucasian war in August 2008.

Iraq destined to become another "polygon" of new international political realities of the post-bipolar world . Moreover, it was here that their ambiguity and inconsistency in the conditions of the transitional period was demonstrated in the most obvious way - since this happened twice and in completely different contexts.

When in 1991 Baghdad committed aggression against Kuwait , its unanimous condemnation became possible only in connection with the beginning of overcoming the bipolar confrontation . On the same basis, an unprecedentedly broad international coalition was formed to carry out a military operation to restore status quo ante. In fact, the "war in the Gulf" has turned even recent enemies into allies. And here in 2003. split over military operation against Saddam Hussein's regime , which divided not only the former antagonists (US + UK versus Russia + China), but also members of the NATO alliance (France + Germany versus US + UK).

But, despite the directly opposite context in both situations, they themselves became possible precisely in the new conditions and would have been unthinkable under the "old" international political order. At the same time, the emergence of two completely different configurations on the same geopolitical field is a convincing (albeit indirect) evidence of the transitional nature of the international system (at least at that moment in time).

At the global level, the most important distinguishing feature of the transition period is surge American unilateralism and then - revealing its inconsistency. The first phenomenon can be traced in the 1990s, on the basis of the euphoria of victory in the Cold War and the status of "the only remaining superpower ". The second one is about since the mid-2000s, When Republican administration of President George W. Bush tries to overcome the excesses of his own offensive enthusiasm.

The unprecedented level of support for the United States by the international community arises in connection with the terrorist attack against them in September 2001. On this wave the American leadership manages to initiate a number of major actions - first of all to conduct military operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (in 2002 with the sanction of the UN Security Council) And against Saddam Hussein's regime Iraq (in 2003 without such authorization). However Washington not only failed to form around itself something like a "world coalition" on the basis of the fight against terrorism , but also strikingly quickly crossed out his shameless politics, the real and potential benefits of international solidarity and sympathy .

If at first the vector of American policy undergoes only minor adjustments, then in the late 2000s, the question of changing the paradigm of foreign policy was raised more decisively- this was one of the components of victory B. Obama in the presidential election, as well as an important component of the practical line of the Democratic administration.

In a certain sense, the noted dynamics of Washington's foreign policy reflects the logic of the transit that the international system is going through . The beginning of the transitional period is accompanied by a "rapture of power." But over time, the ingenuous simplicity of the power approach begins to give way to an understanding of the complexities of the modern world. Illusions are dispelled regarding the possibility and ability of the United States to act as the demiurge of world development, proceeding only from its own interests and defiantly ignoring those of other participants in international life. The imperative is not the construction of a unipolar world, but a more multifaceted policy focused on interaction with other participants in international life .

Russia, having emerged from the bipolar confrontation into a new state, also did not escape a certain euphoria. Although the latter turned out to be very fleeting for the Russian foreign policy consciousness, it still took time to make sure: triumphant entry into the "community of civilized states" is not on the agenda, since it cannot be only the result of a political choice and will require significant efforts to transform the country and ensure its compatibility with other developed countries .

Russia had to go through both overcoming the painful syndrome of "historical retreat", and through the phase of "foreign policy concentration". A colossal role was played by the competent removal of the country from the default of 1998, and then the exceptionally favorable situation in the world energy markets. . By the mid-2000s, Russia began to increasingly demonstrate offensive activism in the sphere of relations with the outside world. It manifested itself in vigorous efforts in the Ukrainian direction (in order to win back the losses that Moscow saw in the "orange revolution" of 2004), as well as - and even more clearly - the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in 2008.

There are very conflicting views on this.

Critics of Russian policy in Transcaucasia, they see here a manifestation of Moscow’s neo-imperial ambitions, point to the unattractiveness of its image and its declining international political rating note the absence of reliable partners and allies. Proponents of positive assessments quite emphatically put forward a different set of arguments: Russia, not in words, but in deeds, has demonstrated the ability to defend its interests, clearly marked their area (space of the former Soviet Union excluding the Baltic States) and generally managed to ensure that her views were taken seriously, and not for the sake of diplomatic protocol.

But no matter how one interprets Russian politics , there are fairly widespread ideas that she also testifies to the ending transitional period in international relations. Russia, according to this logic, refuses to play by rules in the formulation of which it could not participate because of its weakness. . Today, the country is able to declare its legitimate interests in full voice (option: imperial ambitions) and force others to reckon with them. No matter how controversial the legitimacy of ideas about the post-Soviet territory as a zone of "special Russian interests", Moscow's clearly expressed position on this matter can be interpreted, among other things, as its desire to put an end to the uncertainties of the transition period . Here, however, the question arises as to whether in this case the reclamation of the syndromes of the “old” international political order (in particular, through the intensification of rejection of the West) is taking place.

Formation of a new world order, like any restructuring of society, is not carried out in laboratory conditions and therefore may be accompanied by elements of disorganization. Those really arose in the transitional period. The imbalance of the international political system is quite clearly visible in a number of areas.

Among the old mechanisms that ensured its functioning, there are many that are partially or completely lost, or are subject to erosion. The new ones have not yet been approved.

In the conditions of bipolar confrontation, the confrontation between the two camps was to some extent a disciplinary element , muffled inter- and intra-country conflicts, prompted caution and restraint. The accumulated energy could not help splashing out to the surface as soon as the hoops of the Cold War fell apart.

The compensatory mechanism that operated vertically has also disappeared - when conflict topics could, for one reason or another, be mixed at higher levels of interaction along the East-West line. For example, if the US and the Soviet Union were in a phase of mutual rapprochement, this created a positive impetus for the policy of their allies/clients in relation to the countries of the opposite camp.

The factor complicating the modern international political landscape is the emergence of new states, associated with the contradictory process of their foreign policy identification, the search for their place in the system of international relations. .

Almost all countries of the former "socialist commonwealth" who gained independence as a result of the destruction of the "Iron Curtain" and the mechanisms of inter-bloc confrontation, made a choice in favor of a radical change in the vector of their foreign policy . Strategically, this had a stabilizing effect, but in the short term was another impetus to unbalance the international system - at least in terms of the relations of the respective countries with Russia and its positioning in relation to the outside world.

It can be stated that on In the final phase of the transition period, the world did not collapse, general chaos did not arise, the war of all against all did not become a new universal algorithm for international life.

The inconsistency of dramatic prophecies was revealed, in particular, under the conditions global financial and economic crisis that erupted in the late 2000s. After all, its scale, admittedly, is quite commensurate with the serious economic shock of the last century, which affected all the largest countries in the world - crisis and the Great Depression in 1929-1933. But then the crisis shifted the vector of international political development to a new world war . Today, the impact of the crisis on world politics is even more stabilizing character.

It is too " good news”- after all, in conditions of difficult trials, the instinct of national egoism has a rather high chance of becoming the prevailing, if not the only driver of foreign policy, and the fact that this did not happen indicates a certain stability of the emerging international political system. But, stating that she has some margin of safety, it is important to see the possibility of destabilizing emissions accompanying the process of change.

For example, polycentrism as the antithesis of bipolarity may not turn out to be a boon in everything . Not only because of the objective complication of the international political system associated with it, but also because in some cases, in particular, in the field of military preparations and especially in the field of nuclear weapons - an increase in the number of competing centers of power can lead to a direct undermining of international security and stability .

The features listed above characterize a dynamic and full of contradictions. the formation of a new international system. Not everything developed during this period has stood the test of time; some algorithms turned out to be inadequate (or effective only in the short term) and, most likely, will come to naught; a number of models clearly did not stand the test of time, although they attracted attention at the dawn of the transition period. The essential characteristics of post-bipolarity are still quite blurred, labile (unstable) and chaotic. It is not surprising that in its conceptual understanding there is some mosaic and variability.

The antithesis of bipolarity is most often considered multipolarity.(multipolarity) — organization of the international political system on the basis of polycentrism . Although this is the most popular formula today, its implementation can only be fully spoken of as a trend of a strategic nature .

Sometimes it is suggested that a new one will take the place of the "old" bipolarity. At the same time, there are different opinions regarding the structure of the new binary confrontation:

— USA versus China (the most common dichotomy), or

- countries of the golden billion versus disadvantaged part of humanity, or

- countries status quo versus interested in changing the international order, or

- countries of "liberal capitalism" versus countries of "authoritarian capitalism", etc.

Some analysts generally do not consider it correct to consider bipolarity as a reference model for assessing the emerging system of international relations. This might have been appropriate in the 1990s to draw a line under the Yalta international order, but today the logic of the formation of the international system follows completely different imperatives.

Clearly the idea of ​​the “end of history” formulated by F. Fukuyama did not come true. Even if liberal-democratic values ​​are becoming more widespread, their “complete and final victory” is not visible for the foreseeable future, which means that the international system will not be able to be tailored according to the appropriate patterns.

Equally the universalist interpretation of the concept of "clash of civilizations" by S. Huntington was not confirmed. Inter-civilizational collisions, for all their significance, are neither the only nor even the most significant "driver" of the development of the international system.

Finally, there are ideas about the emergence of an unordered and unstructured system of a “new international disorder”.

The task, probably, should not be to find a capacious and all-explaining formula (which does not yet exist). Another thing is more important: to fix the process of formation of the post-bipolar international system. In this sense The 2010s can be described as the final phase of the transition period. The transformation of the international political system is still not completed, but some of its contours are already being drawn quite clearly. .

obvious the main role in structuring the international system of the largest states that form its upper level. For the informal right to enter the core of the international political system, 10-15 states compete with each other.

The most important novelty of recent times is the expansion of their circle at the expense of countries that, in the previous state of the international system, were located quite far from its center. This is first of all China and India, the strengthening of whose positions is increasingly affecting the global balance of economic and political forces and is highly likely to be extrapolated into the future. Regarding the role of these future superstars of the international system, two main questions arise: about the stock of their internal stability and about the nature of projecting their influence outward.

In the international system, there continues to be a redistribution of the share between various existing and emerging centers of influence - in particular, with regard to their ability to influence other states and the outside world as a whole. To "traditional" poles (EU/OECD countries, as well as Russia), in the dynamics of which there are many uncertainties, a number of the most successful states are added Asia and Latin America, as well as South Africa. The presence of the Islamic world in the international political arena is becoming more and more noticeable (although due to its very problematic capacity as a kind of integrity, in this case one can hardly speak of a “pole” or “center of power”).

With the relative weakening of the positions of the United States, their enormous possibilities of influencing international life remain. The role of this state in the world economy, finance, trade, science, computer science is unique and will remain so for the foreseeable future. In terms of the size and quality of its military potential, it has no equal in the world. (if we abstract from the Russian resource in the field of strategic nuclear forces).

The US can be a source of serious stress for the international system(on the basis of unilateralism, orientation towards unipolarity, etc.), and an authoritative initiator and agent of cooperative interaction(in the spirit of responsible leadership and advanced partnerships). Of critical importance will be their willingness and ability to contribute to the formation of an international system that combines efficiency with the absence of a pronounced hegemonic principle.

Geopolitically, the center of gravity of the international system is shifting towards East/Asia. It is in this area that the most powerful and vigorously developing new centers of influence are located. Exactly this is where the attention of global economic actors switches attracted by growing markets, impressive dynamics of economic growth, high energy of human capital. However, it is here that the most acute problem situations exist (hotbeds of terrorism, ethno-confessional conflicts, nuclear proliferation).

The main intrigue in the emerging international system will unfold in relations along the line "developed world versus developing world"(or, in a slightly different interpretation, "center versus periphery"). Of course, there are complex and contradictory dynamics of relationships within each of these segments. But it is precisely from their global imbalance that a threat to the overall stability of the world system can result. However, it can also be undermined by the costs of overcoming this imbalance — economic, resource, environmental, demographic, security-related, and others.

1. Qualitative parameters of the new system of international relations

Some features of modern international relations deserve special attention. They characterize the new that distinguishes the international system that is being formed before our eyes from its previous states.

intensive processes globalization are among the most important characteristics of modern world development. On the one hand, they are obvious evidence of the acquisition of a new quality by the international system - the quality of globality. On the other hand, their development has considerable costs for international relations. Globalization can manifest itself in authoritarian and hierarchical forms generated by selfish interests and aspirations of the most developed states . There are fears that globalization makes them even stronger, while the weak are doomed to complete and irreversible dependence.

Nevertheless, it makes no sense to oppose globalization, no matter what good motives may be guided by. This process has deep objective prerequisites. A relevant analogy is the movement of society from traditionalism to modernization, from the patriarchal community to urbanization .

Globalization brings a number of important features to international relations. She makes the world whole by increasing its ability to respond effectively to general problems , which in the XXI century. become increasingly important for international political development. Interdependence, increasing as a result of globalization, can serve as a basis for overcoming differences between countries , a powerful stimulus for the development of mutually acceptable solutions.

However, with globalizationconnected unification with its impersonality and loss of individual characteristics, erosion of identity, weakening of national-state possibilities for regulating society, fears about one's own competitiveness - all this can cause attacks of self-isolation, autarky, protectionism as a defensive reaction.

In the long term, this kind of choice will doom any country to a permanent lag, pushing it to the sidelines of mainstream development. But here, as in many other areas, the pressure of opportunistic motives can be very, very strong, providing political support for the line on "protection from globalization."

Therefore, one of the nodes of internal tension in the emerging international political system is the conflict between globalization and the national identity of individual states. All of them, as well as the international system as a whole, are faced with the need to find an organic combination of these two principles, to combine them in the interests of maintaining sustainable development and international stability.

Similarly, in the context of globalization, there is a need to correct the idea of functional purpose of the international system. She, of course, must maintain its capacity in solving the traditional problem of reducing to a common denominator the disparate or divergent interests and aspirations of states - avoid confrontation between them fraught with too serious cataclysms, provide a way out of conflict situations and so on. But today the objective role of the international political system is becoming broader.

This is due to the new quality of the international system that is currently being formed - the presence in it of a significant component of global issues . The latter requires not so much the settlement of disputes as the definition of a joint agenda, not so much the minimization of disagreements as the maximization of mutual gain, not so much the determination of a balance of interests, but the identification of a common interest.

The most important areas of action on the global positive agenda are :

- overcoming poverty, fighting hunger, promoting the socio-economic development of the most backward countries and peoples;

— maintenance of ecological and climatic balance, minimization of negative impacts on the human habitat and the biosphere as a whole;

- solution of the largest global problems in the field of economy, science, culture, health care;

- prevention and minimization of the consequences of natural and man-made disasters, organization of rescue operations (including on humanitarian grounds);

- the fight against terrorism, international crime and other manifestations of destructive activity;

- organization of order in the territories that have lost political and administrative control and found themselves in the grip of anarchy that threatens international peace.

The successful experience of jointly solving such problems can become an incentive for a cooperative approach to those disputable situations that arise in line with traditional international political conflicts.

In general terms the vector of globalization indicates the formation of a global society. At an advanced stage of this process we can talk about the formation of power on a planetary scale, and the development of a global civil society , and about the transformation of traditional interstate relations into intra-social relations of the future global society.

However, this is a rather distant prospect. In the international system that is taking shape today, only some manifestations of this line are found. . Among them:

- a certain activation of supranational tendencies (primarily through the transfer of individual functions of the state to structures of a higher level);

- further formation of elements of global law, transnational justice (incremental, but not abruptly);

— expanding the scope of activities and increasing the demand for international non-governmental organizations.

International relations are relations about the most diverse aspects of the development of society. . Therefore, it is far from always possible to isolate some dominant factor in their evolution. This, for example, clearly demonstrates dialectics of economics and politics in modern international development.

It would seem that on its course today, after the elimination of the hypertrophied significance of the ideological confrontation characteristic of the Cold War era, an ever-increasing influence is exerted by a combination of factors of an economic order - resource, production, scientific and technological, financial . This is sometimes seen as the return of the international system to a "normal" state - if this is considered the situation of the unconditional priority of the economy over politics (and in relation to the international sphere - "geo-economics" over "geopolitics"). In the case of bringing this logic to extremum one can even speak of a kind renaissance of economic determinism — when exclusively or predominantly economic circumstances explain all conceivable and inconceivable consequences for relationships on the world stage .

In modern international development, some features are indeed found that seem to confirm this thesis. So, for example, the hypothesis that compromises in the sphere of “low politics” (including on economic issues) are easier to achieve than in the sphere of “high politics” (when prestige and geopolitical interests are at stake) does not work. . This postulate, as is known, occupies an important place in understanding international relations from the positions of functionalism - but it is clearly refuted by the practice of our time, when often it is economic issues that turn out to be more conflicting than diplomatic conflicts. Yes and in the foreign policy behavior of states, economic motivation is not only weighty, but in many cases it clearly comes to the fore .

However, this issue requires more careful analysis. The statement of the priority of economic determinants is often superficial and does not provide grounds for any significant or self-evident conclusions. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that economics and politics are not related only as a cause and effect - their relationship is more complex, multidimensional and elastic. In international relations, this manifests itself no less clearly than in domestic development.

International political consequences arising from changes within the economic sphere are traceable throughout history. Today this is confirmed, for example, in connection with the rise Asia , which became one of the largest events in the development of the modern international system . Here, among other things, powerful technological progress and the dramatically expanded availability of information goods and services outside the countries of the “golden billion” played a huge role. There was also a correction of the economic model: if until the 1990s almost limitless growth of the service sector and a movement towards a “post-industrial society” were predicted, then subsequently there was a change in trend towards a kind of industrial renaissance. Some states in Asia managed to get out of poverty on this wave and join the ranks of countries with a “rising economy” . And from this new reality there are impulses to reconfigure the international political system.

Major problematic topics that arise in the international system most often have both an economic and a political component. An example of such a symbiosis is the renewed importance of control over territory in light of the growing competition for natural resources . The scarcity and/or scarcity of the latter, coupled with the desire of States to provide reliable supplies at affordable prices, all together become a source of increased sensitivity regarding territorial areas that are the subject of disputes over their ownership or raise concerns about reliability. and transit security.

Sometimes, on this ground, collisions of the traditional type arise and become aggravated - as, for example, in the case of waters of the South China Sea where vast oil reserves on the continental shelf are at stake. Here, right before your eyes:

Intra-regional competition intensifies China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei;

Efforts to establish control over the Paracel Islands and the Spartly archipelago(which will allow them to claim an exclusive 200-mile economic zone);

Demonstration actions are being carried out with the use of naval forces;

Informal coalitions are being built with the involvement of extra-regional powers (or the latter are simply addressed with calls to indicate their presence in the region), etc.

An example of a cooperative solution to emerging problems of this kind could be Arctic. In this area, there are also competitive relationships regarding explored and eventual natural resources. But at the same time, there are powerful incentives for the development of constructive interaction between coastal and extra-regional states based on a joint interest in establishing transport flows, solving environmental problems, maintaining and developing the region's bioresources.

In general, the modern international system develops through the emergence and “unraveling” of various knots that form at the intersection of economics and politics. This is how new problem fields are formed, as well as new lines of cooperative or competitive interaction in the international arena.

On modern international relations a significant impact is exerted by tangible changes related to with security issues. First of all, this concerns understanding the very phenomenon of security, the ratio of its various levels ( global, regional, national ), challenges to international stability, as well as their hierarchy.

The threat of a world nuclear war has lost its former absolute priority, although the very presence of large arsenals of weapons of mass destruction has not completely eliminated the possibility of a global catastrophe. But at the same time the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons, other types of WMD, missile technologies is becoming more and more formidable . Awareness of this problem as a global one is an important resource for mobilizing the international community.

With the relative stability of the global strategic situation, a wave of diverse conflicts is growing at lower levels of international relations, as well as those of an internal nature. It is becoming increasingly difficult to contain and resolve such conflicts.

Qualitatively new sources of threats are terrorism, drug trafficking, other types of criminal cross-border activities, political and religious extremism. .

The way out of the global confrontation and the reduction of the danger of a world nuclear war was paradoxically accompanied by a slowdown in the process of arms limitation and reduction. In this area, there was even a clear regression - when some important agreements ( CFE Treaty, ABM Treaty) ceased to operate, and the conclusion of others was called into question.

Meanwhile, it is the transitional nature of the international system that makes the strengthening of arms control particularly urgent. Its new state puts states before new challenges and requires them to adapt their military-political tools - and in such a way as to avoid conflicts in relations with each other. The experience of several decades accumulated in this regard is unique and invaluable, and it would be simply irrational to start everything from scratch. Another important thing is to demonstrate the readiness of the participants for cooperative actions in the area that is of key importance for them - the sphere of security. An alternative approach - actions based on purely national imperatives and without taking into account the concerns of other countries - would be an extremely "bad" political signal, indicating unwillingness to focus on global interests.

Particular attention should be paid to the issue of current and future the role of nuclear weapons in the emerging international political system.

Each new expansion of the "nuclear club" turns into the heaviest stress for her. existential The incentive for such expansion is the very fact of the preservation of nuclear weapons major countries as a security measure . It is not clear whether any significant changes can be expected from their side in the foreseeable future. Their statements in support of "nuclear zero", as a rule, are perceived with skepticism, proposals in this respect often seem formal, non-specific and not credible. In practice, however, the nuclear potential is modernized, improved and "reconfigured" to solve additional tasks.

Meanwhile in the face of growing military threats, the unspoken ban on the combat use of nuclear weapons may lose its meaning . And then the international political system will face fundamentally a new challenge - the challenge of the local use of nuclear weapons(devices). This can happen in almost any conceivable scenario - with the participation of any of the recognized nuclear powers, unofficial members of the nuclear club, applicants for membership in it or terrorists. Such a formally “local” situation could have extremely serious global consequences.

The highest sense of responsibility, truly innovative thinking and an unprecedented degree of cooperation are required from the nuclear powers in order to minimize the political impulses for such a development. Of particular importance in this respect should be agreements between the United States and Russia on a deep reduction in their nuclear potentials, as well as giving the process of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons a multilateral character.

An important change, which concerns not only the security sphere, but also the toolkit used by states in international affairs in general, is reassessment of the force factor in world and national politics.

In a set of policy instruments of the most developed countries non-military means are becoming increasingly important — economic, financial, scientific and technical, information and many others, conditionally united by the concept of "soft power" . In certain situations, they make it possible to exert effective non-coercive pressure on other participants in international life. The skillful use of these funds also contributes to the formation of a positive image of the country, its positioning as a center of attraction for other countries.

However, the ideas that existed at the beginning of the transition period about the possibility of almost completely eliminating the factor of military force or significantly reducing its role turned out to be clearly overestimated. Many states see military force important tool ensure their national security and enhance their international status .

Major Powers, giving preference to non-coercive methods, politically and psychologically ready for selective direct use of military force or threats to use force in certain critical situations.

As regards a number medium and small countries(especially in the developing world), many of them, for lack of other resources regard military force as of paramount importance .

To an even greater extent, this applies to countries with a non-democratic political system, in the case of the leadership's inclination to oppose itself to the international community using adventurous, aggressive, terrorist methods to achieve its goals.

On the whole, one has to speak rather cautiously about the relative decrease in the role of military force, bearing in mind the developing global trends and the strategic perspective. However, at the same time, there is a qualitative improvement in the means of warfare, as well as a conceptual rethinking of its nature in modern conditions. The use of this tool in real practice is by no means a thing of the past. It is possible that its use may become even wider in the territorial range. The problem will rather be seen in achieving the maximum result in the shortest possible time and while minimizing political costs (both internal and external).

Power tools are often in demand in connection with new security challenges. (migration, ecology, epidemics, vulnerability information technologies, emergencies and so on.). But still, in this area, the search for joint answers occurs mainly outside the force field.

One of the global issues of modern international political development is the relationship between domestic politics, state sovereignty and the international context. The approach proceeding from the inadmissibility of external involvement in the internal affairs of states is usually identified with the Peace of Westphalia (1648). On the conditionally round (350th) anniversary of its conclusion, the peak of the debate about overcoming the "Westphalian tradition" fell. Then, at the end of the last century, ideas about almost cardinal changes that were brewing in the international system in this parameter prevailed. Today, more balanced assessments seem appropriate, also because of the rather contradictory practice of the transition period.

It is clear that in modern conditions one can talk about absolute sovereignty either because of professional illiteracy, or because of deliberate manipulation of this topic. What happens within a country cannot be separated by an impenetrable wall from its external relations; problem situations arising within the state (of an ethno-confessional nature, associated with political contradictions, developing on the basis of separatism, generated by migration and demographic processes, arising from the collapse of state structures, etc.), it becomes more and more difficult to keep in a purely internal context . They affect relations with other countries, affect their interests, affect the state of the international system as a whole.

The strengthening of the interconnection between internal problems and relations with the outside world is also taking place in the context of some more general trends in world development. . Let us mention, for example, the universalist presuppositions and consequences of scientific and technological progress, unprecedented spread of information technologies , growing (although not universally) attention to humanitarian and/or ethical issues, respect for human rights and so on.

Hence two consequences.

Firstly, the state assumes certain obligations regarding the compliance of its internal development with certain international criteria. In essence, in the emerging system of international relations, this practice is gradually becoming more widespread.

Secondly, the question arises about the possibility of external influence on the internal political situations in certain countries, its goals, means, limits, etc. This topic is already much more controversial.

In the maximalist interpretation, it gets its expression in the concept of "regime change" as the most radical means to achieve the desired foreign policy result. . Initiators of the operation against Iraq in 2003 pursued precisely this goal, although they refrained from its formal proclamation. A in 2011 the organizers of international military actions against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, in fact, set such a task openly.

However, we are talking about an extremely sensitive subject that affects national sovereignty and requires a very careful attitude. For otherwise, there may be a dangerous erosion of the most important foundations of the existing world order and the reign of chaos, in which only the right of the strong will dominate. But still it is important to emphasize that both international law and foreign policy practice are evolving (however, very slowly and with big reservations) in the direction of abandoning the fundamental inadmissibility of outside influence on the situation in a particular country .

The reverse side of the problem is the very often encountered harsh opposition of the authorities to any kind of external involvement. Such a line is usually explained by the need to protect against interference in the internal affairs of the country, but in fact it is often motivated by a lack of desire for transparency, fear of criticism, and rejection of alternative approaches. There may also be a direct accusation of external "ill-wishers" in order to transfer the vector of public discontent to them and justify harsh actions against the opposition. True, the experience of the “Arab Spring” of 2011 showed that this may not give regimes that have exhausted their internal legitimacy any additional chances – thus, by the way, marking another rather remarkable innovation for the emerging international system.

But still on this basis, additional conflict may arise in international political development. Serious contradictions cannot be ruled out between the external contractors of a country engulfed in unrest, when the events taking place in it are interpreted from directly opposite positions.

In general, in the formation of a new system of international relations, a parallel development of two, it would seem that, opposite tendencies. .

On the one side, in societies with a prevailing political culture of the Western type, there is a certain increase in the willingness to tolerate involvement in "foreign affairs" based on a humanitarian or solidarity plan . However, these motives are often neutralized by concerns about the costs of such intervention for the country (financial and associated with the threat of human losses).

On the other side, there is a growing opposition to it from those who consider themselves its actual or eventual object . The first of these two tendencies appears to be forward-looking, but the second draws its strength from its appeal to traditional approaches and is likely to have broader support.

The objective task facing the international political system is to find adequate methods of responding to possible conflicts that arise on this basis. It is quite likely that here, taking into account, in particular, the events of 2011 in and around Libya, it will be necessary to foresee situations with the possible use of force, but not through a voluntaristic denial of international law, but through its strengthening and development.

However, the issue, if we keep in mind the longer-term prospects, has a much broader character. The circumstances in which the imperatives of the internal development of states and their international political relations collide are among the most difficult to bring to a common denominator. There is a range of conflict-generating topics around which the most serious knots of tension arise (or may arise in the future) not for situational, but for fundamental reasons . For example:

- mutual responsibility of states in matters of use and cross-border movement natural resources;

— efforts to ensure their own security and the perception of such efforts by other states;

- a conflict between the right of peoples to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states.

Simple solutions for this kind of problems are not visible. The viability of the emerging system of international relations will, among other things, depend on the ability to respond to this challenge.

The collisions noted above lead both analysts and practitioners to the question of the role of the state in the new international political conditions. Some time ago, in conceptual assessments regarding the dynamics and direction of the development of the international system, rather pessimistic assumptions were made about the fate of the state in connection with the growing globalization and increasing interdependence. The institution of the state, according to such assessments, is undergoing increasing erosion, and the state itself is gradually losing its status as the main actor on the world stage.

During the transition period, this hypothesis was tested - and was not confirmed. The processes of globalization, the development of global governance and international regulation do not “cancel” the state, do not push it into the background . None of the significant functions that the state performs as a fundamental element of the international system, it has not lost .

At the same time, the functions and role of the state are undergoing a significant transformation.. This happens primarily in the context of domestic development, but its influence on international political life is also significant . Moreover, as a general trend, one can note the growth of expectations in relation to the state, which is forced to respond to them, including by intensifying its participation in international life.

Along with expectations in the context of globalization and the information revolution, there are higher requirements for the capacity and effectiveness of the state on the world stage, the quality of its interaction with the surrounding international political environment . Isolationism, xenophobia, causing hostility towards other countries can bring certain opportunistic dividends, but become absolutely dysfunctional at any significant time intervals.

Against, the demand for cooperative interaction with other participants in international life is growing. And its absence may turn out to be the reason for the state to gain a dubious reputation as an “outcast” - not as some kind of formal status, but as a kind of stigma that is secretly marked by “shaking hands” regimes. Although there are different views on how correct such a classification is and whether it is used for manipulative purposes.

Another problem is the emergence of incapacitated and incapacitated states.(failed states and failing states). This phenomenon cannot be called absolutely new, but the conditions of post-bipolarity to some extent facilitate its occurrence and at the same time make it more noticeable. Here, too, there are no clear and generally accepted criteria. The question of organizing the administration of territories where there is no any effective power is one of the most difficult for the modern international system.

An extremely important novelty of modern world development is the growing role in international life, along with states, of other actors as well. True, in the period approximately from the beginning of the 1970s to the beginning of the 2000s, there were clearly overestimated expectations in this regard; even globalization has often been interpreted as a gradual but increasingly large-scale replacement of states by non-state structures, which will lead to a radical transformation of international relations. Today it is clear that this will not happen in the foreseeable future.

But myself the phenomenon of "non-state actors" as actors in the international political system has received significant development . Throughout the spectrum of the evolution of society (whether it be the sphere of material production or the organization of financial flows, ethno-cultural or environmental movements, human rights or criminal activity, etc.), wherever there is a need for cross-border interaction, this happens with the participation of an increasing number of non-state actors .

Some of them, speaking on the international field, really challenge the state (such as terrorist networks), can focus on behavior independent of it and even have more significant resources (business structures), are willing to take on a number of its routine and especially newly emerging functions (traditional non-governmental organizations). As a result, the international political space becomes polyvalent, is structured according to more complex, multidimensional algorithms.

However, in none of the listed areas, as already noted, the state does not leave this space. . In some cases, it leads a tough fight with competitors - and this becomes a powerful stimulus for interstate cooperation (for example, on issues of combating international terrorism and international crime). In others, it seeks to put them under control, or at least to ensure that their activities are more open and contain a more significant social component (as is the case with transnational business structures).

The activity of some of the traditional non-governmental organizations operating in a cross-border context can irritate states and governments, especially when power structures become the object of criticism and pressure. But more competitive in the international environment are states that are able to establish effective interaction with their competitors and opponents. The circumstance that such interaction increases the stability of the international order and contributes to a more effective solution of emerging problems is also of significant importance. And this brings us to the consideration of the question of how the international system functions in modern conditions.

1. Functioning of the international system

The framework of the international system is formed by the practice of interaction between states as the main participants in international life. Such interaction - which is more or less regular, subject-focused, often (though not always) carried out in established institutional forms - ensures the functioning of the international system.

A brief overview of this issue is useful in order to focus attention on the specifics of the emerging international system. It seems appropriate to carry it out in several sections:

— Firstly , noting the role of states exercising the function of leadership in international affairs (or claiming to be such);

— Secondly , highlighting the permanent multilateral structures within which interstate interaction is carried out;

— Thirdly , highlighting the situations when the effectiveness of such interaction is reflected in the formation of stable elements of the international system (integration complexes, political spaces, international regimes, etc.).

Although the main actors on the world stage there are states (a total number of about two hundred), far from all of them are really involved in the regulation of international life. Active and purposeful participation in it is available to a relatively small circle leading states.

The phenomenon of international leadership has two hypostases . In one case, it means the ability to express the aspirations, interests, goals of a certain group of states(in the theoretical limit - all countries of the world), in the other - readiness for initiative, often costly efforts to solve certain international political problems and mobilize for this purpose other participants in international life. It is possible for the state to exercise the function of a leader both in one of these two dimensions, and in both. Leadership can also be of a different nature in terms of the range of tasks put forward, the number of states affected, spatial localization — from regional and even local to global .

Within the framework of the Yalta-Potsdam international system only two states put forward claims for global leadership - USSR and USA. But there were also countries with ambition or real leadership potential on a smaller scale - For example, Yugoslavia within the framework of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, China in their attempts to challenge the international political establishment of the bipolar system, France times of the Gaullist opposition to the USA.

After the end of the Cold War the most obvious example of ambitious claims to global leadership was the policy USA which actually reduced him to the task of consolidating his exclusive position in the international system. This line culminated during the neoconservative period in power. (the first administration of George W. Bush) and then declined due to its obvious dysfunction. At the end of the transitional period of the USA begin to practice less straightforward methods, with a predominant emphasis on soft power, non-force tools and with much more attention to allies and partners .

Objective reasons for US leadership remain very significant. By and large, at the global level, no one can throw them an open and full-scale challenge. But the relative dominance of the United States is eroding, while the capabilities of other states are gradually beginning to expand. .

With the acquisition of a more polycentric character by the international system, this trend is intensifying. There are more states with leadership potential - even if we are talking about leadership in limited territorial areas or in relation to individual functional spaces. However, this has happened before, for example, within the EU, where the initiating role in the promotion of a number of integration projects was played by a tandem France and Germany. Today, it is appropriate to assume that the phenomenon of regional leadership will occur much more frequently.

Such development, in principle, works for the structuring of the international system and, thereby, for maintaining its stability. But this is only a statement of the most general plan. On practice important are the qualitative characteristics of both leadership itself and its subject . For example, eventual Iran's claim to regional leadership are one of the reasons for the wary attitude towards Tehran - and this can, in an unfavorable scenario, become an additional source of tension in the Middle East and even beyond its borders.

For a state focused on the implementation of leadership functions, great importance has the perception of the course pursued by the international community. And here the vocabulary used is no less important than practical actions. In Russia discovered this already in the early phase of the transition period, when they considered it necessary to abandon the term " Near Abroad» in relation to the countries of the post-Soviet area. And although the objective possibilities and demand for Russian leadership here are virtually undeniable , before Moscow arises extremely serious task — neutralize its interpretation through the prism of suspicions about Russia's "neo-imperial ambitions".

In a post-bipolar world there is a growing demand for leadership to organize the collective efforts of participants in international life in solving the problems that arise before them. In the era of the Cold War and bipolarity, the division into “us” and “them”, as well as the struggle for the support of those who were in between, were themselves factors in the mobilization of participants in international life. This circumstance could work both to promote certain initiatives, proposals, plans, programs, etc., and to counteract them. Today, there is no such “automatic” formation of a coalition for or against a certain international project.

In this case, the project means any problematic situation in relation to which the participants in international life question about actions to achieve a certain result . Such actions can be providing economic assistance, using political levers, sending a peacekeeping contingent, carrying out humanitarian intervention, conducting a rescue mission, organizing an anti-terrorist operation and so on. Who will carry out such actions? Those of the possible participants who are directly affected by this project are primarily concerned with their own immediate interests - and they can be not only different, but also opposite in different countries. Others may see no reason to get involved, especially if it comes at a financial, resource or human cost.

Therefore, the promotion of the project becomes possible only in the case of a very powerful impulse . Its source should be a state capable of performing the function of an international leader in this particular case. . The conditions for fulfilling this role are:

- the presence of a sufficiently high motivation for this state to implement the planned;

— significant domestic political support;

— understanding and solidarity on the part of the main international partners;

- agreement to go to financial costs (sometimes very large-scale);

- if necessary - the ability and readiness to use their civilian and military personnel (at the risk of human casualties and a corresponding reaction in their own country).

The details of this conditional scheme are subject to change. depending on specific problem situations . Sometimes in order to resolve the latter, multilateral mechanisms of a more permanent nature are also being created - as, for example, is the case in the EU and is trying to be done in the CSTO . But practice shows that even the created, tested and mobilized structures of coalition interaction do not always work in the mode of automatic reaction. Moreover, “coalitions of the willing” do not arise on their own; countries willing to take part in the project. So the problem of leadership as a "trigger" of international political efforts, especially collective ones, is of key importance.

It is clear that this role can be claimed primarily by the largest and most influential countries. But the nature of their claims also matters. Of the 10-15 states that make up the core of the modern world system , those who show an interest in strengthening the international political order, as well as responsibility in terms of respect for international law and the interests of other states, can count on successful leadership . However, it is appropriate to consider this problem from a different angle - the ability and readiness for "responsible leadership" can become one of the informal but important criteria by which the state will be considered part of the core of the modern international political system.

Of particular importance for the structuring of the international system is joint leadership of leading countries in the implementation of major political projects. During the Cold War, an example of this was initiated by the three powers - USA, Soviet Union and Great Britain- Establishment of a nuclear test ban regime in three environments (1963 treaty). Shared leadership could play a similar role today Russia and USA in the sphere of nuclear arms reduction and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons after the “reset” of their relations at the turn of the 2010s.

The infrastructure of the modern international system is formed by Also intergovernmental organizations and other formats of multilateral interaction between states. In general, the activity of these mechanisms is mainly derivative, secondary in nature with respect to the functions, role, positioning of states in the international arena . But their significance for the organization of the modern international system is certainly great. And some multilateral structures occupy a special place in the existing international order.

First of all, this applies to United Nations. She remains unique and irreplaceable in its role . This, Firstly, political role: The UN gives legitimacy to the actions of the international community, "sanctifies" certain approaches to problem situations, is a source of international law, is not comparable with any other structures in its representativeness (because it unites almost all the states of the world). A Secondly , functional role- activities in dozens of specific areas, many of which are "mastered" only through the UN. In the new system of international relations, the demand for the UN in both of these qualities is only increasing.

But, as in the previous state of the system of international relations, The UN is the object of sharp criticism - for low efficiency, bureaucratization, slowness and so on. The international system that is being formed today is unlikely to add any fundamentally new incentives to the implementation of reforms in the UN. However, it strengthens the urgency of these transformations, especially since the possibility of their implementation in the new international political conditions, when the bipolar confrontation is a thing of the past, is becoming more realistic.

We are not talking about a radical reform of the UN ("world government", etc.) - it is doubtful that such a thing could be politically possible today. However, when less ambitious benchmarks are set in the debate on this score, two topics are seen as priorities. Firstly, This increased representation on the Security Council(without violating the fundamental algorithm of its functioning, i.e. with the preservation of special rights for the five permanent members of this Areopagus); Secondly, extension of UN activities to some new areas(without radical "breakthroughs", but with a gradual increase in the elements of global regulation).

If The Security Council is the pinnacle of the international system, structured with the help of the UN, then five countries that are its permanent members (USA, Russia, China, France and UK) have an exclusive status even at this highest hierarchical level. Which, however, does not at all turn this group into a kind of "directory" that governs the world.

Each of the "Big Five" can block in the Security Council a decision that he considers unacceptable , - in this sense, they are united primarily by the fact of having "negative guarantees". What about them joint speech in support of one or another “positive project”, then such, of course, has significant political weight. But, Firstly , consensus within the "five" (especially on a difficult problem) is an order of magnitude more difficult to achieve than to stop an undesirable decision, using the right of veto. Secondly, the support of other countries is also needed (including according to the procedural rules of the Security Council). Third, the very fact of the exclusive rights of an extremely narrow group of countries is subject to growing criticism in the UN - especially in light of the strengthening of the world positions of a number of states that are not included in the circle of the elite. And in general the very “chosenness” of the countries of permanent members of the UNSC stems from the circumstances that were relevant during the formation of the UN .

Another format of the highest hierarchical leveluntil 2104 was"Group of Eight", or " big eight» (G8), consisting of USA, UK, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada and Russia. It is noteworthy that its formation falls just at the beginning of the transition period in international relations - when in the existing since the 1970s years" big seven” begin to gradually involve first the Soviet Union, and then, after its collapse, Russia.

Then the very fact of the emergence of such a structure testified to significant changes in the existing international order. Its political legitimacy was therefore very high. Today, after it has become the "Big Seven" again, it has faded somewhat, but still remains. The agenda still includes large, large-scale and problematic topics - which affects their coverage by the media, the development of policies of the participating countries in relevant areas, the achievement of international agreements, etc., i.e. The impact of the "Big Seven" on the international system, of course, takes place - although, however, indirectly and indirectly.

As a more adequate response to the demand of the time, a new format of multilateral interaction is emerging - “ big twenty» (G20). It is noteworthy that it appears in the context of the search for a way out of the global financial and economic crisis 2008-2010, when the idea of ​​forming a more representative pool of states for this purpose is gaining wide popularity. They also had to ensure a more balanced impact on world economic development in post-crisis conditions in order to prevent its new disruptions.

The G20 is a more representative format than the SB UN andG8 - G7 both quantitatively and qualitatively. The G20 formula, of course, meets the motives of political expediency, but to some extent it is redundant in terms of functional capacity. G 20 is not even a structure yet, but just a forum, and not for negotiations, but for the exchange of views, as well as the adoption of decisions of the most general plan (those that do not require careful coordination).

Even in this capacity, the G20 has more than limited experience in practical functioning. It is not yet clear whether its activities will lead to any practical results and whether they will be more significant than what other structures offer (for example, recommendations through the IMF). The attention of the G20 is focused only on the financial and economic aspects of international development. Whether the participants will want and be able to go beyond these limits is an open question.

Among the mechanisms of a more traditional plan, organizing the multilateral interaction of participants in international life on a regular basis, include intergovernmental organizations. They are an essential structural component of the international system, but generally inferior in terms of their influence major states . But about a dozen of the most significant of them - interstate organizations of general (or very broad) purpose - play an important role in their regions, act as a regulator and coordinator of the actions of member countries, and sometimes they are also empowered to represent them in relations with the outside world .

Multilateral interaction, carried out within one or another framework on a permanent basis, on a significant scale and with a sufficiently deep penetration into the matter of society, can lead to the emergence of some new quality in the relations of the participating states. In this case, there is reason to talk about the formation of more advanced elements of the international infrastructure in comparison with what traditional intergovernmental organizations represent, although the line separating them is sometimes ephemeral or even conditional.

The most significant in this regard is phenomenon of international integration. In the very general view He is expressed in the development of unification processes between several states, the vector of which is focused on the formation of a larger integral complex .

The activation of integration trends in international life is of a global nature, but their most noticeable manifestation has become European Union practitioner. Although there is no reason to portray his experience as a series of continuous and unconditional victories, the successes achieved in this direction are undeniable. Actually The EU remains the most ambitious international project inherited from the past century. Among others it is an example of the successful organization of space in that part of the world system, which for centuries was a field of conflicts and wars, and today has become a zone of stability and security.

Integration experience is also in demand in a number of other regions of the world, although with much less impressive results. The latter are interesting not only and not even primarily in economic terms. An important function of integration processes is the ability to neutralize instability at the regional level .

However, there is no obvious answer to the question about the consequences of regional integration for the formation of global integrity. Removing competition between states (or channeling it into a cooperative channel), regional integration can pave the way for mutual rivalry of larger territorial entities , consolidating each of them and increasing its viability and offensiveness as a participant in the international system.

Here, therefore, a more general theme arises - the ratio of the global and regional levels in the international system.

Formation of an international infrastructure arising from the readiness of states to entrust some of the functions of transnational management to interstate or non-governmental organizations of the appropriate profile not limited by regional frameworks . Its configuration is often determined by other factors as well - for example, industry-specific, problematic, functional features and the regulatory tasks arising from them (as, for example, in the case of OPEC). A the result may be the emergence of specific spaces and regimes, which, according to certain parameters, stand out from the general array of norms, institutions and behavioral practices inherent in the international system.

Some regimes are practically global in nature (non-proliferation of nuclear weapons), others are not tied to any territorial areas (control of missile technologies). But in practical terms, the formation of specific international regimes is easier to carry out at the regional level. Sometimes it is a step that anticipates closer and more imperative global commitments and structures, in other cases, on the contrary, it is a means of collective defense against the manifestations of globalism.

1. Main actors of the international system: great and regional powers

Leadership in the international system is determined by the status of great and regional powers. First, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive understanding of what is meant by leadership in modern world politics.

By the definition of a Russian researcher HELL. Bogaturova, leadership is characterized by "the ability of a country or several countries to influence the formation of the international order or its individual fragments", while the circle of leaders may have its own hierarchy. Can be distinguished classic leaders, having a set of the best military, political, economic and other indicators that allow them to project their influence at the international level , And non-classical leaders, which compensated for the lack of significant military power with economic weight (such leaders are Japan and Germany).

The original leader hierarchy in the second half of the 20th century. formed on the basis of presence of armed force necessary to establish control over the behavior of other states, economic power, ideological influence that promotes voluntary obedience to the leader. In the 1980s and 1990s added to these principles scientific and technical potential, availability of organizational resources, ability to project “soft power” . Has been singled out the next set of five traits required for leadership in world politics:

1) military force;

2) scientific and technical potential;

3) production and economic potential;

4) organizational resource;

5) the total creative resource (the potential for the production of innovations demanded by life, both in the technological and in the political and cultural-philosophical sense).

HELL. Voskresensky connects the processes of structuring the regional and macroregional space, the types and intensity of transregional ties with the discussion about leadership in world politics. Geopolitical changes in the regional space, as a result of which the growing regions begin to reformat the world order, in particular, with the help of new trans-regional links, driven by the activities of powers at the global level . Pomi-mo USA as a dominant state(the influence of which has somewhat weakened compared to the previous hegemonic status), it is also possible to single out a whole group of states that do not have all the criteria for becoming a dominant state , nevertheless having more or less potential to "direct or correct world development, primarily in a particular geographical region . This idea, as noted by many researchers, largely determines the formation of a new model of the world order based on the processes of regionalization and new transregional ties.

It should be noted uhwillsYuconcept of "great power" in the literature on international relations.

Great power concept (great power) was originally used to study the interaction of the main players in a historical context. For this, as a rule, an analysis of the period from the 17th century to the present is carried out. until the end of World War II, the post-bipolar system of international relations is much less frequently included in this analysis. This is done by such researchers as M. Wright, P. Kennedy, K. Waltz, A. F. Organsky, J. Kugler, M. F. Levy, R. Gilpin and others. C. Waltz, in a specific historical period of time, it is not difficult to single out great powers , and most researchers end up converging on the same countries .

Without going into details of the historical interpretation of the actions of great powers, let us dwell on the term itself and the criteria necessary for distinguishing oneself as a great power in the literature on the history of international relations. P. kenne-dee characterizes a great power as "a state capable of withstanding a war against any other state." R. Gilpin distinguishes great powers by their ability to form and impose the rules of the game, which they and all other states in the system must obey. Gilpin in his definition relies on the opinion of R. Aron: “The structure of the system of international relations always has an oligopolistic character. In each particular period, the key actors determined the system themselves to a greater extent than were influenced by it. K. Waltz identifies five criteria for a great power, noting that all of them are necessary to acquire this status:

1) the number of population and the size of the territory;

2) availability of resources;

3) economic power;

4) military force;

5) political stability and competence.

T.A. Shakleina believes that V A great power is a state that retains a very high (or absolute) degree of independence in conducting domestic and foreign policy, which not only ensures national interests, but also has a significant (to varying degrees, up to decisive) influence on world and regional politics and the politics of individual countries (peace-regulating activity), and possessing all or a significant part of the traditional parameters of a great power (territory, population, natural resources, military potential, economic potential, intellectual and cultural potential, scientific and technical, sometimes information potential is singled out separately). Independence in pursuing a policy of a world-regulating nature presupposes the presence of will in pursuing such a policy. The presence of historical experience, tradition and culture of participation in world politics as a decisive and / or active player.

B. Buzan and O. UAndver claim that great power status includes several characteristics: material resources (in accordance with the criteria of K. Waltz), formal recognition of this status by other participants in international relations , and power actions at the global level . They define a great power as a country that is viewed by other powerful powers as having the clear economic, military, and political potential to aspire to superpower status in the short to medium term. In their understanding of the hierarchy of influential powers, its top level is occupied by superpowers, lower — regional, A great powers find themselves in the middle .

Superpowers and Great Powers determine global level of international relations having more (in the case of superpowers) or less (in the case of great powers) ability to intervene in various security complexes to which they do not geographically belong.

Great powers compared to superpowers, they may not have as many resources (military, political, economic, etc.) or not have the same line of conduct (the obligation to actively participate in the processes of ensuring security in all spheres of the system of international relations). The status of a great power differs from the status of a regional power in that a great power is referred to based on "calculations at the systemic (global) level regarding the current and future distribution of power ". Exactly the emphasis on becoming a superpower in certain areas distinguishes a great power from a regional one, and in this sense, great importance is attached to the foreign-political process and discourse in other great powers.

The definition and criteria for the selection of great powers by B. Buzan and O. Weaver seem to be optimal for the selection of great powers. They include objective components (availability of resources in various areas), as well as behavioral (participation in maintaining global security) and subjective (motivation to increase one's status to a superpower and the corresponding perception of this intention by other participants in international processes). These criteria make it possible not only to single out great powers at the global level, but also to trace the difference in the concepts of great and regional powers.

Unlike the concept of great power regional power concept (regional power) arose simultaneously with the emergence of studies on the structuring of regional sub-systems of international relations . In one of the first publications about the concept of regional powers, the following is given definition of a regional power: it is a state that is part of a particular region, can oppose any coalition of other states in the region, has significant influence in the region and, in addition to regional weight, is a great power on a world level .

Theorists of regional processes B. Buzan and O. UAndver think that a regional power is a power with significant capabilities and strong influence in the region . She determines the number of poles in it (unipolar structure in South Africa, bipolar in South Asia, multipolar in the Middle East, South America, Southeast Asia), but its influence is mostly limited to a particular region . Great powers and superpowers are forced to take into account their influence in the region, but at the same time, regional powers are rarely taken into account when forming the global level of the system of international relations.

Of great interest in this regard are the principles comparison of regional powers proposed D. Nolte. His work is based on power transition theory (power transition theory) developed A.F.K. Organic, which represents the system of international relations as a hierarchical system with a dominant power at the head and the presence of regional, great, medium and small powers that occupy their subordinate position in this system .

All subsystems of international relations function in accordance with the same logic as the global system of international relations , i.e. at the top of each subsystem there is a dominant state or a pyramid of power in a given region. According to the author, the presence of certain regional powers determines the structure of this region.

Considering different criteria for the selection of regional powers , D. Nolte highlights the following: regional power- This a state that is part of this region, which has claims to leadership in it, has a significant impact on the geopolitics of this region and its political construction, has material (military, economic, demographic), organizational (political) and ideological resources for projecting its influence, or closely associated with the region in the economy, politics and culture, having a real impact on events taking place in the region, including through participation in regional institutions that determine the regional security agenda . He notes that the participation of a regional power in global institutions, one way or another, expresses the interests of the countries of the entire region. His work also highlights the indicators of these categories in detail. Based on this concept, it seems possible to single out regional powers on the basis of clearly defined criteria proposed by D. Nolte in the space of any region.

To build a hierarchy of regional order, it is also necessary to understand what the concept of " middle power". For example, R. Cohane defines a middle-level power as " a state whose leaders believe that it cannot act effectively alone, but can have a systematic influence over a small group of countries or through any international institutions » . It seems that a middle-level power as a whole has fewer resources than a regional power, although most researchers do not identify specific criteria for differentiating the models of middle-level powers and the regional level. Middle powers have some resources and some influence, but are not able to have a decisive influence on the structuring of the regional space and do not see themselves as a leader on a global scale .

Based on these methodological principles (criteria for identifying great and regional powers, as well as middle-level powers), it seems possible to build a model of a regional order in any region of the world, determine the contours of the interaction of powers within a particular region, and also make forecast about the future development of the regional subsystem of international relations.

Main literature

Bogaturov A.D. International relations and foreign policy of Russia: scientific edition. - M.: Aspect Press Publishing House, 2017. P. 30-37.

World integrated regional studies: textbook / ed. prof. HELL. Resurrection. - M.: Master: INFRA-M, 2017. P. 99-106.

Modern international relations: textbook / Ed. A.V. Torkunova, A.V. Malgin. - M.: Aspect Press, 2012. S.44-72.

additional literature

Modern World Politics: Applied Analysis / Ed. ed. A. D. Bogaturov. 2nd ed., rev. and additional - M.: Aspect Press, 2010. - 592 p.

Modern global problems/ Rev. ed. V. G. Baranovsky, A. D. Bogaturov. - M.: Aspect Press, 2010. - 350 p.

Etzioni A. From empire to community: a new approach to international relations / Per. from English. ed. V.L. Inozemtseva. - M.: Ladomir, 2004. - 384 p.

Buzan V. From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Keohane R.O., Nye J.S., Jr. Power and Interdependence. 4th ed. Boston: Longman, 2011.

Rosenau J. N. The Study of World Politics. Vol. 2: Globalization and Governance. L. and N.Y.: Routledge, 2006.

The Oxford Handbook of International Relations / Ed. by C. Reus-Smit, D. Snidal. Oxford University Press, 2008.

Keohane O.R. Lilliputians" Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics // International Organization. Vol. 23. No. 2. P. 296.

Nolle D. How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topic. P. 10-12.

At the end of XX - beginning of XXI century. new phenomena emerged in international relations and the foreign policy of states.

First, a significant role in the transformation of international processes began to play globalization.

Globalization(from the French global- universal) is a process of expanding and deepening the interdependence of the modern world, the formation of a unified system of financial, economic, socio-political and cultural ties based on the latest means of informatics and telecommunications.

The process of expanding globalization reveals that to a large extent it presents new, favorable opportunities, primarily for the most powerful countries, consolidates the system of unfair redistribution of the planet's resources in their interests, contributes to dissemination of attitudes and values ​​of Western civilization to all regions of the world. In this regard, globalization is Westernization, or Americanization, behind which one can see the realization of American interests in various regions of the globe. As the modern English researcher J. Gray points out, global capitalism as a movement towards free markets is not a natural process, but rather a political project based on American power. This, in fact, is not hidden by American theorists and politicians. Thus, G. Kissinger in one of his last books states: “Globalization views the world as a single market in which the most efficient and competitive flourish. It accepts and even welcomes the fact that the free market will ruthlessly separate the efficient from the inefficient, even at the cost of political upheavals". Such an understanding of globalization and the corresponding behavior of the West gives rise to opposition in many countries of the world, public protests, including in Western countries (the movement of anti-globalists and alter-globalists). The growth of opponents of globalization confirms the growing need for the creation of international norms and institutions that give it a civilized character.

Secondly, in the modern world it is becoming more and more obvious the trend of growth in the number and activity of subjects of international relations. In addition to the increase in the number of states in connection with the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia, various international organizations are increasingly being promoted to the international arena.

As you know, international organizations are divided into interstate , or intergovernmental (IGO), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

There are currently more than 250 interstate organizations. A significant role among them belongs to the UN and such organizations as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the WTO, the IMF, NATO, ASEAN, etc. The United Nations, established in 1945, has become the most important institutional mechanism for the multifaceted interaction of various states in order to maintain peace and security, promoting the economic and social progress of peoples. Today, its members are more than 190 states. The main organs of the UN are the General Assembly, the Security Council and a number of other councils and institutions. The General Assembly is made up of UN member states, each of which has one vote. The decisions of this body do not have coercive force, but they have considerable moral authority. The Security Council consists of 15 members, five of which - Great Britain, China, Russia, USA, France - are permanent members, the other 10 are elected by the General Assembly for a period of two years. Decisions of the Security Council are taken by majority vote, with each of the permanent members having the right of veto. In the event of a threat to peace, the Security Council has the authority to send a peacekeeping mission to the relevant region or apply sanctions against the aggressor, give permission for military operations aimed at ending violence.

Since the 1970s The so-called "Group of Seven", an informal organization of the leading countries of the world - Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada, the USA, France, Japan, began to play an increasingly active role as an instrument for regulating international relations. These countries coordinate their positions and actions on international issues at annual meetings. In 1991, USSR President MS Gorbachev was invited as a guest to the G-7 meeting, and then Russia began to regularly participate in the work of this organization. Since 2002, Russia has become a full member of the work of this group and the "seven" has become known as "group of eight". In recent years, the leaders of the 20 most powerful economies in the world have begun to gather ( "twenty") to discuss, first of all, the crisis phenomena in the world economy.

In the conditions of post-bipolarity and globalization, the need to reform many interstate organizations is increasingly being revealed. In this regard, the issue of reforming the UN is now being actively discussed in order to give its work greater dynamics, efficiency and legitimacy.

In the modern world, there are about 27 thousand non-governmental international organizations. The growth of their numbers, the growing influence on world events became especially noticeable in the second half of the 20th century. Along with such well-known organizations as the International Red Cross, the International Olympic Committee, Doctors Without Borders, etc., in recent decades, with the growth of environmental problems, the environmental organization Greenpeace has gained international prestige. However, it should be noted that for the international community, an increasing concern is created by the activating organizations of an illegal nature - terrorist organizations, drug trafficking and piracy groups.

Thirdly, in the second half of the XX century. huge influence on the world stage began to acquire international monopolies, or transnational corporations(TNK). These include enterprises, institutions and organizations whose purpose is to make a profit, and which operate through their branches simultaneously in several states. The largest TECs have enormous economic resources, giving them advantages not only over small, but even over large powers. At the end of the XX century. there were more than 53 thousand TNCs in the world.

Fourth, the trend in the development of international relations has become growing global threats, and, accordingly, the need for their joint solution. The global threats facing humanity can be divided into traditional And new. Among new challenges The world order should be called international terrorism and drug trafficking, lack of control over transnational financial communications, etc. to traditional include: the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of nuclear war, the problems of preserving the environment, the exhaustibility of many natural resources in the near future, and the growth of social contrasts. Thus, in the context of globalization, many social problems. The world order is increasingly threatened by the deepening gap in the living standards of the peoples of developed and developing countries. Approximately 20% of the world's population currently consume, according to the UN, about 90% of all goods produced in the world, the remaining 80% of the population are content with 10% of goods produced. Less developed countries regularly face mass diseases, starvation, as a result of which a large number of people die. The last decades have been marked by an increase in the flow of cardiovascular and oncological diseases, the spread of AIDS, alcoholism, and drug addiction.

Mankind has not yet found reliable ways to solve problems that threaten international stability. But the need for decisive advancement along the path of reducing the urgent contrasts in the political and socio-economic development of the peoples of the Earth is becoming more and more obvious, otherwise the future of the planet seems rather gloomy.