Artillery of the Soviet Army in the First Post-War Years (1945-1953). Soviet post-war anti-tank artillery

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The fighters of these units were envied and - at the same time - sympathized with. “The trunk is long, life is short”, “Double salary - triple death!”, “Farewell, Motherland!” - all these nicknames, hinting at high mortality, went to the soldiers and officers who fought in the anti-tank artillery (IPTA) of the Red Army.

The calculation of the anti-tank guns of senior sergeant A. Golovalov is firing at German tanks. In recent battles, the calculation destroyed 2 enemy tanks and 6 firing points (the battery of Senior Lieutenant A. Medvedev). The explosion on the right is the return shot of a German tank.

All this is true: both the salaries increased by one and a half to two times for the IPTA units on the staff, and the length of the barrels of many anti-tank guns, and the unusually high mortality among the artillerymen of these units, whose positions were often located near, or even in front of the infantry front ... But the truth and the fact that anti-tank artillery accounted for 70% of the destroyed German tanks; and the fact that among the artillerymen awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, every fourth is a soldier or officer of anti-tank units. In absolute terms, it looks like this: out of 1744 gunners - Heroes of the Soviet Union, whose biographies are presented in the lists of the Heroes of the Country project, 453 people fought in anti-tank fighter units, the main and only task of which was direct fire at German tanks ...
Keep up with the tanks

In itself, the concept of anti-tank artillery as a separate type of this kind of troops appeared shortly before the Second World War. During the First World War, conventional field guns were quite successful in fighting slow-moving tanks, for which armor-piercing shells were quickly developed. In addition, until the beginning of the 1930s, tank reservations remained mainly bulletproof, and only with the approach of a new world war began to intensify. Accordingly, it also required specific means of combating this type of weapon, which became anti-tank artillery.

In the USSR, the first experience of creating special anti-tank guns came at the very beginning of the 1930s. In 1931, a 37 mm anti-tank gun appeared, which was a licensed copy of a German gun designed for the same purpose. A year later, a Soviet semi-automatic 45 mm cannon was installed on the carriage of this gun, and thus a 45 mm anti-tank gun of the 1932 model - 19-K appeared. Five years later, it was modernized, resulting in a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model of the year - 53-K. It was she who became the most massive domestic anti-tank gun - the famous "forty-five".

Calculation of the M-42 anti-tank gun in battle. Photo: warphoto.ru

Soviet gunners are preparing to open fire with a 45-mm anti-tank gun. Karelian front.

Alas, by the beginning of World War II, the country did not have time to complete the formation of anti-tank brigades of the RGC. But even unformed, these units, which came at the disposal of the army and front commands, made it possible to maneuver them much more efficiently than anti-tank units in the state of rifle divisions. And although the beginning of the war led to catastrophic losses throughout the Red Army, including in artillery units, due to this, the necessary experience was accumulated, which rather soon led to the emergence of specialized anti-tank units.

Birth of artillery special forces

It quickly became clear that regular divisional anti-tank weapons were not capable of seriously resisting the Wehrmacht’s tank spearheads, and the lack of anti-tank guns of the required caliber forced light field guns to be rolled out for direct fire. At the same time, their calculations, as a rule, did not have the necessary training, which means that they sometimes acted insufficiently efficiently even in favorable conditions for them. In addition, due to the evacuation of artillery factories and the massive losses of the first months of the war, the shortage of main guns in the Red Army became catastrophic, so they had to be disposed of much more carefully.

Soviet artillerymen roll 45-mm M-42 anti-tank guns, following in the ranks of the advancing infantry on the Central Front.

Soviet gunners with a 45 mm anti-tank gun in December 1941. Photo: Museum of Engineering Troops and Artillery, St. Petersburg

The crossing of the artillery crew and the 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K across the river. The crossing is carried out on a pontoon of landing boats A-3

Pushkar elite

The appearance of the order was preceded by a great deal of preparatory work, concerning not only calculations, but also how many guns and what caliber the new units should have and what advantages their composition would enjoy. It was quite clear that the fighters and commanders of such units, who would have to risk their lives daily in the most dangerous areas of defense, needed a powerful not only material, but also a moral incentive. They did not assign the title of guards to the new units during the formation, as was done with the units of the Katyusha rocket launchers, but decided to leave the well-established word “fighter” and add “anti-tank” to it, emphasizing the special significance and purpose of the new units. For the same effect, as far as we can judge now, the introduction of a special sleeve insignia for all soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery was calculated - a black rhombus with crossed golden trunks of stylized Shuvalov "unicorns".

All this was spelled out in the order in separate paragraphs. The same separate clauses prescribed special financial conditions for new units, as well as norms for the return of wounded soldiers and commanders to duty. So, the commanding staff of these units and subunits was set one and a half, and the junior and private - a double salary. For each downed tank, the crew of the gun was also entitled to a cash bonus: the commander and gunner - 500 rubles each, the rest of the calculation numbers - 200 rubles each. It is noteworthy that initially other amounts appeared in the text of the document: 1000 and 300 rubles, respectively, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Joseph Stalin, who signed the order, personally reduced the prices. As for the norms for returning to service, the entire commanding staff of the anti-tank destroyer units, up to the division commander, had to be kept on special account, and at the same time, the entire staff after treatment in hospitals had to be returned only to the indicated units. This did not guarantee that the soldier or officer would return to the very battalion or division in which he fought before being wounded, but he could not end up in any other units other than anti-tank destroyers.

The new order instantly turned the anti-tankers into the elite artillery of the Red Army. But this elitism was confirmed by a high price. The level of losses in anti-tank fighter units was noticeably higher than in other artillery units. It is no coincidence that anti-tank units became the only subtype of artillery, where the same order No. 0528 introduced the position of deputy gunner: in battle, crews that rolled out their guns to unequipped positions in front of the defending infantry and fired at direct fire often died earlier than their equipment.

From battalions to divisions

The new artillery units quickly gained combat experience, which spread just as quickly: the number of anti-tank fighter units grew. On January 1, 1943, the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army consisted of two fighter divisions, 15 fighter brigades, two heavy anti-tank regiments, 168 anti-tank regiments and one anti-tank battalion.

Anti-tank artillery unit on the march.

Guards artillerymen rolling a 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937) into a prepared trench. Kursk direction.

Soviet gunners at the 45 mm M-42 anti-tank gun. In the background is the T-34-85 tank.

Masters of "firebags"

In ambush "forty-five", 45-mm anti-tank gun model 1937 (53-K).

Soviet artillerymen from the units of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps fire at the enemy from a camouflaged position. In the foreground: 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K (model 1937), in the background: 76-mm regimental gun (model 1927). Bryansk front.

Unknown Soviet female soldiers from the anti-tank artillery unit (IPTA).

The crew of Soviet artillerymen fires from a 45-mm anti-tank gun of the 1937 model (53-K) at a German tank on a village street. The number of the calculation gives the loader a 45-mm sub-caliber projectile.

Knowing all this, one is no longer surprised at the number of heroes among the fighters and commanders of anti-tank fighter units. Among them were real gunners-snipers. Such as, for example, the gun commander of the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Regiment of the Guard, Senior Sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov, who accounted for almost three dozen fascist tanks, and ten of them (including six "Tigers"!) He knocked out in one battle. For this he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Or, say, the gunner of the 493rd anti-tank artillery regiment, Sergeant Stepan Khoptyar. He fought from the very first days of the war, went with battles to the Volga, and then to the Oder, where in one battle he destroyed four German tanks, and in just a few January days of 1945 - nine tanks and several armored personnel carriers. The country appreciated this feat: in April, the victorious forty-fifth, Khoptyar was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard Senior Sergeant Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich Asfandiyarov (1918-1977) and Hero of the Soviet Union gunner of the 322nd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment of the Guard Sergeant Veniamin Mikhailovich Permyakov (1924- 1990) are reading the letter. In the background, Soviet gunners at the 76-mm ZiS-3 divisional gun.

Z.L. Asfandiyarov on the front of the Great Patriotic War since September 1941. Particularly distinguished himself during the liberation of Ukraine.
On January 25, 1944, in the battles for the village of Tsibulev (now the village of Monastyrishchensky district of the Cherkasy region), a gun under the command of the guards senior sergeant Zakir Asfandiyarov was attacked by eight tanks and twelve armored personnel carriers with enemy infantry. Having let the enemy attacking column into direct range, the gun crew opened aimed sniper fire and burned all eight enemy tanks, of which four were Tiger-type tanks. The senior sergeant of the guard Asfandiyarov himself destroyed one officer and ten soldiers with fire from personal weapons. When the gun went out of action, the brave guardsman switched to the gun of the neighboring unit, the calculation of which failed and, having repelled a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two tanks of the Tiger type and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. In just one battle, the calculation of the guards of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov destroyed ten enemy tanks, of which six were of the Tiger type and over one hundred and fifty enemy soldiers and officers.
The title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2386) was awarded to Asfandiyarov Zakir Lutfurakhmanovich by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 1, 1944.

V.M. Permyakov was drafted into the Red Army in August 1942. At the artillery school he received the specialty of a gunner. From July 1943 at the front, he fought in the 322nd Guards Anti-Tank Regiment as a gunner. He received his baptism of fire on the Kursk salient. In the first battle, he burned three German tanks, was wounded, but did not leave his combat post. For courage and steadfastness in battle, accuracy in defeating tanks, Sergeant Permyakov was awarded the Order of Lenin. He especially distinguished himself in the battles for the liberation of Ukraine in January 1944.
On January 25, 1944, in the area at the fork in the road near the villages of Ivakhny and Tsibulev, now the Monastyrishchensky district of the Cherkasy region, the calculation of the guards of senior sergeant Asfandiyarov, in which sergeant Permyakov was the gunner, was among the first to meet the attack of enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers by infantry. Reflecting the first onslaught, Permyakov destroyed 8 tanks with accurate fire, of which four were tanks of the Tiger type. When the positions of the artillerymen approached the enemy landing, he entered into hand-to-hand combat. He was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield. Having beaten off the attack of machine gunners, he returned to the gun. When the gun failed, the guards switched to the gun of a neighboring unit, the calculation of which failed and, repelling a new massive enemy attack, destroyed two more Tiger-type tanks and up to sixty Nazi soldiers and officers. During a raid by enemy bombers, the gun was broken. Permyakov, wounded and shell-shocked, was sent to the rear unconscious. On July 1, 1944, Sergeant Veniamin Mikhailovich Permyakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 2385).

Lieutenant General Pavel Ivanovich Batov presents the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal to the commander of an anti-tank gun, Sergeant Ivan Spitsyn. Mozyr direction.

Ivan Yakovlevich Spitsin has been at the front since August 1942. He distinguished himself on October 15, 1943 when crossing the Dnieper. Direct fire, the calculation of Sergeant Spitsin destroyed three enemy machine guns. Having crossed to the bridgehead, the artillerymen fired at the enemy until a direct hit broke the gun. Artillerymen joined the infantry, during the battle they captured enemy positions along with cannons and began to destroy the enemy from his own guns.

On October 30, 1943, for the exemplary performance of the combat missions of the command on the front of the struggle against the Nazi invaders and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, Sergeant Spitsin Ivan Yakovlevich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 1641).

But even against the background of these and hundreds of other heroes from among the soldiers and officers of anti-tank artillery, the feat of Vasily Petrov, the only one among them twice Hero of the Soviet Union, stands out. Drafted into the army in 1939, right on the eve of the war he graduated from the Sumy Artillery School, and met the Great Patriotic War as a lieutenant, platoon commander of the 92nd separate artillery battalion in Novograd-Volynsky in Ukraine.

Captain Vasily Petrov earned his first "Gold Star" of the Hero of the Soviet Union after crossing the Dnieper in September 1943. By that time, he was already deputy commander of the 1850th anti-tank artillery regiment, and on his chest he wore two orders of the Red Star and a medal "For Courage" - and three stripes for wounds. The decree on awarding Petrov the highest degree of distinction was signed on the 24th, and published on December 29, 1943. By that time, the thirty-year-old captain was already in the hospital, having lost both hands in one of the last battles. And if not for the legendary Order No. 0528, which ordered the return of the wounded to anti-tank units, the freshly baked Hero would hardly have got a chance to continue fighting. But Petrov, who was always distinguished by firmness and perseverance (sometimes dissatisfied subordinates and superiors said that he was stubborn), achieved his goal. And at the very end of 1944 he returned to his regiment, which by that time had already become known as the 248th Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment.

With this regiment of the guard, Major Vasily Petrov reached the Oder, crossed it and distinguished himself by holding a bridgehead on the western bank, and then participating in the development of the offensive on Dresden. And this did not go unnoticed: by decree of June 27, 1945, for the spring exploits on the Oder, artillery major Vasily Petrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the second time. By this time, the regiment of the legendary major had already been disbanded, but Vasily Petrov himself remained in the ranks. And he remained in it until his death - and he died in 2003!

After the war, Vasily Petrov managed to graduate from Lvov State University And military academy, received the degree of candidate of military sciences, rose to the rank of lieutenant general of artillery, which he received in 1977, and served as deputy chief missile troops and artillery of the Carpathian military district. As the grandson of one of General Petrov's colleagues recalls, from time to time, going for a walk in the Carpathians, the middle-aged commander managed to literally drive his adjutants who could not keep up with him on the way up ...

Memory is stronger than time

The post-war fate of anti-tank artillery completely repeated the fate of all the Armed Forces of the USSR, which changed in accordance with the changing challenges of the time. Since September 1946, the personnel of anti-tank artillery units and subunits, as well as anti-tank rifle subunits, ceased to receive increased salaries. The right to a special sleeve insignia, which the anti-tankers were so proud of, remained ten years longer. But it also disappeared over time: another order to introduce new form For Soviet army I canceled this badge.

Gradually, the need for specialized anti-tank artillery units also disappeared. Cannons were replaced by anti-tank guided missiles, and units armed with these weapons appeared on the staff of motorized rifle units. In the mid-1970s, the word “fighter” disappeared from the name of the anti-tank units, and twenty years later, the last two dozen anti-tank artillery regiments and brigades disappeared along with the Soviet army. But whatever the post-war history of Soviet anti-tank artillery, it will never cancel the courage and feats with which the fighters and commanders of the anti-tank artillery of the Red Army glorified their kind of troops during the Great Patriotic War.

For hundreds of years, artillery has been an important component of the Russian army. However, she reached her power and prosperity during the Second World War - it was not by chance that she was called the "god of war." An analysis of a long-term military campaign made it possible to determine the most promising areas of this kind of troops for decades to come. As a result, modern Russian artillery today has the necessary power both for effective combat operations in local conflicts and for repelling massive aggression.

legacy of the past

New samples Russian weapons"lead a family tree" since the 60s of the XX century, when the Soviet army leadership set a course for high-quality rearmament. Dozens of leading design bureaus, where outstanding engineers and designers worked, laid the theoretical and technical foundation for the creation of the latest weapons.

The experience of previous wars and the analysis of the potential of foreign armies have clearly shown that it is necessary to rely on mobile self-propelled artillery and mortar installations. Thanks to decisions made half a century ago, Russian artillery acquired a solid fleet of caterpillar and wheeled missile and artillery weapons, the basis of which is the “flower collection”: from the nimble 122-mm Gvozdika howitzer to the formidable 240-mm Tulip.

Barrel field artillery

The barrel artillery of Russia has a huge number of guns. They are in service with artillery units, units and formations of the Ground Forces and represent the basis of the firepower of the Marine Corps and Internal Troops. Barrel artillery combines high firepower, accuracy and accuracy of fire with simplicity of design and use, mobility, increased reliability, flexibility of fire, and is also economical.

Many samples of towed guns were designed taking into account the experience of the Second World War. In the Russian army, they are gradually being replaced by self-propelled artillery guns developed in 1971-1975, optimized for performing fire missions even in a nuclear conflict. The towed guns are supposed to be used in fortified areas and in secondary theaters of military operations.

Armaments

Currently cannon artillery Russia has the following types of self-propelled guns:

• Floating howitzer 2S1 "Carnation" (122-mm).
• Howitzer 2SZ "Acacia" (152 mm).
• Howitzer 2S19 "Msta-S" (152 mm).
• Gun 2S5 "Hyacinth" (152 mm).
• Gun 2S7 "Peony" (203 mm).

Active testing in progress self-propelled howitzer with unique characteristics and the ability to shoot in the "flurry of fire" mode 2S35 "Coalition-SV" (152 mm).

The 120-mm self-propelled guns 2S23 "Nona-SVK", 2S9 "Nona-S", 2S31 "Vena" and their towed analogue 2B16 "Nona-K" are intended for fire support of combined arms units. A feature of these guns is that they can serve as mortars, mortars, howitzers or anti-tank guns.

anti-tank artillery

Along with the creation of highly effective anti-tank missile systems, considerable attention is paid to the development of anti-tank artillery guns. Their advantages over anti-tank missiles lie primarily in their relative cheapness, simplicity of design and use, and the ability to fire around the clock in any weather.

Russian anti-tank artillery is moving towards increasing power and caliber, improving ammunition and sighting devices. The pinnacle of this development was the 100-mm anti-tank smoothbore gun MT-12 (2A29) "Rapier" with increased muzzle velocity and effective range up to 1500 m. 660 mm.

The towed PT 2A45M Sprut-B, which is in service with the Russian Federation, also has even greater armor penetration. Behind dynamic protection, it is capable of hitting armor up to 770 mm thick. Self-propelled artillery Russia in this segment is represented by a self-propelled gun 2S25 Sprut-SD, in Lately incoming paratroopers.

mortars

Modern Russian artillery is unthinkable without mortars for various purposes and calibers. Russian samples of this class of weapons are exclusively effective tool suppression, destruction and fire support. The troops have the following samples of mortar weapons:

• Automatic 2B9M "Cornflower" (82 mm).
• 2B14-1 "Tray" (82 mm).
• Mortar complex 2S12 "Sani" (120-mm).
• Self-propelled 2S4 "Tulip" (240 mm).
• M-160 (160 mm) and M-240 (240 mm).

Characteristics and features

If the mortars "Tray" and "Sled" repeat the designs of models of the Great Patriotic War, then the "Cornflower" is a fundamentally new system. It is equipped with automatic reloading mechanisms, which allows firing with an excellent rate of fire of 100-120 rds / min (compared to 24 rds / min for the Tray mortar).

Russian artillery can rightly be proud of the self-propelled mortar "Tulip", which is also an original system. In the stowed position, its 240-mm barrel is mounted on the roof of an armored tracked chassis, in combat it rests on a special plate resting on the ground. In this case, all operations are carried out using a hydraulic system.

Coastal troops in the Russian Federation as a branch of independent forces of the Navy was formed in 1989. The basis of its firepower is made up of mobile missile and artillery systems:

• "Redoubt" (missile).
• 4K51 "Frontier" (missile).
• 3K55 "Bastion" (missile).
• 3K60 "Ball" (missile).
• A-222 "Coast" (artillery 130-mm).

These complexes are truly unique and pose a real threat to any enemy fleet. The newest Bastion has been on combat duty since 2010, equipped with Onyx/Yakhont hypersonic missiles. During the Crimean events, several "Bastions", defiantly placed on the peninsula, thwarted plans for a "show of force" by the NATO fleet.

The latest Russian coastal defense artillery A-222 "Bereg" effectively works both on small-sized high-speed vessels moving at a speed of 100 knots (180 km / h), and medium surface ships (within 23 km from the complex), and ground targets.

Heavy artillery is always ready to support powerful complexes as part of the Coastal Forces: self-propelled guns "Hyacinth-S", gun-howitzer "Hyacinth-B", gun-howitzer "Msta-B", howitzers D-20 and D-30, MLRS.

Multiple launch rocket systems

Since WWII rocket artillery Russia, as the successor of the USSR, has a powerful MLRS group. In the 1950s, a 122-mm 40-barrel system BM-21 "Grad" was created. The ground forces of the Russian Federation have 4,500 such systems.

BM-21 "Grad" became the prototype of the "Grad-1" system, created in 1975 to equip tank and motorized rifle regiments, as well as a more powerful 220-mm Uragan system for artillery units of the army level. This line of development was continued by the Smerch long-range system with 300-mm projectiles and the new Prima divisional-level MLRS with an increased number of guides and increased power rockets with a detachable warhead.

Procurement of a new MLRS "Tornado" is underway - a bicaliber system mounted on the MAZ-543M chassis. In the Tornado-G variant, it fires 122-mm rockets from the Grad MLRS, three times as effective as the latter. In the Tornado-S variant, designed for firing 300-mm rockets, it is 3-4 times superior to the Smerch in terms of combat effectiveness. "Tornado" strikes targets with a volley and single high-precision rockets.

Flak

Russian anti-aircraft artillery is represented by the following self-propelled small-caliber systems:

• Quadruple self-propelled installation "Shilka" (23 mm).
• Self-propelled twin installation "Tunguska" (30 mm).
• Self-propelled twin installation "Pantsir" (30 mm).
• Towed twin installation ZU-23 (2A13) (23 mm).

Self-propelled units are equipped with a radio instrumentation system that provides target acquisition and auto-tracking, generation of data for aiming. Automatic aiming of guns is carried out with the help of hydraulic drives. Shilka is exclusively an artillery system, while Tunguska and Pantsir are also armed with anti-aircraft missiles.

The Byutast firm supplied the USSR with twelve 3.7-cm anti-tank guns with a total value of 25 thousand dollars, as well as sets of parts and semi-finished products for several artillery systems and complete technological documentation. Curious detail- 3.7-cm guns were supplied to the USSR with a horizontal wedge gate with a quarter-automatic. For such guns, after the shot, the loader opened the shutter manually, and after reloading the cartridge case, the shutter closed automatically. For semi-automatic guns, the shutter is unlocked and locked automatically, but the projectile is fed manually. And finally, for automatic guns, the projectile is fed automatically and the calculation functions are reduced to aiming the gun at the target.

After the manufacture of the first 100 serial 3.7-cm guns in the USSR, the Byutast company undertook to replace the quarter-automatic shutter with a semi-automatic one. However, she did not fulfill her promise, and all 3.7-cm Rheinmetall anti-tank guns until the end of their production in 1942 had a quarter-automatic shutter.

The production of 3.7-cm Rheinmetall anti-tank guns began in 1931 at plant number 8 in the village of Podlipki near Moscow, where the gun received a factory index of 1K. By order of the Revolutionary Military Council of February 13, 1931, the gun was put into service under the name “37-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1930".

The shots of the Soviet and German guns were completely interchangeable.

However, the 37 mm caliber did not suit the Soviet leadership, who wanted to increase the armor penetration of the gun, especially at long distances, and make the gun universal - having the qualities of anti-tank and battalion guns. 37mm fragmentation projectile turned out to be very weak, so it was desirable to have a heavy 45-mm fragmentation projectile. This is how our 45-mm anti-tank and tank guns appeared. Soviet designers, after lengthy improvements, introduced in 1933–1934. semi-automatic breech for 45 mm anti-tank and tank guns.

In Germany in 1935–1936 The Rheinmetall 3.7 cm gun also underwent modernization, which mainly affected the wheel travel of the gun. So, wooden wheels were replaced with metal ones with rubber tires and introduced suspension. The upgraded gun was named 3.7 cm Pak 35/36.

I note that the modernized gun mod. 35/36 at the end of May 1937 was delivered to the plant number 8 in Podlipki. Interestingly, in the secret documentation for the guns, it was called the “37-mm OD gun”, that is, “special delivery”. So our leadership kept their deals with Germany secret even from the middle and top commanders of the Red Army. On the basis of the 3.7 cm Pak 35/36 gun, the carriage of the Soviet 45 mm 53K anti-tank gun was modernized. April 24, 1938 53K was adopted by the Red Army under the name "45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937”, and on June 6, 1938 it was transferred to gross production.

From the beginning of the 1930s in the USSR, thousands of light tanks with bulletproof armor such as BT, T-26, T-37, etc. were produced. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Armaments M.N. Tukhachevsky relied on the fight "with a class-heterogeneous enemy", that is, with units in which the proletarian element, sympathizing with the Red Army, prevailed over people from the bourgeois environment. Armadas of Soviet light tanks were supposed to terrify the "class-heterogeneous enemy." The Spanish war shook, and the Soviet-Finnish war and 1941 finally buried the illusions of the Soviet leadership about the "class-heterogeneous enemy."

Analyzing the causes of losses Soviet tanks in Spain, our leadership decided to create heavy and medium tanks with thick bulletproof armor. And the leadership of the Wehrmacht, on the contrary, rested on the laurels of the war in Spain and by 1939 considered the 3.7-cm Pak 35/36 quite modern weapons, capable of fighting any tanks of a potential enemy.

By September 1, 1939, that is, by the beginning of World War II, the Wehrmacht had 11,200 3.7 cm Pak 35/36 guns and 12.98 million rounds for them. (Among these guns were a small number of unsprung systems with wooden wheels made before 1936.)

The most combat-ready infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht were called divisions of the first wave; by May 1, 1940, there were 35 such divisions. Each division of the first wave had three infantry regiments, each of which had one company of anti-tank guns - twelve 3.7 cm Pak 35/36. In addition, the division had a squadron of heavy guns with three 3.7 cm Pak 35 / 36 and an anti-tank artillery battalion (from March 1940 - an anti-tank artillery battalion) with three companies of twelve 3.7 cm Pak 35 / 36 in each. In total, the infantry division of the first wave had 75 anti-tank guns of 3.7 cm caliber.

Four motorized divisions (they had a two-regiment composition) each had 48 3.7-cm Pak 35/36 anti-tank guns, and the cavalry division had 24 such guns.

Until June 22, 1941, 3.7 cm anti-tank guns mod. 35/36 operated quite effectively in all theaters of war. By April 1, 1940, the troops had 12,830 of these guns. An unpleasant surprise was that the shells of 3.7-cm guns almost did not penetrate the medium French S-35 Somois tanks, which had 35-45 mm armor, and most of the armor was sloping.

However, the French had few Somua tanks, according to various sources, from 430 to 500, they were used tactically illiterately and had a number of design flaws, one of which was the presence of only one crew member (commander) in the tower. So the battles with the French units equipped with the Somua tanks did not lead to heavy losses for the Germans.

The Germans drew some conclusions from the encounter with the Somua tanks and began accelerated design of 5 cm anti-tank guns, as well as the development of sub-caliber and cumulative shells, but still considered 3.7 cm anti-tank guns to be effective against tanks. 3.7 cm gun mod. 35/36 continued to be the main anti-tank gun both in units and in production.

After the start of the war in 1939, 1229 3.7 cm guns mod. 35/36, in 1940 - 2713, in 1941 - 1365, in 1942 - 32, and this was the end of their production.

By the beginning of World War II, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) of the Red Army had 14,791 45-mm anti-tank guns, of which 1,038 required "master repair".

To deploy artillery in wartime states, 11,460 anti-tank guns were required, that is, the provision for serviceable guns was 120%.

Of the available 14,791 45-mm anti-tank guns, 7682 guns were mod. 1932 (factory index 19K), and 7255 - arr. 1937 (factory index 53K). The ballistics of both guns were the same. The main difference is the introduction of suspension in guns mod. 1937, which made it possible to increase the maximum speed of carriage on the highway from 25 km / h to 50–60 km / h.

According to the wartime states introduced in April 1941, rifle and motorized rifle divisions were supposed to have 54 45-mm anti-tank guns, and 30 in motorized divisions.

It should be noted that according to another, also a classified source, by the beginning of World War II, the Red Army consisted of 45-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1932 and arr. 1934 - 15,468 and in the Navy - 214, a total of 15,682 guns. In my opinion, the difference in 891 guns in both sources is due to differences in the method of counting, such as, for example, at what stage of acceptance of the gun from the industry it was counted. Very often, a certificate of the state of the artillery materiel was drawn up according to the reports of the military districts, often made several weeks earlier.

Big problems for the historian were created by the Soviet and German generals, who, with enviable obstinacy, tried not to include information about the use of captured guns in their reports. Usually they were either included in the number of standard German or, respectively, Soviet guns, or even information about them was thrown out.

By June 22, 1941, there were relatively few small-scale and captured anti-tank guns registered with the GAU. This is about five hundred 37-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1930 (1K). In 1939 over 900 guns of the former Polish army were captured. Of these, at least a third were 37-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1936

I do not have data on the presence of 37-mm Polish anti-tank guns in the units of the Red Army by June 22, 1941. But later they were actively used. In any case, the GAU twice, in 1941 and in 1942, published "Firing Tables" for the 37-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1936

Finally, in the armies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which, after a thorough purge of officers and non-commissioned officers, joined the Red Army, there were 1,200 guns, of which about a third were anti-tank guns.

The Germans from 1938 to June 1941 captured about 5 thousand anti-tank guns in Czechoslovakia, Norway, Belgium, Holland, France, Yugoslavia and Greece. Most of these guns were used in coastal defense, fortified areas (URs), and also transferred to Germany's allies.

The most powerful among these guns were 47 mm anti-tank guns. So, in 1940, a large number of 47-mm anti-tank guns mod. 1937 Schneider systems. The Germans gave them the name 4.7 cm Pak 181(f). In total, the Germans used 823 French 47 mm anti-tank guns.

The gun barrel is a monoblock. The shutter is semi-automatic vertical wedge. The gun had a sprung travel and metal wheels with rubber tires. In the ammunition load of the guns sent to the Eastern Front, the Germans introduced German armor-piercing sub-caliber shells mod. 40, which significantly increased the effectiveness of the fight against T-34 tanks. The Germans mounted several dozen 4.7 cm Pak 181(f) guns on the chassis of French Renault R-35 tanks.

The most effective of the captured light anti-tank guns was the 47-mm Czechoslovak gun mod. 1936, which received the German name 4.7 cm Pak 36 (t), and its modification was simply called 4.7 cm Pak (t). A characteristic feature of the gun was the muzzle brake. The shutter of the gun is semi-automatic wedge, the recoil brake is hydraulic, the knurler is spring. The gun had a somewhat unusual design for its time - for transportation, the barrel turned 180 ° and was attached to the beds. For more compact stacking, both beds could be folded. The wheel travel of the gun is sprung, the wheels are metal with rubber tires. In 1941, the Germans introduced an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile mod. 40.

From May 1941, 4.7-cm Czechoslovak guns began to be installed on French R-35 tanks.

In 1939, 200 4.7-cm Pak 36 (t) were manufactured in Czechoslovakia, and in 1940 another 73, after which their production ceased. But in the same 1940, the production of a modification of the gun mod. 1936 - 4.7 cm Pak (t). In 1940, 95 of these guns were manufactured, in 1941 - 51 and in 1942 - 68. Guns for wheeled chassis were called 4.7-cm Pak (t) (Kzg.), And for self-propelled guns - 4.7 -see Pak(t)(Sf.).

Mass production of ammunition for 4.7 cm Czechoslovak guns was also launched. So, in 1939, 214.8 thousand shots were fired, in 1940 - 358.2 thousand, in 1941 - 387.5 thousand, in 1942 - 441.5 thousand and in 1943 - 229, 9 thousand shots.

By the time Austria joined the Reich, the Austrian army had 357 47-mm M. 35/36 anti-tank guns, created by the Böhler company. (In a number of documents, this gun was called an infantry gun.) The Wehrmacht used 330 of these guns, which received the designation 4.7 cm Pak 35 / 36 (c). The barrel length of the gun was 1680 mm, i.e. 35.7 caliber. The vertical aiming angle of the gun is from -10° to +55°, the horizontal aiming angle is 45°. Gun weight 277 kg. The ammunition of the gun included fragmentation and armor-piercing shells. With a projectile weight of 1.45 kg, the initial velocity was 630 m/s. Cartridge weight 3.8 kg.

In September 1940, the production of 4.7-cm Pak 35/36(c) guns was resumed, and 150 guns were made by the end of the year. In February 1941, almost the entire batch was sold to Italy. Later, the Germans took some of these guns from the Italians in North Africa and used against allies. It is curious that the Germans assigned the name 4.7 cm Pak 177 (i) to the guns taken from the "pasta".

As you can see, in anti-tank artillery on both sides by June 22, 1941, quantitative and qualitative equality was observed. Regular anti-tank guns - 14,459 for the Germans and 14,791 for the Russians. Soviet 45-mm anti-tank guns could successfully operate against all German-made tanks, and 3.7-cm German anti-tank guns against all Soviet tanks, except for the KV and T-34.

Did the Germans know about the creation of thick-armored tanks in the USSR? It can be unequivocally answered that not only officers and generals of the Wehrmacht were amazed when they met our KV and T-34s, firing at which from 3.7-cm anti-tank guns was absolutely useless.

There is a version that German intelligence provided Hitler with data on the scale of production and performance characteristics of Soviet thick-armored tanks. However, the Fuhrer categorically forbade the transfer of this information even to the leadership of the Wehrmacht.

In my opinion, this version is quite convincing. It was physically impossible to hide from German intelligence the presence of hundreds of KV and T-34 tanks in the border districts (as of June 22, 1941, there were 463 KV tanks and 824 T-34 tanks).

And what did the Germans have in reserve?

The design of the 5-cm Pak 38 anti-tank guns by Rheinmetall began in 1935. However, due to a number of technical and organizational difficulties, the first two guns entered the troops only at the beginning of 1940. They did not have time to take part in the hostilities in France. By July 1, 1940, the units had 17 5 cm anti-tank guns. Large-scale production of them was established only at the end of 1940, and by June 1, 1941, there were already 1047 5-cm anti-tank guns in the units.

The 5-cm Pak 38 cannons, with a successful hit, could knock out a T-34 tank, but they were ineffective against KV tanks. The guns suffered heavy losses. So, in just three months (from December 1, 1941 to February 28, 1942), 269 5-cm guns were lost on the Eastern Front.

In 1936, the Rheinmetall company began designing a 7.5-cm anti-tank gun, called the 7.5-cm Pak 40. However, the Wehrmacht received the first 15 guns only in February 1942. The gun’s ammunition included both caliber armor-piercing and sub-caliber and cumulative shells. Until 1942, it was a fairly effective anti-tank gun, capable of fighting both T-34 and KV tanks.

Back in the 1930s. the Germans were developing anti-tank guns with a conical bore, which, of course, were a masterpiece of engineering. Their trunks consisted of several alternating conical and cylindrical sections. The projectiles had a special design of the leading part, allowing its diameter to decrease as the projectile moved along the channel. Thus, the most complete use of the pressure of powder gases on the bottom of the projectile was ensured by reducing the cross-sectional area of ​​the projectile. For the first time a patent for a gun with a conical bore in 1903 was received by the German Karl Ruff.

In the summer of 1940, the world's first mass-produced cannon with a conical bore was put into production. The Germans called it the s.Pz.B.41 heavy anti-tank rifle. The barrel had a caliber of 28 mm at the beginning of the channel, and 20 mm at the muzzle. The system was called a gun for bureaucratic reasons, in fact it was a classic anti-tank gun with recoil devices and a wheel drive, and I will call it an anti-tank gun. The weight of the gun in combat position was only 229 kg.

The ammunition included a sub-caliber projectile with a tungsten core and a fragmentation projectile. Instead of the copper belts used in classic projectiles, both projectiles had two soft iron centering annular protrusions. When fired, the protrusions were crushed and crashed into the rifling of the barrel bore. During the passage of the entire path of the projectile through the channel, the diameter of the annular protrusions decreased from 28 to 20 mm. The fragmentation projectile had a very weak damaging effect.

A sub-caliber projectile at an angle of 30 ° to the normal at a distance of 100 m pierced 52 mm armor, at a distance of 300 m - 46 mm, at a distance of 500 m - 40 mm.

In 1941, a 4.2 cm anti-tank gun mod. 41 (4.2 cm Pak 41) from Rheinmetall with a tapered bore. Its initial diameter was 40.3 mm, the final diameter was 29 mm. The gun was mounted on a carriage from a 3.7 cm Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun. The gun ammunition included sub-caliber and fragmentation shells. In 1941, 27 4.2-cm guns mod. 41, and in 1942 another 286.

At a distance of 457 m, her sub-caliber projectile pierced 87 mm armor along the normal and 72 mm armor at an angle of 30 °.

The most powerful serial anti-tank gun with a conical channel was the 7.5-cm Pak 41. Its design was started by Krupp back in 1939. In April-May 1942, Krupp produced a batch of 150 items, on which their production stopped.

The 7.5 cm Pak 41 gun performed well in combat. At distances up to 500 m, it successfully hit all types of heavy tanks. However, due to technological difficulties associated with the production of guns and shells, mass production of the gun was not established.

If German intelligence withheld from their generals information about our thick-armored tanks, then Soviet intelligence scared the generals and leaders to death with enemy "superpanzers". Soviet intelligence in 1940 received "reliable information" that in Germany, not only created, but also put into mass production supertanks with super-thick armor and a super-powerful gun. At the same time, astronomical quantities were called.

Summarizing all these data, on March 11, 1941, the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army presented “upstairs” special message No. 316. The following was said about the heavy tanks of the Wehrmacht: “According to information requiring additional verification, the Germans are starting to build three models of heavy tanks.

In addition, the Renault factories are repairing 72-ton French tanks that participated in the war in the west.

According to information received in March this year and requiring verification, the production of 60 and 80 tons of tanks is being set up at the Skoda and Krupp plants.

As you can see, smart guys were sitting in the General Staff - they didn’t analyze and double-check the German “misinformation”, but only made sure: “According to the information, verification is required.”

What really happened? Yes, in Germany, development work was carried out to create heavy tanks and even produced several prototypes of heavy tanks VK-6501 and VK-3001 (both by Henschel and Son). But these were actually prototype chassis samples. Not even prototypes of guns for heavy tanks were made. The most powerful tank guns were 7.5 cm KwK 37L24 guns (slightly better than our 76 mm gun model 1927/32 and much worse than the F-32 and F-34).

Well, in addition, French tanks with anti-shell armor were tested at the Kummersdorf training ground. That's all! And then came the magnificent misinformation of the Abwehr. When and how our scouts pecked at her, we, apparently, will never know - the entrance to Yasenevo is closed to independent historians.

The frightened leadership urgently demanded the creation of powerful tank and anti-tank guns. In 1940 V.G. Grabin presented a project for a 107 mm F-42 tank gun, and then an even more powerful 107 mm ZIS-6 tank gun.

At the same time, Grabin also creates a powerful anti-tank gun. In May 1940, he began designing the 57 mm F-31 anti-tank gun.

For her, an armor-piercing projectile weighing 3.14 kg was adopted, the initial speed was assumed to be 1000 m / s. They decided to use the sleeve from a 76-mm divisional gun with a re-compression of the barrel of the sleeve from a caliber of 76 mm to 57 mm. The sleeve, thus, was almost completely unified.

In October 1940, a prototype F-31 was completed at factory No. 92, and Grabin began factory testing it.

Somewhere at the beginning of 1941, the factory index F-31 was replaced with the ZIS-2 for the new 57-mm anti-tank gun. This was due to the assignment of Stalin's name to Plant No. 92.

At the beginning of 1941, the ZIS-2 gun was put into service under the name "57-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1941".

Interestingly, in parallel with the ZIS-2, Grabin created an even more powerful 57-mm anti-tank gun ZIS-1KV. Its design was completed in December 1940. The ZIS-1KV gun was designed for an initial velocity of 1150 m/s for a caliber projectile weighing 3.14 kg. The barrel length was increased to 86 caliber, that is, up to 4902 m. The carriage, the upper machine and the sight for the ZIS-1KV were taken from the 76-mm F-22USV divisional gun.

Although Grabin tried to lighten the weight of the carriage structure, the weight of the new 57-mm anti-tank gun turned out to be 30 kg more than the weight of the F-22USV division (about 1650 kg). In January 1941, a prototype ZIS-1KV was completed, which passed field tests in February - May 1941. Of course, with such ballistics, the survivability of the gun turned out to be low. Grabin himself in the book “The Weapon of Victory” wrote that after 40 shots the initial speed dropped sharply and the accuracy became unsatisfactory, and after 50 shots the barrel came to such a state that the projectile did not receive “spin” in the bore and flew tumbling. This experiment marked the limits of the 57-mm anti-tank guns.

It should be noted that Grabin somewhat simplifies the situation, in fact, things were not so bad with the survivability of the ZIS-1KV. And further work on it was stopped in connection with the start of the gross production of the ZIS-2.

Gross production of the ZIS-2 began on June 1, 1941 and was suspended on December 1, 1941. During this time, 371 guns were manufactured.

In conclusion, it is worth saying a few words about company anti-tank guns, which our official military historians do not know about or do not want to talk about. The fact is that from 1935 to 1941, several samples of company anti-tank guns were tested in the USSR. For firing from them, cartridges from regular guns were used - a 20-mm anti-aircraft gun mod. 1930, 20 mm ShVAK aircraft gun - and a new 25 mm cartridge.

Under the cartridge arr. 1930 V. Vladimirov and M.N. Big designed a 20-mm anti-tank gun INZ-10 mod. 1936 (in the documentation it was sometimes called the "20-mm company anti-tank rifle"). One of the samples was on a bipod, the other was on a wheeled carriage. The gun was semi-automatic. Semi-automatic operated due to the energy of the rollback. The barrel of the gun is movable. Five rounds were placed in an over-the-barrel box magazine. Vertical and horizontal guidance was carried out with a shoulder butt. There was no shield. Wheels are motorcycle bicycle type with pneumatic tires. The weight of the system in combat position on bipods is 50 kg, on wheels - 83.3 km.

Under the ShVAK cartridge in 1936, a 20-mm anti-tank gun TsKBSV-51 of the S.A. system was created. Korovin. The prototype was made in Tula. Semi-automatic worked on the principle of exhaust gases. The barrel is fixedly fixed in the casing. The shutter is warped, of the type "Colt". Food was produced from a single-row magazine with a capacity of 5 rounds. The gun had a powerful muzzle brake of the Slukhotsky system. The gun was mounted on a tripod with coulters (a total of 5 supports). The weight of the system in combat position is 47.2 kg.

On March 4, 1936, artillery engineers Mikhno and Tsyrulnikov submitted a project for a 25-mm self-loading company anti-tank gun MTs for consideration by the Main Artillery Directorate.

According to this project, the PTP had a barrel with a muzzle brake. Automation with a "long stroke". Piston lock. Detachable magazine capacity 5 rounds. The cartridge is special. The carriage consisted of a stroke, a lower machine, an upper machine and two tubular beds, moving apart at an angle of 60 °. Vertical and horizontal guidance was carried out by the shoulder rest. Spring knurler. Wheels with bicycle type tires. For carrying by hand, the system was disassembled into three parts. Shooting could be carried out both from a tripod and from wheels. The weight of the system in combat position is 107.8 kg.

All these, as well as a number of other projects in 1936-1940. passed field tests, but none of these guns was put into service, although the need for such guns was extremely great.

At the end of 1940, our generals were sure that the army had enough 45-mm anti-tank guns in excess, in addition, it was planned to begin production of 57-mm guns. As a result, the Council of People's Commissars did not include 45-mm anti-tank guns in the order plan for 1941. However, this did not have catastrophic consequences, contrary to the opinion of a number of historians. The fact is that the technology for manufacturing these tools remained at the factories.

In addition, in 1941 it was planned to manufacture 2664 45-mm tank guns mod. 1934, whose bodies differed slightly from the anti-tank guns mod. 1937. Thanks to this, with the outbreak of war, the production of 45-mm anti-tank guns was quickly restored.

In the Wehrmacht, unlike the Red Army, regimental guns were called infantry, and divisional and corps guns were called field guns. The most curious thing is that the Germans did not have ... guns among the infantry and field guns! Anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, of course, do not count. Our and German generals had fundamentally different views on the use of field artillery.

In the Wehrmacht, all infantry and field guns had to be able to conduct mounted fire, for which they had a large vertical guidance angle and separate-sleeve loading shots. In shots of separate-sleeve loading, by changing the number of beams of gunpowder, it was easy to change the initial speed and, accordingly, the steepness of the projectile trajectory.

In the Red Army, they relied mainly on flat shooting. Soviet regimental guns could not carry out mounted fire, and 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers and 152-mm ML-20 howitzers-cannons could carry out mounted fire from divisional and corps guns.

Alas, the earth is flat only on the maps of our generals. In fact, as any child knows, “in nature” is hills, ridges of heights, ravines, beams, hollows, forests, etc. And in the city, these are houses, factories, embankments of railways and highways, bridges and etc. All these objects create "dead zones" for flat fire at tens or even hundreds of meters.

German designers did everything to ensure that there were practically no “dead zones” for their infantry and field guns. But our military and historians in the military history literature make fun of the Germans, unlike our designers, they say, they were so stupid that they did not introduce unitary loading in their infantry and field guns. Yes, indeed, unitary loading at first gives a gain in rate of fire, but then the maximum rate of fire is determined by recoil devices (due to their heating).

As already mentioned, in Germany regimental guns were called infantry guns. Infantry guns were divided into light - 7.5 cm caliber and heavy - 15 cm caliber. Both types of infantry guns were a kind of hybrid of cannon, howitzers and mortars. They could conduct both flat and mounted fire. Moreover, the main type of shooting was mounted.

In a German infantry division, each infantry regiment had a company of infantry guns consisting of six 7.5 cm light infantry guns mod. 18 (le.I.G.18) and two 15 cm heavy infantry guns mod. 33 (S.I.G.33). Taking into account the two light infantry guns in the state reconnaissance battalion, the Wehrmacht infantry division had 20 light and 6 heavy infantry guns.

7.5 cm light infantry gun mod. 18 (7.5-cm le.I.G.18) was created in 1927 by Rheinmetall. The gun began to enter the troops in 1932. Initially, the guns were made with wooden wheels, and then with metal discs.

The gun could be transported with or without a limber. In the latter case, it was carried in a single-horse harness, and on the battlefield - by the forces of the gun crew on straps. If necessary, the gun was disassembled into five parts and could be transported on packs.

In domestic military history literature, both official and amateur, it is customary to compare the German light infantry gun with the Soviet 76-mm regimental gun mod. 1927 as the superiority of domestic artillery systems over enemy ones. In fact, our "colonel" fired a regular high-explosive fragmentation projectile at 6700 m, and a lightweight OF-343 projectile as much as 7700 m, and the German light infantry gun fired them at 3550 m. But no one asks himself whether the range is needed firing 6–7 km to a gun intended for direct artillery support infantry battalion, last resort shelf. I'm not talking about the fact that the indicated firing range from the cannon arr. 1927 could only be obtained at an elevation angle of 40 °. And it was impossible to give it such an elevation angle by the action of the lifting mechanism, it gave a maximum of 24–25 °. Theoretically, it was possible to dig a ditch under the trunk and shoot at full range.

But a light infantry gun could fire at an angle of up to 75 °. In addition, the light infantry gun had a separate case loading. The charge of the gun was variable. On the smallest charge No. 1, the initial velocity of the projectile was only 92-95 m / s, and the maximum firing range was only 25 m, that is, the gun could fire at a brick wall or near a hut and hit targets directly behind an obstacle. No hillocks, ravines and other obstacles could serve as a shelter for the enemy from the mounted fire of German light and heavy infantry guns.

And the Soviet 76-mm gun mod. 1927 was a relic of the beginning of the 20th century and was intended exclusively for flat shooting. In fact, guns mod. 1927 were a lightweight version of the 76-mm divisional gun mod. 1902 with degraded ballistics. Not without reason, before the war, its main projectile was shrapnel. The light infantry gun had no shrapnel in its ammunition at all. It should be noted that in the early 1930s some of our artillerymen tried to enable the mod. 1927 to conduct at least some kind of mounted shooting, and for this it was proposed to switch to separate-sleeve loading. But the leadership of the Main Artillery Directorate rejected this proposal, and during the war the guns mod. 1927 fired with unitary cartridges.

Finishing the comparison of both regimental guns, I note that the gun mod. 1927 had a weight in combat position on metal wheels of 903 kg, and a light infantry gun - 400-440 kg. It’s easy for a smart guy to write, but let him drive both systems manually on the battlefield.

For firing at tanks in late 1941 - early 1942, a cumulative fragmentation projectile mod. 38 (7.5 cm Igr.38). It is curious that in the Soviet closed edition of 1947 this projectile was called high-explosive, which gave reason to the smart people to claim that the Germans created a special high-explosive projectile mod. 1938 for tank shooting.

Somewhat later, in 1942, a more powerful cumulative projectile mod. 38 Hl / A with greater armor penetration. Moreover, this projectile in most cases was fed in a unitary cartridge.

In 1927, the Rheinmetall company created a 15-cm heavy infantry gun. It began to enter the troops in 1933 under the name 15-cm s.I.G.33.

During the war, the 15-cm s.I.G.33 easily destroyed enemy field fortifications. His high-explosive shells penetrated shelters up to three meters thick from earth and logs.

The tool machine is single-beam box-shaped. Torsion suspension. Aluminum alloy wheels, horse-drawn guns had iron tyres. When hauling a mechanical traction, solid rubber tires were put on the wheels.

The 15 cm heavy infantry gun could also act as a super-heavy mortar. To do this, in 1941 a powerful over-caliber projectile (mine) weighing 90 kg was developed, containing 54 kg of ammatol. For comparison: the F-364 mine of the Soviet 240-mm Tyulpan mortar contains 31.9 kg of explosive. But unlike a mortar, a heavy infantry gun could fire an over-caliber projectile and direct fire at pillboxes, houses, and other targets.

To fight tanks in late 1941 - early 1942, cumulative shells were introduced into the ammunition load of heavy infantry guns, which burned through armor with a thickness of at least 160 mm along the normal. Thus, at a distance of up to 1200 m (table firing range with a cumulative projectile), a heavy infantry gun could effectively hit any type of enemy tanks.

The carriage of a heavy infantry gun was sprung, and when transported by a mechanized draft, the speed could reach 35-40 km / h. Horse-drawn gun with limber was transported by six horses.

By June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 4176 light infantry guns and 7956 thousand shells for them and 867 heavy infantry guns and 1264 thousand shells for them.

And now let's move on to the artillery of the divisions of the Red Army. According to the staff of rifle and motorized rifle divisions of wartime dated April 5, 1941, each artillery regiment was supposed to have a 6-gun battery of 76-mm guns mod. 1927

According to the pre-war states, 4 guns mod. 1927 were to have regiments of motorized, cavalry and tank divisions.

By the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 4768 76-mm regimental guns mod. 1927. Another 120 of these guns were in the Navy. In addition, the Navy had 61 76-mm short gun mod. 1913. I note that the 76-mm gun mod. 1927 was created on the basis of a short gun mod. 1913 In the late 1930s. all remaining guns mod. 1913 were transferred to the Navy.

Well, now let's move on to divisional and corps artillery. Unlike the Germans, the red commanders still considered the 76-mm divisional cannon to be the main field artillery weapon. The idea of ​​"trinity", that is, one caliber, one gun, one projectile, arose somewhere in the early 90s. XIX century.

At the suggestion of the French generals, this idea was enthusiastically accepted in the Russian Military Department. And in 1900, the 76-mm (3-inch) gun mod. 1900, and on March 3, 1903, the famous “three-inch gun” was put into service - a 76-mm cannon mod. 1902, which differed from arr. 1900 by the carriage system and the absence of trunnions on the barrel body. She relied on a single ammunition - 76-mm shrapnel.

The three-inch gun became a miracle weapon, the “death scythe,” as our generals called it. Cannon battery mod. 1902 could literally mow down an entire enemy infantry battalion with shrapnel in a 30-second artillery attack.

The gun really could solve all the problems in the war against the enemy, who acted in accordance with the tactics of the Napoleonic wars. As for the infantry, who had settled in trenches, ravines, houses (even wooden ones!), the action of shrapnel was ineffective.

Already the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. showed the complete delusional nature of the theory of "trinity".

In 1907, a high-explosive fragmentation grenade was introduced into the ammunition load of the 76-mm gun, and in subsequent years, the production of 122-mm and 152-mm field howitzers mod. 1909 and 1910

The civil war was a mobile war and had a number of specific moments that were absent in other wars. The use of 76-mm shrapnel and high-explosive fragmentation shells turned out to be quite effective in it. In 1918–1920 "three-inch" was the main artillery weapon of the red, white and nationalist formations.

In the late 1920s The supply of the Red Army with artillery was in charge of incompetent, but extremely ambitious people - Tukhachevsky, Pavlunovsky and Co.

They decided to increase the range of the divisional guns without increasing the caliber of the guns and even leaving intact the cartridge case of the 76-mm gun mod. 1900 As they say, eat a fish and not get pricked. But the obvious thing is to increase the caliber, and not only will the firing range increase, but also the weight of the explosive in the projectile will increase cubed.

And how to increase the firing range without changing the caliber and cartridge case? Well, the sleeve is designed with a margin, and you can put in a larger charge, not 0.9 kg, but 1.08 kg, it won’t fit any more. Further, it is possible to improve the aerodynamic shape of the projectile, and this was done. You can increase the elevation angle of the gun. So, a grenade weighing 6.5 kg at an initial speed of 588 m / s flew 6200 m at an angle of + 16 °, and at an angle of + 30 ° - by 8540 m. But with a further increase in the elevation angle, the range almost did not increase, so, with + 40 ° range was 8760 m, that is, it increased by only 220 m, while the average deviation of the projectile (in range and lateral) sharply increased. Finally, the last resort was to increase the length of the barrel from 30 to 40 and even up to 50 calibers. The range increased slightly, but the weight of the gun increased, and most importantly, maneuverability and maneuverability deteriorated sharply.

Well, using all the mentioned means, we achieved a “long-range form” when firing a grenade at an angle of 45 ° from a barrel of 50 calibers with a range of 14 km. And what's the use? It is impossible for a ground observer to observe explosions of 76-mm weak grenades at such a distance. Even from an airplane from a height of 3-4 km, explosions of 76-mm grenades are not visible, and it was considered dangerous for a reconnaissance officer to descend below because of anti-aircraft fire. And of course, a huge dispersion, and even low-power shells.

Here it is appropriate to say about the grandiose undertaking of creating ultra-long-range shells. There were several dozen clever men who proposed to increase the range of divisional, corps and even naval artillery by introducing the so-called beltless shells - polygonal, sub-caliber, rifled, as well as their various combinations.

As a result, many dozens of guns of caliber from 76 to 368 mm rumbled at all the ranges of the Union, firing these shells. I told about this grandiose adventure back in 2003 in the book “Secrets of Russian Artillery”.

Here I will only say that dozens of types of polygonal, sub-caliber and rifled shells were tested in Russia from 1858 to 1875. Reports on their tests with a list of shortcomings and outlining the reasons why they were not accepted for service can be found in " Artillery magazine” for 1860-1876, as well as in the affairs of the military-historical archives.

One fairly competent artilleryman in 1938 compiled extracts from reports on tests of beltless shells in the USSR in 1923–1937. and sent their analysis to the GAU, and a copy of the analysis to the NKVD. How the adventures of fans of ultra-long-range shooting ended is not difficult to predict.

So it was necessary to shoot from 76-mm guns only with ordinary belt shells. It was only possible to improve their aerodynamics by introducing a mod. 1928 In 1930, the 76-mm gun mod. 1902. The main changes were the lengthening of the barrel from 30 to 40 calibers and an increase in the elevation angle from 16 ° 40? up to 37 °, which made it possible to increase the firing range of a long-range grenade (OF-350) to 13 km. I note that an increase in the length of the barrel by 10 calibers gave a gain of only 1 km. The upgraded gun became known as "arr. 1902/30".

Then they decided to bring the barrel length to 50 calibers. The first such gun was the 76 mm mod. 1933, and then the Grabin F-22 gun (sample 1936). Her elevation angle was brought to 75 °, so that anti-aircraft fire could be fired from a divisional gun.

It is clear that the effectiveness of firing from the F-22 on aircraft of the late 1930s - early 1940s. gravitated towards zero.

With the elimination of Tukhachevsky, Pavlunovsky, as well as most of the members of the GAU, ideas appeared to increase the caliber of divisional guns. Already in the second half of 1937, the well-known designers Sidorenko and Grabin proposed creating a duplex - a 95-mm divisional gun and a 122-mm howitzer on a single carriage. Grabin at the factory number 92 created a system of 95 mm F-28 guns and 122 mm F-25 howitzers. A similar set of 95 mm U-4 guns and 122 mm U-2 howitzers was created at UZTM.

Both systems were quite effective and could play an important role in the war. But in Rus', the people and leaders always bring. For 40 years, our generals, like children at the hem of their mother, held on to the 76-mm caliber, and then they suffered - but what is 95 mm, give the caliber 107 mm. Unfortunately, from Czechoslovakia, a 105-mm cannon "ODCH" (Czech special delivery) came to us for testing. The authorities liked it, plus the rumors about thick-armored German tanks, which were mentioned earlier.

The question of the appointment of those designed in 1938-1941. 107 mm guns are still largely unclear. In those years, they were called either corps, or divisional, and sometimes diplomatically - field. The fact is that in the corps artillery there was already a 122-mm A-19 gun, which, as they say, the 107-mm gun was not up to the mark. On the other hand, the four-ton 107-mm guns were too heavy for the division.

In the 1960s a certain strategist wrote in his memoirs that Stalin confused the 107-mm guns mod. 1910 and the new M-60 gun. But this is just an anecdote characterizing the mental level of a strategist.

One way or another, but on October 5, 1938, the GAU sent the “Tactical and Technical Requirements” (TTT) to the plant number 172 (Perm) to develop a new 107-mm gun. According to these TTTs, plant No. 172 developed a project for a 107-mm gun in 4 versions: two options had the same factory index M-60, the other two had the indices M-25 and M-45. The M-25 guns were an overlay of a 107 mm barrel on the carriage of a 152 mm M-10 howitzer. The shutter for all four options was taken from a 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 The M-25 and M-45 guns were somewhat heavier and taller than the M-60. The weight in the stowed position is 4050 and 4250 kg versus 3900 kg, and the minimum height is 1295 mm versus 1235 mm. But the M-25 and M-45 had a larger elevation angle - + 65 ° versus + 45 °.

Prototypes of the M-25 and M-45 guns passed factory tests at the Motovilikha training ground. Nevertheless, for unclear reasons, the GAU did not want to have a duplex - a 107-mm cannon and a 152-mm howitzer on the same carriage and preferred the M-60.

Serial production of the M-60 was entrusted to the new artillery plant No. 352 in the city of Novocherkassk. In 1940, Plant No. 352 produced an experimental batch of 24 guns, and in 1941, 103 guns. On this work on the M-60 was completed. In 1941–1942 there was no special need for it, and the Germans captured Novocherkassk.

V.G. Grabin, with all his merits as a designer, was a great opportunist. He practically curtailed work on the 95/122-mm duplex - F-28 / F-25 and in 1940-1941. designed the 107 mm ZIS-24 and ZIS-28 guns.

The 107-mm ZIS-24 gun was more likely not a field one, but an anti-tank one. A long barrel (73.5 calibers) was placed on the carriage of the 152-mm ML-20 howitzer-gun. The gun had a huge initial speed for a caliber projectile - 1013 m / s. They made a prototype, on which the work stopped.

The project of the 107-mm divisional gun ZIS-28 was completed in May - June 1941 on an initiative basis. The system was designed on the basis of the M-60 and differed from it in a swinging part with a barrel length of 48.6 calibers. The ballistics of the gun was taken from the ZIS-6 tank gun, the muzzle velocity was 830 m/s. In connection with the outbreak of war, work on the manufacture of an experimental mod. ZIS-28 stopped.

In the meantime, 95-mm and 107-mm divisional guns were being created, the leadership of the GAU decided to play it safe and simultaneously worked on 76-mm divisions, returning to a barrel length of 40 calibers and reducing the elevation angle to 45 °. In fact, it was a step backwards.

The 76-mm USV gun designed by Grabin was put into service on September 22, 1939 under the name “76-mm divisional gun mod. 1939".

By the beginning of World War II, the Red Army had 8521 76-mm divisional guns in service. Of these, 1170 - arr. 1939 (USV), 2874 - arr. 1936 (F-22) and 4447 - arr. 1902/30. Moreover, among the latter, most were equipped with a 40-caliber barrel, but some of them also had old 30-caliber barrels.

In addition, there were several more types of guns in the warehouses, including unconverted 76-mm guns mod. 1902 and 1900, 76 mm guns mod. 1902/26, that is, old Russian "three-inch guns" converted in Poland, 75-mm French guns mod. 1897 and others

As already mentioned, the German army did not have regular divisional guns. However, in the secondary (security and other) divisions of the Wehrmacht, old (during the First World War) German guns were used. It is curious that the old 7.7 cm F.K.16 field gun in the early 1930s. received new barrels in 7.5 cm caliber, and the letters n.A (new design) were added to the index.

The fundamental difference between the 7.5-cm F.K.16.n.A and the 76.2-mm Soviet, 75-mm French and other divisional guns was the presence of a separate-sleeve, rather than a unitary loading. The German cannon had four charges, which allowed it to conduct mounted fire.

In addition, limited use was made of captured divisional guns of 75-80 mm caliber taken throughout Europe - Czech, Polish, Dutch, etc. Most of all (several thousand) the Germans captured French 75-mm guns mod. 1897, which in the German army received the name 7.5-cm F.K.231 (f).

As a legacy from the tsarist army, the Red Army received two 122-mm howitzers - mod. 1909 and 1910 with almost the same performance characteristics. But the designs of both systems had fundamental differences, starting with the wedge gate of the howitzer mod. 1909 and a piston howitzer mod. 1910 Yes, and outwardly both systems had cardinal differences.

What was the point of having two such different systems in service? From a military point of view, none. But in 1909-1910. All orders of the Military Department were in charge of the Inspector General of Artillery, Grand Duke Sergei Nikolayevich. The Grand Duke, his mistress Matilda Kshesinskaya, as well as the French-speaking board of the Schneider plant and the Russian-speaking board of the Putilov plant organized a criminal community. As a result, all artillery systems adopted in Russia had to be Schneider systems and be produced exclusively in France or at the only private cannon factory in Russia, that is, Putilov.

Formally, open competitions were still held for the models of guns announced by the Military Department. All foreign and Russian factories were invited to shoot at the GAP. And in the absence of the Grand Duke, who was resting on the Cote d'Azur, the sample of the 122-mm howitzer of the Krupp system that won the competition was accepted. It was launched into production under the name “122-mm howitzer mod. 1909".

Enraged, Sergei Nikolayevich orders to follow up with the adoption of a sample of Schneider's company. Thus, two completely different 122-mm howitzers appeared in the Russian army - mod. 1909 and 1910

In 1930, the Perm plant upgraded the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910 The main goal of modernization is to increase the firing range. For this, the howitzer chamber was bored out (lengthened) by one caliber. The upgraded system was named "122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30". The Perm plant has upgraded 762 howitzers mod. 1910

In 1937, at the same plant, a similar upgrade was made to the Krupp howitzer mod. 1909 New sample was named "122-mm howitzer mod. 1909/37".

Regardless of these upgrades, since 1937, both howitzers began to be supplied with metal wheels with main wheel tires instead of wooden ones. Nevertheless, the replacement of the wheels was slow. This is evidenced by the complaints of the command of the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO) in November 1940 about the presence of a significant number of 122-mm mod. 1910/30 and 152 mm arr. 1909/30 on wooden wheels.

It is curious that the 122-mm howitzer mod. 1910/30 was produced until the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War. So, in 1938, 711 units were produced, in 1939 - 1294, in 1940 - 1139 and in 1941 - 21 such howitzers.

The new 122-mm howitzer M-30 was put into service by a resolution of the Defense Committee (KO) dated September 29, 1939 under the name “122-mm divisional howitzer mod. 1938". She had suspension, sliding beds and metal wheels.

Gross production of the M-30 began only in 1940, when 639 systems were manufactured.

In total, by the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 8142 122-mm howitzers. Of these, 1563 - M-30, 5690 - arr. 1910/30 and 889 - arr. 1909/37

In addition, the warehouses had two or three hundred captured 100-mm Polish howitzers mod. 1914/1919. They were used during the war, as evidenced by the "Firing Tables" published for them in 1941 and 1942.

And now let's move on to 152-mm howitzers. From the "damned tsarism" of the Red Army got two 152-mm howitzers - field mod. 1910 and serf arr. 1909

Both howitzers used the same projectiles, and the difference in ballistics was small - the initial velocity of the projectile was 335 m / s and the range was 7.8 km at mod. 1910 and, respectively, 381 m/s and 8.7 km at sample. 1909, that is, the range differed by less than 1 km.

Both systems were naturally designed by Schneider. The adoption of two almost identical howitzers can only be explained by the dementia of the tsarist generals.

In 1930–1931 at the Perm plant, a 152-mm howitzer mod. 1909 The main goal of modernization is to increase the firing range. For this, the chamber was lengthened, which made it possible to shoot the new OF-530 grenade at a distance of 9850 km.

In addition to the alteration of old howitzers, the production of new howitzers was also carried out - arr. 1909/30. So, in 1938, 480 units were manufactured, in 1939 - 620, in 1940 - 294, and the last 10 howitzers were produced in 1941.

In 1936–1937 the 152-mm howitzer mod. 1910 The upgraded howitzer was named “152-mm howitzer mod. 1910/37". On its trunks it was stamped: "an elongated chamber."

New howitzers mod. 1910/37 were not manufactured, but only the modernization of old howitzers arr. 1910

In 1937, both 152 mm howitzers began to gradually replace wooden wheels with metal ones. This was done regardless of the modernization.

In 1937, tests began on the 152-mm M-10 howitzer, created at the Perm plant. By a resolution of the CO of September 29, 1939, the M-10 howitzer was put into service under the name “152-mm divisional howitzer mod. 1938".

However, for divisional artillery, the M-10 turned out to be too heavy, and for corps artillery it was not powerful enough. The combat weight of the system exceeded 3.6 tons, which was then considered unacceptable for field artillery. Nevertheless, the M-10 was put into serial production at the plant number 172 in Perm. In 1939, the plant delivered 4 howitzers, in 1940 - 685.

In total, by the beginning of the war, the Red Army had 3,768 152-mm howitzers. Of these, 1058 - M-10, 2611 - arr. 1909/30 and 99 - arr. 1910/37

In addition, the Red Army had 92 British 152-mm Vickers howitzers, preserved from the times of the First World War and the Civil War. The firing range of the howitzer is 9.24 km, the weight in combat position is 3.7 tons. Moreover, 67 152-mm Vickers howitzers were in the ZapOVO by the beginning of World War II.

The Red Army also included several dozen Polish captured 155-mm howitzers mod. 1917, for which in 1941 they created "Firing Tables". In particular, 13 of these howitzers participated in the defense of Sevastopol as part of the 134th howitzer regiment.

According to wartime states, the basis of the Soviet rifle division was supposed to have 32 122-mm howitzers and 12 152-mm howitzers. In a motorized rifle division, the number of 122-mm howitzers was reduced to 24, and in motorized divisions to 16. In tank divisions, there were to be 12 howitzers of both calibers.

In the Wehrmacht by May 1940, 35 infantry divisions of the 1st wave included one artillery regiment. The regiment consisted of: 3 light artillery battalions of 3 batteries each (4 light field howitzers of 10.5 cm caliber in each battery), 1 heavy artillery battalion of three batteries (4 heavy field howitzers of 10.5 cm caliber in each battery). All these howitzers were German-made.

In motorized infantry divisions, an artillery regiment consisted of two light artillery battalions of three batteries (4 light field howitzers of 10.5 cm caliber in each battery), one heavy artillery battalion of three batteries (4 heavy field howitzers of 150 mm caliber in each battery).

The artillery regiment of tank divisions consisted of two light artillery battalions of three batteries (each battery had 4 light field howitzers of 10.5 cm caliber). The 1st, 2nd and 10th tank divisions also had one heavy artillery battalion with three batteries (two batteries of 15 cm heavy field howitzers and one battery of 10.5 cm guns; in the 1st tank division- 3 batteries of heavy field howitzers).

The first post-war 10.5 cm light field howitzer was created by the Rheinmetall company in 1929. The howitzer began to enter the troops in 1935, for the purpose of secrecy, it was called “10.5 cm light field howitzer mod. 18" (10.5 cm le.F.H.18). Howitzer mod. 18 was a completely modern gun with sliding box-shaped beds, sprung travel and metal wheels. A distinctive feature of the howitzer was the location of the recoil devices above and below the barrel in the cage of the cradle.

10.5 cm howitzer mod. 18 and subsequent samples had the largest range of shots. In their ammunition, there were over a dozen types of fragmentation and high-explosive fragmentation shells, smoke, lighting and armor-piercing caliber shells.

10.5-cm high-explosive fragmentation grenades had fragments spread forward by 10–15 m and sideways by 30–40 m. These shells pierced a concrete wall 30 cm thick, and a brick wall up to 2.1 m thick.

10.5 cm howitzer mod. 18 armor-piercing projectile pierced armor up to 50 mm thick at a distance of 500 m at an angle of 30 ° from the normal.

A special place was occupied by 10.5-cm shells with toxic substances. Among them were projectiles of type Kh weighing 14.0 kg, ZB weighing 13.23 kg, 38 Kh weighing 14.85 kg, 40 AB weighing 14.0 kg and 39 ZB weighing 13.45 kg.

At the end of 1941 or at the beginning of 1942, sub-caliber armor-piercing and cumulative shells were introduced into the ammunition load of 10.5-cm howitzers to fight the T-34 and KV tanks. In 1934, work began on the creation of 10.5-cm active rocket projectiles. However, by May 1945, only a small batch of active rockets had been fired for 10.5 cm howitzers.

In total, by the beginning of the war, the Wehrmacht had 4845 10.5-cm howitzers mod. 16 and 18. They had 16 million high-explosive fragmentation shells and 214.2 thousand shells containing poisonous substances.

In 1926–1930 Krupp and Rheinmetall jointly created a 15-cm heavy field howitzer. In 1934, she began to enter the army under the name "15-cm s.F.H.18". Such howitzers were in heavy artillery battalions of artillery regiments of infantry divisions of the 1st - 6th waves, mountain rifle and motorized divisions.

The division had three batteries of four guns each, that is, 12 15-cm howitzers per division. In addition, 15-cm heavy field howitzers were part of the RGK artillery battalions. So, by May 1, 1940, the RGK artillery had 21 mixed artillery battalions, each battalion had two batteries of 15 cm heavy howitzers and one battery of 10.5 cm guns, and 41 battalions of heavy field howitzers, in each battalion there were three batteries of heavy field howitzers of 15 cm caliber.

The ammunition load of the 15-cm howitzer included almost two dozen types of shells. 15-cm high-explosive fragmentation shells (grenades) were supplied with percussion and mechanical remote fuses. The optimal height of the explosion of a remote grenade was 10 m. In this case, the lethal fragments flew forward by 26 m and to the sides by 60-65 m, the fragments did not fly back. With an instantaneous operation of the head fuse, when it hit the ground, the lethal fragments flew forward by 20 m, sideways by 50 m and back by 6 m.

High-explosive fragmentation projectile type 15 cm Gr.19 and 19 stg. pierced normal to a concrete wall up to 0.45 m thick, a brick wall up to 3.05 m, sandy soil up to 5.5 m, loose soil up to 11 m.

A concrete-piercing 15-cm Gr.19 Be projectile pierced a reinforced concrete wall 0.4–0.5 m thick.

The 15-cm Gr.19 Nb smoke projectile, when broken, formed a smoke cloud with a diameter of about 50 m, which persisted in a light wind for up to 40 seconds.

Since 1942, cumulative 15-cm shells Gr.39 Hl, Gr.39 Hl / A and Gr.39 Hl / B have been introduced into the howitzer ammunition to fight tanks. 15 cm cumulative shells hit the armor of any heavy tank. Their armor penetration was 150-200 mm when hit at an angle of 45 ° from the normal. The effective range of firing at tanks (in terms of accuracy) with cumulative and high-explosive fragmentation shells was 1500 m.

The German 15-cm heavy field howitzer became the first artillery piece in the world to use active rocket projectiles. Work on active-rocket projectiles began in Germany in 1934. With the help of such projectiles, the designers sought to increase the firing range. However, the Germans faced a number of difficulties. So, in active-rocket projectiles, in comparison with conventional projectiles, the weight of the bursting charge has decreased, the accuracy of fire has worsened, etc. I note that many of these problems have not been resolved to this day. In the prewar years, the Germans spent about 2.5 million marks on work on active rockets.

Initially, experiments were carried out with cannon shells of 7.5 cm and 10 cm caliber. Black powder was used as rocket fuel. However, due to the fragility of the checkers of this gunpowder, satisfactory results could not be obtained.

Only in 1938, the DAG company in the city of Düneberg managed to create a technology for pressing strong smokeless powder checkers and a reliable ignition scheme. As a result, the tested experimental active-rocket projectile had a firing range 30% greater than that of a conventional projectile.

In 1939, the Baprif company developed a 15-cm Rgr.19 active rocket projectile. The weight of the projectile was 45.1 kg, length 804 mm / 5.36 caliber. The projectile contained 1.6 kg of explosive. The muzzle velocity of the projectile is 505 m/s. Firing range 18.2 km. After testing, the projectile was adopted.

In 1940, 60,000 15-cm Rgr.19 active-rocket projectiles were manufactured in the Bamberg Military Arsenal. All of them were sent to the African Corps.

In 1941–1944 Rheinmetall and Krupp produced a small batch of improved 15-cm Rgr.19 / 40 active-rocket projectiles with a firing range of 19 km. These shells were not widely used because of the poor accuracy of fire and the low strength of the shells. Deviations in range when firing at 19 km were up to 1250 m.

In 1944–1945 for the 15-cm howitzer, several samples of high-explosive fragmentation feathered shells were created. A long 70-kilogram projectile fired normally from a howitzer, but due to the presence of a towing washer with protrusions in the tail section of the projectile, it received 20 times less angular velocity than a conventional projectile. After the projectile took off, four stabilizers were opened in its tail section, the span of which was 400 mm. The initial speed of the projectile reached 360 m / s. The German designation of the projectile 15-cm Flü. Ni. Gr. (winged mine).

In addition to regular German-made 10.5 cm and 15 cm howitzers, the Wehrmacht used thousands of captured 100–155 mm howitzers.

The tsarist army of the Red Army inherited a rather weak 107-mm (42-line) corps gun mod. 1910 In 1930, the gun underwent modernization, during which the barrel was lengthened by 10 calibers (from 28 to 39 calibers), a muzzle brake was introduced, the charging chamber was enlarged, unitary loading was replaced by a separate-sleeve, etc. In total, it was modernized 139 guns mod. 1910 They received a new name - “107-mm cannon mod. 1910/30". In addition, in 1931-1935. 430 new systems were manufactured arr. 1910/30

Regardless of the modernization, in 1937 the slow replacement of wooden wheels with metal ones began.

By the beginning of the war, the Red Army, according to the work "Artillery in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War", consisted of 863 guns, and according to archival data - 864 guns, and four more 107-mm guns mod. 1910/30 were in the Navy.

In addition to them, there were at least two hundred 105-mm Polish (French-made) guns mod. 1913 and 1929, as well as 107-mm Japanese guns mod. 1905. I would like to note that in 1941 “Firing tables” were published for all three guns (No. 323, 319 and 135).

The history of the creation of the 152-mm howitzer-gun mod. 1937 (ML-20), which became the most powerful and most common weapon of the Soviet corps artillery.

In 1910, under pressure from Grand Duke Sergei Mikhailovich, the 152-mm Schneider siege gun was adopted, although a similar Krupp system showed better results in tests in Russia. She received the name "152-mm siege gun mod. 1910 ", and the order for its production, of course, was issued to the Putilov plant. From 1914 to 1930, the plant delivered 85 of these guns.

In 1930, the guns underwent modernization, which consisted in lengthening the barrel by one caliber and boring the chamber for a long-range projectile mod. 1928 A muzzle brake was also introduced. In 1930, the modernized gun was put into service and received the name “152-mm gun mod. 1910/1930".

By November 1, 1936, all 152-mm guns mod. 1910 were redesigned by the factories "Red Putilovets" and "Barricades" in arr. 1910/1930 By this time, the Red Army had 152 guns mod. 1910/1930

In the new 152 mm gun mod. 1910/1930, the carriage still remained the weak point of the system. Therefore, in 1932, a project was developed for imposing the barrel of a 152-mm gun mod. 1910/1930 on the carriage of a 122-mm gun mod. 1931 (A-19). The system thus obtained was originally called “152-mm howitzer mod. 1932", then - "152-mm howitzer mod. 1934 A-19", that is, she was assigned the factory index of the 122-mm gun mod. 1931

The system was put into service and put into production, although the names continued to be inconsistent: “152-mm cannon mod. 1910/1934" or "152-mm howitzer mod. 1934".

During the design of the 152-mm gun mod. 1910/1934, a lot of controversy was caused by the method of transporting the system in the stowed position. For her, two options for carriage were developed - in a separate and inseparable position.

Production of 152-mm gun mod. 1910/1934 was carried out at the Perm plant. In 1934, the plant delivered 3 guns, in 1935 it also delivered 3 guns (this is with a plan of 30 pieces).

By January 1, 1937, 125 guns were manufactured. During 1937 another 150 guns were produced. On this, the production of 152-mm guns mod. 1910/34 was discontinued. A total of 225 guns were made.

152 mm gun mod. 1910/1934 (in 1935-1936 it was called "152-mm howitzer mod. 1934") had many shortcomings. The main ones were:

- only the carriage was sprung, and the front end had no suspension, and the speed of carriage along the highway was limited to 18-20 km / h.

- suspension was turned off by a special mechanism, and not automatically, which took 2-3 minutes.

- the upper machine was a too complex casting.

And the most serious drawback was the combination of the lifting and balancing mechanism in one system. The speed of vertical guidance per revolution of the flywheel did not exceed 10 minutes, which was extremely small.

Finally, although the system of 1934 was called a howitzer, its elevation angle (+45 °) for howitzers of the 1930s. was too small.

During the modernization of the system arr. In 1910/34, a sample of the ML-20 howitzer gun was created at the Perm plant.

After conducting military tests, the ML-20 system was put into service on September 22, 1939 under the name “152-mm howitzer-gun mod. 1937".

Serial production of the ML-20 began in 1937, when 148 guns were produced, in 1938 - 500, in 1939 - 567, in 1940 - 901.

By the beginning of World War II, the Red Army had 2,610 152-mm ML-20 howitzer guns, as well as 267 152-mm guns mod. 1910/30 and 1910/34

The development of a 122-mm long-range gun has been carried out at the Perm plant since 1929. A 122-mm gun mod. 1931 (A-19) was adopted by the Decree of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) of March 13, 1936.

Initially, the carriage of the barrel and carriage was carried out separately, but in 1937 they switched to an inseparable carriage. After applying the barrel of the A-19 system to the ML-20 carriage, the system became known as the “122-mm cannon mod. 1931/37". By June 22, 1941, the Red Army consisted of 1255 guns mod. 1931 and 1931/37, of which arr. 1931 there were only 21 guns.

In Germany in 1926–1930 a new type of 10.5 cm K.18 cannon was created with sliding beds, sprung travel and metal wheels. The barrels for these guns were made by Krupp and Rheinmetall, and the carriages were made by Krupp. By April 1, 1940, there were 700 guns and 1427 thousand shots for them.

The 10.5-cm K.18 guns were in regiments and divisions of the Wehrmacht RGC units and, if necessary, were attached to infantry and other divisions. By May 1940, the RGC consisted of 27 motorized battalions of 10.5 cm cannons with three batteries and 21 mixed motorized artillery battalions (two batteries of 15 cm heavy field howitzers and one battery of 10.5 cm guns each).

The 15 cm K.16 gun was developed by Krupp and put into service in January 1917. The system was produced until 1933 in two almost identical versions, manufactured by Krupp and Rheinmetall (K.16.Kp. and K.16 .Ph.), differing in barrel weight and size. So, the barrel length of the Krupp samples was 42.7 calibers, and the Rheinmetall samples had 42.9 calibers.

The K.16 barrel consisted of a tube, casing, and a removable breech. The shutter is horizontal wedge. Carriage box-shaped single-beam. Rollback brake hydraulic. Wheels are iron disk. Initially, the system was transported on two wagons, and then they began to use an inseparable wagon on the front end (behind the mechanical traction). The speed of carriage did not exceed 10 km / h.

By September 1, 1939, the Wehrmacht had 28 K.16 guns and 26.1 thousand shots for them. During the war, K.16 guns were not manufactured. However, in 1940, the production of ammunition for them was resumed. In 1940, 16.4 thousand shots were fired, in 1941 - 9.5 thousand and in 1942 - 4.6 thousand shots, on which their production was completed. By the end of the war, 16 K.16 guns remained, 15 of which were at the front.

Due to the shortage of 15-cm long-range guns, the Wehrmacht command in the late 30s. took the necessary measure and adopted the 15-cm SKC / 28 naval gun. These guns were installed on the battleships Bismarck and Scharnhorst, battleships of the Deutschland type and other ships. In the Wehrmacht, 15 cm SKC / 28 guns were mounted on eight-wheeled carts. The system was a mobile coastal installation with a low silhouette in a combat position.

The SKC/28 barrel consisted of a free tube with a casing and had a muzzle brake. The shutter is horizontal wedge.

In the stowed position, the gun was transported on an eight-wheeled (four-axle) wagon, like an anti-aircraft gun. In the combat position, the gun was lowered onto a base plate, which was balanced by eight cross-shaped beds (the Germans called them "cigars") and an opener driven into the ground.

In 1941, five motorized divisions with 15 cm SKC/28 guns (No. 511, 620, 680, 731 and 740) were in service, each division had three batteries of three guns.

In addition, in 1941, due to the fact that the production of 15-cm barrels for K.18 guns was slow, and the field troops urgently needed them, 8 barrels of SKC / 28 guns were superimposed on carriages of 21-cm mortar mod. 18.

Instead of the 15 cm K.16 guns, Rheinmetall began designing the 15 cm K.18 gun. The K.18 cannon began to enter the troops in 1938.

Shooting was carried out from wheels or from a platform, consisting of two parts and allowing circular fire. In the stowed position, the system was transported on two wagons. The speed of transportation on wheels with trucks was allowed up to 24 km / h, and with pneumatic tires - up to 50 km / h.

During the war years, K.18 guns were in production from 1940 to 1943. In 1940, 21 guns were delivered, in 1941 - 45, in 1942 - 25 and in 1943 - 10. In 1940 48.3 thousand shots were fired for K.18, in 1941 - 57.1 thousand, in 1942 - 86.1 thousand, in 1943 - 69 thousand and in 1944 - 11.4 thousand shots .

In 1941, 15 cm K.18 guns were in service with three motorized batteries (821, 822 and 909). By March 1945, only 21 K.18 guns survived.

In 1938, Türkiye issued an order to Krupp for 15 cm guns. Two such guns were delivered to the Turks, but in November 1939 the Wehrmacht command forced Krupp to break the contract and paid 8.65 million Reichsmarks for the remaining 64 guns ordered. In the Wehrmacht, they received the name "15-cm K.39". Until the end of 1939, Krupp handed over 15 K.39 guns to the Wehrmacht, in 1940 - 11, in 1941 - 25 and in 1942 - 13 guns. Ammunition for K.39 was produced from 1940 to 1944: in 1944 - 46.8 thousand rounds, in 1941 - 83.7 thousand, in 1942 - 25.4 thousand, in 1943 - 69 thousand and in 1944 - 11.4 thousand shots.

The 15 cm K.39 guns were used in both heavy field artillery and coastal defense. The 15 cm K.39 guns were divided into three-battery divisions. Each battery had three 15 cm guns and seven Sd.Kfz.9 tractors. There were also separate heavy three-gun batteries.

In addition to German-made 15 cm guns, the Wehrmacht used many dozens of captured French, Czech, Belgian and other guns.

In the late 1930s in the USSR, a high-power triplex (BM) was created as part of a 152-mm Br-2 gun, a 203-mm B-4 howitzer and a 280-mm Br-5 mortar. Of these, the B-4 howitzer was most widely used.

Initially, in 1937, Br-2 guns were made with fine cutting. However, the survivability of their trunks was extremely low - about 100 shots.

In July - August 1938, the Br-2 barrel with a deep groove (from 1.5 mm to 3.1 mm) and a reduced chamber was tested at the NIAP. The gun fired a projectile, which instead of two had one leading belt. According to the test results, the Artillery Directorate announced that the survivability of the Br-2 gun had increased by 5 times. Such a statement must be treated with caution, since there was a clear fraud: the criterion for the survivability of the gun - the drop in the initial speed - was quietly increased from 4% to 10%. One way or another, but on December 21, 1938, the Artillery Directorate issued a resolution “To approve the 152-mm Br-2 cannon with deep cutting for gross production”, and it was decided to stop experiments with Br-2 barrels of 55 calibers.

In 1938, the serial Br-2 guns did not give up. In 1939, 4 guns were handed over (according to the plan 26), and in 1940 - 23 (according to the plan 30), in 1941 there was not a single gun.

Thus, in 1939-1940. 27 deep-rifled Br-2 guns were delivered; in 1937, 7 fine-rifled Br-2 guns were delivered. In addition, before January 1, 1937, the industry delivered 16 152-mm guns mod. 1935 (among them, apparently, were Br-2 and B-30).

According to the state of February 19, 1941, the RVGK heavy cannon regiment consisted of 152-mm Br-2 24 cannons, 104 tractors, 287 vehicles and 2598 personnel. The regiment consisted of four divisions of three-battery composition. Each battery consisted of 2 Br-2 guns.

In total, by June 22, 1941, the RVGK artillery, taking into account mobilization deployment, consisted of one cannon regiment (24 Br-2 cannons) and two separate heavy cannon batteries (each with 2 Br-2 cannons). A total of 28 guns. In total, in the Red Army on June 22, 1941, there were 37 Br-2 guns, of which 2 required major repairs. Here, the guns of polygons, etc. are taken into account. In addition, it can be assumed that finely cut guns were not removed from service, but they were not issued to the unit either.

The barrel of the 203-mm B-4 howitzer turned out to be more tenacious. Officially, the B-4 203-mm howitzer was put into service on June 10, 1934. In 1933, the production of B-4 howitzers began at the Barrikady plant.

By June 22, 1941, the Red Army had only 849 B-4 howitzers, of which 41 howitzers needed major repairs.

In 1938–1939 an attempt was made to introduce 203-mm howitzers into corps artillery regiments (“second type regiments”), 6 howitzers per division. However, by the beginning of the war, B-4s were withdrawn from corps artillery, and instead of six howitzers, each division received 12–15 ML-20 howitzer guns.

By the beginning of the war, B-4 howitzers were only in howitzer artillery regiments of high power of the RVGK. According to the staff of the regiment (dated February 19, 1941), it had 4 divisions of a three-battery composition. Each battery consisted of 2 howitzers, respectively, one howitzer was considered a platoon. In total, the regiment had 24 howitzers, 112 tractors, 242 cars, 12 motorcycles and 2304 personnel (of which 174 were officers). By June 22, 1941, the RVGK had 33 regiments with B-4 howitzers, that is, a total of 792 howitzers in the state, and in fact the regiments consisted of 727 howitzers.

Tests of the 280-mm mortar Br-5 began in December 1936.

Although the Br-5 mortar was not debugged, the Barricades plant launched it into gross production. In total, 20 mortars were handed over in 1939, and 25 more in 1940. In 1941, not a single 280-mm mortar was handed over. After the start of World War II, Br-5 mortars were not produced.

On June 22, 1941, the Red Army was armed with 25 280-mm Schneider mortars and 47 280-mm Br-5 mortars (apparently, 45 serial mortars and two experimental mortars handed over at the beginning of 1939).

All 280 mortars were part of 8 separate artillery battalions of special power (OAD OM). Each division had 6 mortars. In total, the ARGC had 48 280-mm Schneider and Br-5 mortars.

Of the triplex systems, the 203-mm B-4 howitzer turned out to be the most successful. Looking ahead, I will say that it was operated in the Soviet Army for a long time, and in 1964 the design of a nuclear charge began for it.

However, the above applies exclusively to the B-4 rocking chair, and not to its course. Soviet engineers in the mid-20s. decided to abandon the platform when firing from high-powered guns. But in those years, not a single wheel could withstand the force of recoil when firing at full charge. And then smart heads decided to replace the wheel drive with a caterpillar one, without thinking about the weight of the system, or, most importantly, about its cross-country ability. As a result, the operation of triplex guns, even in peacetime, turned into a continuous "war" with its undercarriage.

For example, the horizontal guidance angle of the system was only ± 4 °. To turn the 17-ton B-4 colossus through a larger angle, the force of the calculations of two or more howitzers was required. The carriage of the system, of course, was separate. Tracked carriages and tracked barrel carts (B-29) had terrible maneuverability. In the icy conditions, the carriage of the gun carriage or the receiver wagon had to be pulled by two "Cominterns" (the most powerful Soviet tractors). Total for the system - four "Comintern".

Already on February 8, 1938, the GAU issued tactical and technical requirements for the development of a wheeled duplex, that is, a new carriage for the B-4 and Br-2. The M-50 duplex project was developed by the Perm plant, but by June 22, 1941, it remained on paper.

In the next 10 war and post-war years, a number of designers, including V.G. Grabin, made attempts to put the triplex on the wheels, but all was unsuccessful. Only in 1954, the chief designer of the Barrikady plant, G.I. Sergeev created a wheeled carriage (in fact, only a move) for a 152 mm gun and a 203 mm howitzer. Systems on a wheeled carriage were named "Br-2M" and "B-4M".

The German analogue of the B-4 is the 21-cm mortar Mrs.18. The mortar was put into service in 1936.

Due to the long barrel, in some English reference books, the 21 cm Mrs.18 mortar is called a cannon. This is fundamentally wrong. It's not just the high elevation angle (+70°). The mortar could shoot at an angle of 0 ° only at small charges - from No. 1 to No. 4. And with a large charge (No. 5 and No. 6), the elevation angle had to be at least 8 °, otherwise the system could tip over. Thus, the 21 cm Mrs.18 was a classic mortar.

A characteristic feature of the 21-cm mortar mod. 18 there was a double rollback: the barrel rolled back along the cradle, and the cradle, together with the barrel and the upper machine, along the lower carriage machine, which achieved good stability of the mortar when firing.

In the combat position, the mortar rested in front on the base plate, and in the back - on the trunk support. The wheels were hung out at the same time. In the stowed position, the barrel was removed and mounted on a special barrel wagon. Usually the carriage was carried out separately - a barrel wagon and a separate carriage with a limber. The towing speed did not exceed 20 km / h. However, for short distances at a speed of 4–6 km / h, it was allowed to transport mortars unassembled, that is, with a barrel superimposed on a gun carriage.

The mortar ammunition included two high-explosive fragmentation grenades and a concrete-piercing projectile. When a high-explosive fragmentation grenade hit the ground at an angle of at least 25 °, the lethal fragments flew forward by 30 m and to the sides by 80 m, and when falling at an angle of more than 25 °, the fragments flew forward by 75 m and to the sides by 50 m. The projectile had the same effective fragmentation action when it burst at a height of 10 m. Lethal fragments flew forward 80 m and sideways 90 m. Therefore, 21-cm high-explosive fragmentation grenades were equipped with remote mechanical fuses.

A concrete-piercing projectile pierced a concrete wall 0.6 m thick and a brick wall up to 4 m thick, and also penetrated, when hit close to normal, into sandy soil to a depth of 7.2 m, and into loose soil - up to 14.6 m.

By June 1, 1941, the Wehrmacht had 388 21-cm Mrs.18 mortars. All 21 cm mortars mod. 18 were in the artillery units of the RGC. By the end of May 1940, the 21-cm Mrs.18 was in service with two mixed motorized artillery battalions (No. 604 and No. 607). Each division had two batteries of 21-cm mortars (three-gun composition) and one battery of 15-cm guns. Also 21-cm mortars mod. 18 consisted of fifteen motorized divisions, three batteries of three-gun composition each (2nd and 3rd divisions of the 109th artillery regiment, 2nd division of the 115th artillery regiment, divisions No. 615, 616, 635, 636, 637, 732 , 733, 735, 736, 777, 816, 817). In addition, there were three mortars in the 624th and 641st divisions of special power in addition to batteries of 30.5-cm mortars.

In 1939, the Krupp company made the barrel of a 17-cm (172.5-mm) naval gun superimposed on a mortar carriage. The system received the designation 17-cm K.Mrs.Laf. German historians consider the 17 cm cannon mod. 18 on a mortar carriage (17 cm K.Mrs.Laf) the best gun of its class in World War II.

The 17-cm K.Mrs.Laf guns were most often part of the mixed motorized artillery battalions of the Wehrmacht's RGK. Each division had two three-gun batteries of 21-cm mortar mod. 18 and one three-gun battery of 17 cm guns.

The first four 17-cm guns were delivered to units in January 1941. In 1941, 91 guns were received from industry, in 1942 - 126, in 1943 - 78, in 1944 - 40 and in 1945 - 3.

In addition to these two regular systems, the Germans used on the Eastern Front many dozens of large and special power guns of Czech, French, Dutch and British production.

For the first time with mortars Stokes-Brandt, that is, mortars created according to the scheme of an imaginary triangle, the painters met in October 1929 during the Soviet-Chinese conflict on the CER.

During the fighting, units of the Red Army captured several dozen Chinese 81-mm Stokes-Brandt mortars and hundreds of mines for them. In November - December 1929, captured mortars were sent to Moscow and Leningrad for study.

Chinese mortars first fell into group "D". At the first acquaintance with mortars, the leader of the group, N.A. Dorovlev appreciated the ingenious simplicity of the product. Without hesitation, he abandoned the deaf scheme, although work on such systems was still carried out for some time by inertia. Within a few months, the "D" group developed according to the imaginary triangle scheme (or rather, copied the Chinese mortar) a system of three mortars of 82, 107 and 120 mm caliber.

So the first Soviet mortars were created according to the imaginary triangle scheme.

Gradually, the group "D" and their high-ranking fans in the GAU skidded. They decided that mortars could replace classical artillery. In 1930, a sample of a twelve-finger 160-mm mine and several samples of 160-mm mortars were created. The design of 240-mm mortars began.

On the other hand, at the end of 1939, an original type of mortar was created - the “37-mm mortar-shovel”, made according to the “unitary barrel” scheme.

In the stowed position, the mortar was a shovel, the handle of which was the barrel. The shovel mortar could be used to dig trenches.

When firing from a mortar, the shovel served as a base plate. The shovel is made of armored steel and could not be penetrated by a 7.62 mm bullet.

The mortar consisted of a barrel, a shovel - a base plate and a bipod with a cork.

The barrel tube is tightly connected to the breech. A striker is pressed into the breech, on which the primer of the expelling cartridge of the mine was applied.

In the winter of 1940, when using a 37-mm mortar-shovel in battles in Finland, it was discovered low efficiency 37 mm mines. It turned out that the range of the mine at the optimal elevation angle is insignificant, and the fragmentation effect is weak, especially in winter time when almost all the fragments got stuck in the snow. Therefore, the 37-mm mortar-shovel and the mine for it were removed from service and their production was stopped.

By the beginning of World War II, the Red Army had 36,324 company 50-mm mortars, 14,525 battalion 82-mm mortars, 1,468 mountain 107-mm mortars and 3,876 regimental 120-mm mortars.

Already in the mid-1930s. a number of mortar designers and their patrons literally declared war on everyone artillery pieces capable of direct fire.

For example, consider the guns included in the artillery armament system for 1929-1932, which was approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 15, 1920 and had the force of law. In this system, the section "Battalion artillery" consisted of 76-mm mortars. In the "Regimental Artillery" section - 76-mm infantry escort howitzers and 122-mm mortars. In the section "Divisional artillery" - 152-mm mortars. In the "Hull Artillery" section - 203-mm mortars.

As you can see, it is simply not serious to blame our artillerymen for underestimating mounted fire. But alas, none of the points of the program was carried out.

But the system of artillery weapons for 1933-1937. Among other things there:

- 76-mm gun-mortar for arming rifle battalions;

- 152-mm mortar for arming a rifle regiment;

- 203-mm mortar for corps artillery.

Result? Again, all three points were not met.

Thus, if both pre-war programs were completed for the rest of the artillery weapons, then not a single mortar entered service. What is it - an accident? Or maybe our designers blundered and made crooked mortars?

In 1928–1930 at least a dozen 76-mm battalion mortars were made. The best designers of the country took part in their design. All these systems have been tested and have generally shown good results. But in the early 1930s stopped working on them.

In December 1937, the Artillery Administration decided to return to the issue of 76-mm mortars. The military engineer of the 3rd rank of the NTO of the Art Administration, Sinolitsyn, wrote in conclusion that the sad end of the story with the 76-mm battalion mortars “is a direct act of sabotage ... I believe that work on light mortars should be resumed immediately, and all previously manufactured mortars scattered around the factories and landfills, search for.

Nevertheless, work on these mortars was not resumed, and 4 experienced 76-mm mortars were sent to the Artillery Museum.

In the system of artillery weapons for 1933-1937. the "76-mm cannon-mortar" was included. Its weight was supposed to be 140–150 kg, firing range 5–7 km, rate of fire 15–20 rounds per minute. The mortar gun was intended to arm rifle battalions.

The expression "gun-mortar" did not take root, and such systems began to be called battalion howitzers. Two such howitzers were designed and tested - 35K of factory No. 8 and F-23 of factory No. 92.

The 35K howitzer was designed and manufactured at factory number 8 under the direction of V.N. Sidorenko. It was intended for mountain and airborne units, as well as a battalion gun for direct infantry support.

The design of the 35K howitzer began in 1935. On May 9, 1936, the first prototype was handed over to the military representative.

The gun was disassembled into 9 parts weighing from 35 to 38 kg. Thus, in disassembled form, it could be transported not only on horse, but also on human packs.

The 35K howitzer was tested at the NIAP 5 times.

The first test took place in May - June 1936. After 164 shots and 300 km of run, the howitzer failed and was removed from testing.

The second test - September 1936. During firing, the frontal connection burst, as there were no bolts that fastened the shield bracket to the frontal part. Someone, apparently, took out or "forgot" to put these bolts.

The third test - February 1937. Again, someone did not fill the liquid into the compressor cylinder. As a result, when firing due to a strong impact of the barrel, the frontal part of the machine was deformed.

The fourth test - when firing from a new experimental howitzer on May 23, 1937, the knurler spring broke. The reason is an engineer's gross error in the drawing of the compressor spindle.

The fifth test - December 1937 - 9 35K systems were tested at once. Due to undershoots and throws when firing at an angle of 0 °, the commission decided that the test system could not stand it. There is a clear nitpicking here, since all mountain tools had similar phenomena, for example, 7-2 and 7-6.

In total, by the beginning of 1937, twelve 76-mm 35K howitzers were manufactured at plant No. 8. However, by this time, having many more profitable orders, the plant had lost all interest in this howitzer.

At the beginning of 1937, all work on the 35K howitzer was transferred from plant No. 8 to plant No. 7, which was given an order for the manufacture of 100 35K howitzers in 1937. But plant No. 7 also did not want to do anything with the "foreign" system.

Outraged, Sidorenko wrote a letter to the Artillery Directorate on April 7, 1938: “Plant No. 7 is not interested in finishing 35K - this threatens it with gross arbitrariness ... You [in the Artillery Directorate] 35K are in charge of a department that is a staunch supporter of mortars and, therefore, an opponent of mortars ". Further, Sidorenko directly wrote that there was elementary wrecking during the tests of 35K at the NIAP.

The unique 76-mm F-23 battalion howitzer was created by the famous designer V.G. Grabin in the Design Bureau of Plant No. 92 in Gorky. The design feature of the howitzer was that the axis of the trunnions did not pass through the central part of the cradle, but through its rear end. In the combat position, the wheels were at the back. When moving to the stowed position, the cradle with the barrel rotated about the axis of the trunnions back by almost 180 °. Like Sidorenko, the howitzer was dismantled for transportation to horse packs. Needless to say, the F-23 also suffered the fate of 35K.

At the plant in Perm (then the city of Molotov) in 1932, a prototype of the 122-mm regimental mortar M-5 was manufactured and tested, and the following year, the 122-mm regimental mortar Lom. Both mortars had fairly high tactical and technical data, but they were not accepted into service. Moreover, we note: if, for example, the 76-mm F-22 divisional gun could be accepted or not, fortunately, in the latter case, 76-mm guns mod. 1902/30, then there was no alternative to the 122-mm M-5 and Lom mortars in the regiments.

In 1930, the design bureau of the Krasny Putilovets plant developed a project for a 152-mm divisional mortar. But she had no chance of survival. According to the agreement concluded on August 28, 1930 with the Byutast company (a front office of the Rheinmetall company), the Germans were to supply eight 15.2-cm mortars from the Rheinmetall company and help organize their production in the USSR.

In the USSR, the mortar was put into service under the name "152-mm mortar mod. 1931". In the documents of 1931-1935. it was called the mortar "N" or "NM" (NM - German mortar).

From June 5 to June 30, 1931, the German 152-mm mortar "N" successfully passed tests at the Main Artillery Range in the amount of 141 shots, and in the autumn of the same year it passed military tests in the 20th Infantry Division.

The 152-mm mortar "N" was put into serial production at the Perm plant. However, only 129 mortars were made. Where is the company "Rheinmetall" against our mortar lobby!

Nevertheless, the design bureau of plant No. 172 (Perm) modernized the mortar mod. 1931 and submitted three new ML-21 152-mm mortars for testing. Tests revealed a number of minor design flaws.

The mortar lobby in the Artillery Directorate met the ML-21 literally with hostility. On July 13, 1938, a slander went to Marshal Kulik from the 2nd department of the Art Administration: “For a number of years, Plant No. 172 tried to work out 152-mm mortars in a large number of options and did not receive a satisfactory solution to a number of issues: system strength, weight, clearance, etc. .

Tests of mortars in the troops also showed unsatisfactory results both in terms of design and tactical data (heavy for a regiment, but weak for a division). In addition, it was not part of the weapons system. Based on the foregoing, the Artillery Committee considers it necessary to stop further work on the mortar.

On August 28, 1938, Marshal Kulik, in a letter to People's Commissar Voroshilov, rewrote all the arguments of the Art Administration like a parrot and added on his own: "I ask for your order to stop experimental work on this mortar." Work on 152-mm divisional mortars was finally stopped.

Looking ahead, I’ll say that mortars of this type, which were called 15-cm heavy infantry guns in the Wehrmacht, did a lot of trouble on all fronts of World War II.

The Soviet designers also successfully completed the item of both artillery programs for the 203-mm hull mortar.

Several samples of 203-mm hull mortars were created and tested (in 1929 - mortar "Zh"; in 1934 - mortar "OZ", etc.). The result is the same - not a single hull mortar entered service. Moreover, I note that the guns of the flat battle - the same "polkovushki", divisional guns - were regularly taken into service and launched into mass production.

A unique weapon, the 40.8-mm Taubin automatic grenade launcher, which was almost 40 years ahead of all armies in the world, also became a victim of the mortar lobby.

The 40.8 mm Taubin automatic grenade launcher was formidable weapon. The rate of fire was 440–460 rounds per minute. Another question is that with magazine feeding, the practical rate of fire was initially only 50-60 rounds per minute. But Taubin also developed a variant of tape power. At the same time, the practical rate of fire became equal to the rate of fire over the entire length of the belt. Given the low charge unitary patron the heating of the barrel and its wear during firing were small. Thus, the length of the tape was limited only by weight restrictions. The practical firing range of the grenade launcher was 1200 m.

Tests of the 40.8-mm grenade launcher have been continuously conducted since 1933. Almost every year, new models were made, and even small series. So, in 1937 alone, OKB-16 manufactured 12 grenade launchers for military testing, and the INZ-2 plant produced 24 more.

At the end of 1937, the 40.8-mm Taubin grenade launcher underwent military tests simultaneously in three rifle divisions. Reviews were generally positive everywhere, the practical rate of fire was increased to 100 rounds per minute (with circulating power). Here, for example, is a report from the 90th Infantry Division of the Leningrad Military District, where grenade launchers were tested from December 8 to 18, 1932: "The action of grenade launchers is trouble-free."

In November 1938, a 40.8-mm grenade launcher was tested on a small D-type armored boat of the Dnieper military flotilla. The grenade launcher was mounted on a pedestal from a ShVAK machine gun. Shooting was carried out both at anchor and on the move. From the conclusion of the commission: "The automation worked flawlessly ... the accuracy is satisfactory ... the system does not unmask when firing due to the weak sound of the shot and the absence of flame ... the fuse works flawlessly both in water and on the ground."

On January 20, 1939, the Naval Ordnance Department concluded an agreement with OKB-16 for the manufacture of 40.8-mm and 60-mm ship grenade launchers, but soon terminated the agreement without explanation.

The Taubin grenade launcher was also tested in parts of the NKVD in the Far East, where it also received positive reviews.

Already according to the results of military tests at the end of 1937, the grenade launcher should have been adopted by the Red Army. All noted shortcomings were not serious and eliminated. Yes, and without flaws, not a single artillery system was adopted by us. Look how many shortcomings the 76-mm divisional gun F-22 (sample 1936) had, but they put it into mass production. What happened?

The fact is that Taubin crossed the road to the “mortarmen”. They considered that the Taubin grenade launcher called into question the continuation of work on 50-mm company mortars, and maybe on 60-mm and 82-mm mortars.

On July 27, 1938, Taubin wrote to the People's Commissariat of Defense: “Individual employees of Artkom - Dorovlev, Bogomolov, Bulba, Ignatenko - during 1937, with the help of the former chairman of the Artillery Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Kirillov-Gubetsky, created an atmosphere of blackmail around ... 40.8-mm grenade launcher » .

The mortarmen managed to achieve the release of Decree KO No. 137 of June 22, 1938, which adopted a 50-mm mortar, which had many design flaws.

The mortarmen are trying to get a stupidly fantastic decision from the Artillery Directorate - to test a 40.8-mm grenade launcher along with a 50-mm mortar and according to the mortar firing program. Naturally, the mortar could not conduct flat fire, and it was not in the program, and the grenade launcher could effectively conduct both flat and mounted fire. But at the maximum elevation angle, the accuracy of fire of the 50-mm mortar turned out to be slightly better. In addition, the mortar was much simpler and cheaper than a grenade launcher.

So the Red Army was left without flat-firing artillery systems and without automatic grenade launchers. Note that in the mid-1960s. the Americans first used an automatic grenade launcher in Vietnam, and at the end of 1969, tests of the Flame automatic grenade launcher began in the USSR, very similar in design and principle of operation to the Taubin grenade launcher.

Adventurous designers and illiterate members of the Art Committee of the GAU staged campaign after campaign to create incapable artillery systems. We have already spoken about the adventure with beltless shells. In 1931–1936 undergraduate (2nd year) student Leonid Kurchevsky, using the patronage of Tukhachevsky, Pavlunovsky and Ordzhonikidze, tried to replace all the guns of the Red Army and the Navy with dynamo-reactive ones. He created a dead-end direction for the development of recoilless guns according to the "loaded barrel" scheme. From 1931 to 1936, the industry produced about 5 thousand recoilless guns of the Kurchevsky system with a caliber from 37 to 305 mm. Most of these guns did not pass military acceptance at all, and several hundred guns were in service for several months (up to three years), and then were removed.

By June 22, 1941, not a single Kurchevsky artillery system was in service with the Red Army. It is curious that several tens of thousands of K-type shells for 76-mm Kurchevsky recoilless rifles during the battle for Moscow were fed to 76-mm regimental guns mod. 1927 and for these shells they compiled special "Firing Tables".

In 1938–1940 in the GAU began "kartuzomaniya". On the eve of the war, a number of leaders decided to transfer all the corps artillery of the Red Army from separate-sleeve loading to cap-loading. The advantages of separate-sleeve loading are more than obvious. I note that Germany, which had the best artillery in the world in both world wars, relied exclusively on separate-sleeve loading. And not only in medium-caliber guns (10.5-20.3 cm), but also in large-caliber guns (30.5-43 cm).

It is important to note that the transition from the cartridge case to the cap concerns not only the shot, it requires the introduction of changes in the gun barrel. Thus, the barrels of experienced 152-mm M-10 howitzers and ML-20 howitzer-guns with cap loading were not interchangeable with standard barrels. The krokhobors-kartuzniks could win in kopecks, but completely disorganize our corps artillery. The war put an end to the intrigues of the “cartridgers”.

Krokhobors from the GAU calmed down for a while, right up to December 11, 1967, when a decree was issued on the start of work on the creation of 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers with cap loading. 5 years of futile work, and in March 1972 the Ministry of Defense Industry issued an order to stop work on the 122-mm D-16 and 152-mm D-11 cap howitzers.

As you can see, our artillery in the 1920-1940s. tossed from side to side. Billions of rubles taken from the hungry people went to tricks with beltless shells, Tukhachevsky's "universal guns" (that is, anti-aircraft divisional guns), Kurchevsky's recoilless rifles, projecting "kartuzniks", etc.

Personally, I am not a fan of unreliable sensations. But one gets the impression that a large, carefully conspiratorial group of wreckers worked in our artillery. We couldn't have had so many fools, especially since all the dead-end ideas were too well thought out.

If we put in a row all Russian serial and experimental field guns, created from 1800 to 1917, and there are more than two dozen of them, then it is easy to see that their dimensions are almost the same. The same can be said about the weight of the guns. The fact is that the weight and size characteristics of field artillery systems were determined by “Her Majesty the Six Horses”. To reduce the weight is to lose in the power of the gun, and a small increase in weight drastically reduces mobility. Increase the diameter of the wheel - the carriage will begin to tip over when cornering, reduce it - the patency will worsen.

Four horses have always been considered the optimal harness for one wagon. When harnessing more horses, the efficiency decreased. Therefore, more than 10 horses tried not to harness. In the 19th century, light and heavy field (divisional) guns were in service. The first were harnessed by four, and the second by six horses. By the beginning of the 20th century, it was decided to partially sacrifice the mobility of the field gun in order to improve its ballistic qualities. Weight in the stowed position of 76-mm field guns mod. 1900 and arr. 1902 turned out to be about 2 tons, that is, the extreme limit for six horses. The speed of transporting them on good dirt roads did not exceed 6-7 km / h. Moreover, it is worth noting that for the carriage of six guns of a battery of 76-mm guns, not 36 horses were required, but 108, since each gun in the battery had 2 charging boxes, each of which was also harnessed by six horses. In addition, the foot battery had horses for officers, household needs, etc.

Horse traction significantly limited the power of siege artillery. In Russian siege artillery, the maximum body weight of the gun was 200 pounds (3.2 tons). In 1910–1913 in Russia, collapsible siege weapons are adopted. So, for example, a 280-mm mortar (Schneider) was disassembled in the stowed position into 6 parts. For the carriage of each part (wagon) 10 horses were required, that is, for the entire mortar - 60 horses, not counting the horses for the ammunition carts.

The first attempt to use mechanical traction in the Russian army took place in 1912–1914. So, 152-mm siege gun mod. 1904 in 1912 was towed by a wheeled tractor along the highway at a speed of up to 12 km / h. In 1913, in the Brest-Litovsk fortress, experiments were carried out on the carriage of a 76-mm cannon mod. 1900 behind a truck. However, the command of the fortress artillery looked at the mechtyag as tricks, and the command of the field artillery generally ignored it.

In 1914–1917 Russia bought several heavy guns and tractors from England to haul them. So, for the 305-mm Vickers howitzer, wheeled steam tractors "Big Lion" and "Small Lion" designed by Fowler were ordered. During the tests of the 305-mm howitzer with the Big Lion tractor, the excellent highway from Tsarskoye Selo to Gatchina was completely ruined. In addition, it took several hours to breed steam, so the GAU abandoned the steam "lions".

Tractors with carburetor engines turned out to be more successful - a 60-horsepower wheeled "Morton" and a wheeled-caterpillar "Allis-Schalmers". These tractors were used to haul 203-mm and 234-mm Vickers British howitzers. The rest of the heavy guns remained horse-drawn.

Due to the low power and scarcity of collapsible heavy guns, the Russian command was forced to mobilize heavy ship and coastal guns - 152-mm Canet guns and 254-mm guns - to the front. They were transported unassembled only by rail. A railway line of normal gauge was specially laid to the position of the gun. Curious was the method of transporting a 305-mm siege howitzer mod. 1915. The howitzer was delivered to the front line by rail with normal gauge. Then parts of the howitzer were transferred in a rather original way to the carts of the narrow gauge railway (750 mm gauge) and in this way were delivered directly to the position.

In the years civil war The Red Army has never used heavy artillery, except for railway and ship installations. It is curious that in the Crimea, the White siege weapons, abandoned in November 1920, stood for almost a year - the Reds had nothing to take them out with.

In the first half of 1941, the partial deployment of the army and the intensive formation of new artillery units began. This further worsened the situation with mechanical traction. The tractors mobilized from the national economy were mostly worn out, and the army had neither the strength nor the means to repair them. Neither the repair bases of the People's Commissariat of Defense, nor the artillery units were engaged in the average repair of tractors; the first - due to the lack of free production capacity, the second - due to the lack of spare parts, tools or workshops.

The overhaul of tractors at the repair bases of the People's Commissariat of Defense was delayed. So, in the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO) there were 960 tractors at repair bases, in ZapOVO - 600. The completion date for their repair, excluding newly arriving tractors, was scheduled only for the second quarter of 1943. In the machine and tractor workshops of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture since 1940. there were about 400 tractors handed over for repair by the Western and Kiev districts. The date of their release from repair remained unspecified.

Table 1. The main technical specifications of special artillery tractors and tractors used to tow guns at the beginning of the war

Table 2.The number, composition and qualitative state of the tractor park of the Soviet artillery on January 1, 1941

Here, for example, is a report from the chief of artillery of the Oryol military district dated June 5, 1941: “According to the states of peacetime and wartime, the 364th, 488th corps artillery regiments and the 399th howitzer artillery regiment put the Komintern and Stalinets- 2". At the time of the formation of the indicated artillery units, there were no Komintern, Stalinets-2 tractors and their replacement ChTZ-65 in the district ... Comintern" and "Stalinets-2" low-power tractors STZ-3-5 ...

The transportation of the indicated tractors of the material part of the artillery from the station of the Rada of the Leninskaya railway to the camps was carried out along a forest country road at a distance of 0.5–1 km ... guns, stuck 8. All the measures taken to pull out stuck guns with STZ-3-5 tractors turned out to be ineffective ... I believe that equipping these artillery units with low-power STZ-3-5 tractors in the amount of 50% of the regular requirement makes them unfit for combat. And here is a report dated June 18, 1941 on the movement of units of the ZapOVO to a new location: “During the march of the 27th and 42nd divisions, due to the low qualification of drivers, there were cases of accidents of cars and tractors. On May 8, 1941, the driver of 132 bn 27 sd Poltavtsev overturned the car. The cook-instructor Izmailov, who was in it, received a fracture of his right collarbone. ml. The commander of the 75th GAP 27th Rifle Division, Koshin, driving a ChTZ-5 tractor, ran into a 122-mm gun, as a result of which the tractor was disabled. The tractor driver Teilinsky (42nd Rifle Division) ran into the implement in front, as a result of which the tractor broke down and the implement was damaged. The driver Bayev of the same division, driving a car, ran into a second car, as a result of which both cars broke down. Leontiev, the driver of the car park battery 42 sd, ran into a pole, which disabled the car and injured himself. Similar facts took place in 75 sd.

In addition, during the march in 115 joint ventures of 75 rifle divisions, 23 horses broke down due to wear. ”

In order to save materiel and fuel in the prewar years, only one tractor per battery was allowed to be used for combat training and household needs, and its operating time should not exceed 25 hours per month. One can imagine at what level the combat training of our mechanized artillery was carried out.

The unsatisfactory situation with the means of mechanized traction, along with other factors, led to disastrous consequences in the very first days of the war.

June 26, 1941 Colonel I.S. Strelbitsky reported to the artillery commander of the 13th Army that out of the 12 artillery battalions of the brigade, 9 battalions had neither tractors, nor drivers, nor shells.

In the city of Dubno, the 529th howitzer artillery regiment of high power was formed. Due to the lack of mechanical traction, when the Germans approached, 27 203-mm B-4 howitzers, that is, the entire regiment, were abandoned in good condition.

In the first half of 1942, only STZ-5 tractors came from industry to replenish the fleet. Of these, 1628 - before June 1, 1942 and 650 - for June 1942.

These tractors were almost completely used to equip the newly formed artillery regiments of rifle divisions.

The Voroshilovets tractor has not been produced since August 1941. And during the war, the Red Army did not receive a single Voroshilovets.

The issue of manufacturing prototypes and preparing the A-45 tractor (instead of the Voroshilovets) based on the T-34 tank was not resolved on July 13, 1942. The technical design of this tractor, developed by plant No. 183, was approved by the GABTU and GAU on June 4, 1942. Nevertheless, in a series according to different reasons A-45 never went. The production of ChTZ tractors ceased in December 1941, and on July 13, 1942, their production was not resumed.

Table 4

As of July 13, 1942, no tractors had arrived from abroad, and the first batch of 400 units was expected only in August. From the report of the head of the ATU GABTU KA for the secretariat of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the state of the tractor fleet of the Red Army dated July 13, 1942: “Due to the complete cessation of the production of Voroshilovets and ChTZ tractors, an extremely difficult situation was created in artillery and tank units. New formations of cannon and heavy howitzer artillery regiments of the RGK are completely not provided with mechanical traction (ChTZ tractor). The need to replenish the lost tractors of the operating parts is not satisfied. In many artillery regiments, 1 tractor accounts for 2–3 guns. Tank units are completely not provided with powerful Voroshilovets tractors, as a result of which heavy and medium tanks, even due to minor malfunctions or damage, are not evacuated from the battlefield in a timely manner and get to the enemy ...

In connection with the cessation of the production of ChTZ tractors, a catastrophic situation with mechanical traction was created in the artillery units.

In August 1943, tests began on three prototypes of the Ya-12 caterpillar artillery tractor, created in the Design Bureau of the Yaroslavl Automobile Plant. The tractors were equipped with a 112 hp GMC-4-71 diesel engine supplied under Lend-Lease, which made it possible to reach a speed of 37.1 km / h on a good road. The weight of the tractor without load is 6550 kg.

The Ya-12 tractor could tow 85-mm anti-aircraft guns, A-19 and ML-20 hull artillery systems, and even (with difficulty) a 203-mm B-4 howitzer. From August to the end of 1943, the Yaroslavl plant manufactured 218 Ya-12 tractors, in 1944 - 965, and until May 9, 1945 - another 1048.

And now let's move on to the regular artillery tractors of the Wehrmacht. During the first 18 days of the war, the average daily advance of German troops was between 25 and 35 km. And this was achieved not least thanks to the system of German wheeled artillery tractors. In the Wehrmacht, they were called "Somderkraftfarzeug", that is, "special motorized vehicles."

Initially, there were six classes of such machines:

- 1/2-ton class, Sd.Kfz.2;

- 1-ton class, Sd.Kfz.10;

- 3-ton class, Sd.Kfz.11;

- 5-ton class, Sd.Kfz.6;

- 8-ton class, Sd.Kfz.7;

- 12-ton class, Sd.Kfz.8;

- 18-ton class, Sd.Kfz.9.

Cars of all classes were very similar to each other and were equipped with cabins made of awnings. The undercarriage of the caterpillar chassis was equipped with road wheels mounted in a checkerboard pattern. The tracks were with rubber pads and track lubrication. This chassis design provided high speed on the highway and satisfactory off-road patency.

The track rollers of all vehicles, except for the Sd.Kfz.7, had a torsion bar suspension. The turn of the car was carried out by turning the front (ordinary) wheels and turning on the caterpillar differentials.

The smallest German artillery tractor was the Sd.Kfz.2, an NSU caterpillar motorcycle. In total, NSU and Stoewer manufactured at least 8345 tracked motorcycles.

This motorcycle with a 36 hp engine. and its own weight of 1280 kg was originally intended for use in the Airborne Forces for towing 7.5 cm and 10.5 cm recoilless guns, mortars and other systems. Effort "on the hook" up to 200 kg.

In infantry divisions, the Sd.Kfz.2 was used to tow 37 mm anti-tank guns, 7.5 cm infantry guns, 2 cm anti-aircraft guns and other light systems.

The speed of movement Sd.Kfz.2 reached 70 km / h. However, on curved sections of the track, the speed had to be reduced, and climbs or hills could only be overcome in a straight line, while moving diagonally, the Sd.Kfz.2 could tip over.

In the spring of 1942, the GABTU conducted comparative tests of the captured German Sd.Kfz.2 tractor, which we simply called the NSU, and our GAZ-64 car.

According to a report dated May 6, 1942, “the German NSU tractor and the GAZ-64 vehicle can tow a 45-mm anti-tank gun in terms of traction and maneuverability. However, neither the tractor nor the GAZ-64 car is able to transport a full-time gun crew, consisting of 5 people, and ammunition. Towing a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun with a calculation of 3 people instead of seven by a German tractor and GAZ-64 is possible only on good highways ...

Tractor patency on country and forest roads during spring off-road is better than GAZ-64 ...

The lack of advantages of the NSU tractor in comparison with the GAZ-64 both in terms of dynamic and traction qualities, the complexity of the design of the tractor and the difficulties in mastering its production give reason to conclude that it is inappropriate to take it into production.

It should be noted that the Germans called their wheeled-tracked tractors 1-, 3-, 5-, 8-, 12- and 18-ton, meaning not their carrying capacity in tons, but the conditional load that they could tow over rough terrain in medium traffic conditions.

The one-ton Sd.Kfz.10 half-track tractor was intended for towing anti-tank guns of 3.7 cm, 5 cm and 7.5 cm caliber. A light armored personnel carrier was created on its basis. The power of the Sd.Kfz.10 engine was 90-115 hp. Highway speed - up to 65 km / h.

A passenger car-tractor with a traction force of 3 tons Sd.Kfz.11 was intended for towing 10.5-cm light field howitzers and 15-cm rocket launchers. On its basis, a medium armored personnel carrier was created. Engine power 90-100 hp Travel speed 50–70 km/h.

The medium tractor Sd.Kfz.6 of 5 tons towed a 10.5 cm light howitzer, a 15 cm heavy howitzer, a 10.5 cm gun and an 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun. Engine power 90-115 hp Highway speed 50–70 km/h.

The medium tractor Sd.Kfz.7 of 8 tons towed a 15 cm heavy howitzer, a 10.5 cm cannon and an 8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun. Engine power 115–140 hp The maximum speed on the highway is 50–70 km/h.

A heavy tractor Sd.Kfz.8 of 12 tons towed anti-aircraft guns of 8.8 cm and 10.5 cm caliber, as well as 21 cm mortars mod. 18. Engine power 150–185 hp Highway speed 50–70 km/h.

And finally, the heavy tractor Sd.Kfz.9 of 18 tons could tow all types of tanks, all heavy artillery systems of large and special power, as well as 12.8-cm anti-aircraft guns. Naturally, the guns of special power were transported disassembled. Accordingly, three Sd.Kfz.9 tractors were required to transport one 21 cm K.39 gun, and five tractors were required for the 24 cm K3 gun. For 35.5-cm mortars M.1 - seven tractors. Its engine power was 230–250 hp. Travel speed 50–70 km/h.

During the war, on the basis of light, medium and heavy half-track tractors, the Germans created a dozen improvised self-propelled units. In this case, the gun simply fit in the back of the tractor. This is how self-propelled ordinary and quadruple 2-cm anti-aircraft guns were created, as well as 3.7-cm and 5-cm anti-aircraft automatic guns, and self-propelled 8.8-cm anti-aircraft guns on the chassis of the Sd.Kfz.9 tractor.

On medium tractors Sd.Kfz.6, 3.7 cm and 5 cm anti-tank guns were installed.

In addition to half-tracked tractors, the Wehrmacht also used purely tracked vehicles to transport artillery. The Steyr RSO tractor was especially famous among them.

For the "blitzkrieg" in Russia, the Germans used hundreds of thousands of tractors and cars captured throughout Europe in 1939-1941. The degree of motorization of both the army as a whole and artillery in particular was significantly higher in the Wehrmacht than in the Red Army, which became an important component of the artillery vector of defeat in 1941.

By the beginning of World War II, the main German aircraft - artillery spotters were the single-engine Henschel HS-126. The crew of the aircraft is two people. The high position of the wing provided good visibility for the pilot and spotter. The maximum speed of the HS-126 is 349 km / h, the flight range is 720 km. The machine was produced in 1938–1940, a total of 810 aircraft were produced.

In July 1938, flight tests began on the most famous reconnaissance spotter of World War II, the Focke-Wulf FW-189. In the Luftwaffe it was called “Uhu” (“Owl”), the German press - “flying eye”, but our soldiers dubbed it “Rama” for its two-keel design.

The gondola-fuselage in its design was a metal monocoque, the individual parts of which were bolted together. The nose and tail parts of the gondola had large area glazing, which was made with flat panels that do not give distortion. The gondola accommodated three crew members - the pilot, the navigator-observer and the shooter of the tail machine gun installations.

The tail unit was mounted on two oval beams, which were a continuation of the engine nacelles. By design, these beams were a monocoque. The stabilizer and keels were of a monoblock design. The rudders had a frame made of duralumin and fabric covering.

The Rama was equipped with two Argus As-410A-1 engines with an HP 465 power. every. The propellers were variable pitch in flight.

The aircraft was armed with two fixed 7.92 mm MG 17 machine guns in the center section for firing forward and two movable 7.92 mm MG 15 machine guns in pivot mounts at the rear of the gondola. One of the mobile machine guns was designed to fire back and up, and the second - back and down. Such armament, good visibility and high maneuverability allowed the crew to constantly keep the attacking fighter in the zone of fire of its rear firing points while turning. Having fired at the attacking fighter, the "Rama" usually went spirally to low altitudes and strafing flight. The Soviet pilot who shot down the Rama was usually presented for a reward.

The production of FW-189 aircraft at German factories was terminated in 1942, but at French factories it continued until January 1944, and at Czechoslovak factories until 1945. A total of 846 FW-189 aircraft of all modifications were produced.

By June 22, 1941, there was not a single FW-189 in combat squadrons, and artillery adjustments in the first months of the war were carried out only by HS-126s. During the first three months of the war, more than 80 Henschels were disabled, 43 of them irretrievably.

Only in November 1941 did the first FW-189А-1 aircraft arrive in the 2.(F)11 squadron operating on the Eastern Front. Then the Focke-Wulfs entered service with squadron 1. (P) 31, operationally assigned to the 8th Army Corps, and squadron 3. (H) 32, attached to the 12th Panzer Division.

"Rama" turned out to be a tough nut to crack for our fighters. Here are some examples. On May 19, 1942, over the Taman Peninsula, two Soviet MiG-3 fighters attacked a German FW-189A reconnaissance aircraft at an altitude of 4000 m. As a result, the Rama engine was damaged, all defensive weapons were out of order, but the pilot was still able to land the plane at the forward airfield. During landing, the car was damaged: the left main landing gear broke and the left wing plane was crushed. The aircraft was quickly repaired and returned to service.

On August 25, 1942, our anti-aircraft gunners shot down a "Rama" from squadron 2. (H) 12. The 22-year-old pilot, sergeant major F. Elkerst, survived and was interrogated. He had extensive combat experience, starting the war in France. The pilot said that his squadron from the Olshantsy landing site near Orel conducted reconnaissance with passing bombardment in the Kirov-Zhizdra-Sukhinichi triangle. During the day, 5-6 sorties were made, and almost always without fighter cover. For three months of fighting, the squadron did not lose a single aircraft. One of the pilots was seriously injured, but managed to fly to his airfield. According to the German pilot, the Focke-Wulfs managed to avoid encounters with Soviet fighters due to good interaction with VNOS posts.

In the Stalingrad area, FW-189 scouts were constantly over the positions of our troops. So, over Mamayev Kurgan, they appeared every 2–3 hours, 5–6 times a day, and their sorties were accompanied by massive shelling and dive bombing raids.

The Focke-Wulfs usually operated at an altitude of 1000 m, from where they monitored the transfer of infantry and tank units, photographed aircraft stands, positions of anti-aircraft batteries, warehouses, discovered reserves, and also corrected artillery fire. The scouts worked in almost any weather conditions, and when they got into the air defense coverage area, they went to a height of up to 3000 m.

In September 1942, the Germans on the Eastern Front had 174 FW-189 reconnaissance aircraft, as well as 103 He-126, 40 Bf-109 and Bf-110 aircraft.

In addition to the Rama and Hs-126, the Germans often used the Fuseler Fi-156 Storch (Aist) liaison aircraft as a spotter, which needed only 60 meters for takeoff and about the same for landing. The Germans achieved this by using a "super-mechanized" wing with wing flaps, flaps and the so-called hanging ailerons, which also play the role of wing flaps.

The maximum takeoff weight of the machine was 1325 kg, maximum speed 175 km/h The cab has been designed to provide good visibility in all directions. The side parts of the cockpit canopy acted as balconies, which provided a vertical downward view. The cabin ceiling was also all transparent. Three seats were located one behind the other. The front seat was for the pilot. The back seat was removable, and a camera was installed in its place.

Serial production of "Storch" began in 1937 in Germany at a plant in the city of Kassel and continued until the end of the war. In addition, from April 1942, these aircraft were produced in France at the Moran-Sologne plant, and from December 1943 - in Czechoslovakia at the Mraz plant. In total, about 2,900 Fi-156 aircraft were produced on orders from the Luftwaffe.

Especially for reconnaissance and adjustment, the Fi-156С-2 version was produced with aerial photographic equipment in the cockpit and Fi-156С-5 with aerial photographic equipment in a dropped container.

In the Red Army, aerial artillery reconnaissance before the war was represented by reconnaissance aviation in the form of aviation units (three aircraft per flight), which were organizationally part of corps squadrons (three links per squadron) of military aviation. In total, according to the pre-war states, it was supposed to contain 177 corrective and reconnaissance units with 531 aircraft in 59 squadrons. In fact, due to understaffing, there were fewer of them. For example, in the Kiev Special Military District, instead of the 72 corrective aircraft required by the state, there were only 16. There were not enough radio stations and aerial cameras.

In the 1930s we have developed several projects of spotter aircraft, but none of them could be put into production. As a result, the corrective links were equipped with aircraft of obsolete designs not adapted for these purposes (P-5 and PZ), moreover, many of them were badly worn out.

The flight personnel of the corrective units was recruited mainly from pilots expelled from combat aviation in connection with its transition to high-speed aircraft. Special training for pilots to correct artillery fire was weak, since squadron commanders, not being organizationally connected with artillery, did not pay enough attention to this type of training.

All these circumstances led to the fact that the methods of firing artillery with spotting aircraft before the war were not widely used. Thus, for example, out of 2,543 combat firings conducted by corps artillery units of 15 military districts in the 1939/40 academic year, only 52 firings (2%) were carried out with the participation of corrective aviation.

By the beginning of the war, the artillery had only three detachments of observation balloons (one balloon per detachment), stationed in the Leningrad Military District.

In August 1941, at the airfield of the Research Institute of the Air Force of the KA, special tests were carried out for the serial Su-2 aircraft manufactured by plant No. 207 in order to identify the possibility of using it as an "artillery aircraft for enemy artillery reconnaissance, aerial photography and artillery fire correction." At the end of the tests, with some changes in the equipment, the aircraft was recommended for adoption by corrective squadrons.

In September 1941, the head of armaments orders of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Space Agency, Lieutenant-General of the quartermaster service Zharov, in his appeal to the Deputy People's Commissar of the aviation industry P.A. Voronin wrote: “The experience of military operations has revealed that the Su-2 aircraft can be used at the front not only as a short-range bomber, but also as a reconnaissance and spotter of artillery fire.

The Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Spacecraft decided to send the aircraft supplied by Plant No. 207 to the reconnaissance formations of the Air Force of the Spacecraft. I ask you to give an urgent instruction to the director of the plant 207 t. Klimovnikov to supply the Main Directorate of the Air Force KA with Su-2 aircraft, additionally equipped for AFA aerial cameras according to the drawings of the chief designer, with the RSB, SPU radio station.

In February 1942, in connection with the disbandment of plant No. 135, the production of Su-2 aircraft ceased. In total, 12 reconnaissance and corrective squadrons and 18 units were armed with Su-2 aircraft.

At the beginning of 1943, the squadrons of corrective reconnaissance aviation were consolidated into corrective reconnaissance aviation regiments (three squadrons each).

By the middle of 1943, converted Il-2 aircraft began to replace the Su-2 aircraft, which until the end of the war were the main reconnaissance-spotters of artillery fire.

August 13, 1942 the commander of the Air Force KA A.A. Novikov, in connection with the positive experience of using the Il-2U aircraft (with the AM-38 engine) in June-July 1942, to adjust artillery fire, turned to the people's commissar for the aviation industry A.I. Shakhurin (letter No. 376269) with a request to create a reconnaissance artillery spotter on the basis of the Il-2 attack aircraft: “The Front also requires reconnaissance aircraft and artillery spotter aircraft. Equipped for these purposes, the two-seat Il-2 aircraft will also satisfy this requirement of the front. I ask for your instructions to the chief designer comrade. Ilyushin to urgently develop and manufacture prototypes of the two-seater Il-2 aircraft in the variants of an attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft and spotter of artillery fire.

On February 7, 1943, the State Defense Committee, by its Decree No. 2841, obliged Ilyushin "... until the final development of the spotter aircraft, to adapt the existing two-seater Il-2 aircraft with AM-38f by installing an RSB radio station and a photo installation."

In March 1943, the Il-2 reconnaissance spotter was built. The IL-2KR has completely preserved the design and armament of the serial two-seat Ila with AM-38f. Changes were made only to the composition of the equipment, to the fuel system and to the booking scheme. The RSI-4 radio station was replaced with a more powerful RSB-3bis with a longer range, which was placed in the middle part of the cockpit canopy directly behind the pilot's armored back above the rear gas tank reduced in height. To fix the reconnaissance results, an AFA-I camera was installed in the rear fuselage (the AFA-IM installation was allowed). Externally, the Il-2KR aircraft differed from the serial Il-2 only in the presence of a radio antenna installed on the front fixed canopy of the cockpit canopy.

Flight tests of the Il-2KR (serial number 301896) at the Research Institute of the Air Force of the KA were successfully completed from March 27 to April 7, 1943 (test pilot A.K. Dolgov, chief engineer N.S. Kulikov).

The test report indicated that the volume of special equipment does not sufficiently meet the requirements for an aircraft of this purpose. Nevertheless, by GKO Decree No. 3144 of April 10, 1943, the Il-2KR aircraft was put into mass production at factory No. 1, which was also given the program for the production of this modification of the attack aircraft of factory No. 30, in view of the fact that the latter received the task of producing Il- 2, armed with 37-mm OKB-16 air cannons designed by A.E. Nudelman and A.S. Suranova.

In April 1943, the 30th aircraft factory managed to produce 65 Il-2KR aircraft, and already on July 1, the active army had 41 aircraft of this type.

In addition, a significant number of full-time Il-2 attack aircraft were used to adjust the artillery fire.

In 1942, under Lend-Lease, the Americans supplied 30 Curtiss O-52 "Owi" ("Owl") machines to the USSR without a request from our side. Of these, our Air Force used only 19 vehicles. The two-keel monoplane is specially designed as an "observer", that is, an artillery spotter. Its maximum takeoff weight was 2433 kg, maximum speed was 354 km/h. According to the US military, the plane is very uncomfortable. By the way, only 209 Owls were produced in the USA.

Curtiss O-52 "Owi" aircraft were equipped with the 12th separate correction squadron of the Leningrad Front. In 2001, search engines near Novaya Dubrovka found one of these cars.

For lack of a better one, single-seat fighters were often used to correct artillery fire. How it was done, told the Hero of the Soviet Union A.A. Barsht, who fought in the 118th separate correctional and reconnaissance regiment: “We, the spotters, flew at an altitude of 3-4 thousand meters, that is, a projectile could easily hit one of our aircraft. Therefore, it was necessary to imagine a shooting director (a straight line connecting the battery and the target) and stay away from it. If I'm just flying, then because of high speed you can't see the area well. And when I dive on the target, there is almost no angular movement. Therefore, this is what we did: we climbed about 4 thousand meters near the front line and commanded: "fire"! They make a shot, and the projectile flew. Now I lower my nose and - went to the target. The projectile overtakes me and explodes, and I fix where the explosion is, in advance (during preliminary reconnaissance) having chosen a landmark on the ground - a corner of the forest, or a bend in the river, or a church - whatever it is. I give corrections such that, as a rule, the second, maximum third volley covers the target.

I will leave without comment the question of how effective the firing correction of single-seat fighters was, and leave it to the reader.

So, all the aircraft used by the Red Army in 1941-1945 were not suitable for adjusting artillery fire.

In July 1943, the Research Institute of the Air Force of the KA developed the tactical and technical requirements for a military reconnaissance artillery fire spotter for the experimental aircraft construction plan for 1943–1944.

By November 1943, in the Design Bureau P.O. Sukhoi completed the development of a project for a three-seat spotter with two M-62 engines, made according to the scheme of the German reconnaissance aircraft FW-189. The spotter aircraft was included in the draft plan for the construction of experimental aircraft of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry in 1944-1945, but in the process of agreeing and approving the plan, this topic was "reduced".

In 1946, in the Design Bureau P.O. Sukhoi, an analogue of the FW-189 was created - an artillery spotter and reconnaissance Su-12 (RK). The duration of the reconnaissance flight was 4 hours 18 minutes against 3 hours specified by the tactical and technical requirements. Flight range 1140 km.

The first prototype Su-12(RK) was completed in December 1947, and in 1948 it passed state tests.

At the end of September 1950, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, in an address to the Minister of War of the USSR, reported that “the correction and reconnaissance aviation of the SA Air Force, consisting of 18 separate air squadrons and one regiment, is armed with Il-2 aircraft, which, due to their technical condition, do not ensure the fulfillment of the tasks facing her combat training tasks.

The Il-2 aircraft is not adapted to fly at night, in clouds and in difficult weather conditions, therefore, the KRA flight personnel are deprived of the opportunity to improve in piloting technique and in combat use at night and in bad weather.

As of September 1, 1950, the KRA was equipped with serviceable Il-2 aircraft by only 83%, and the percentage of staffing is systematically reduced due to the failure of the aircraft due to their deterioration and the lack of replenishment with new aircraft.

Based on the foregoing, I would consider it necessary to ask the USSR Council of Ministers to oblige the MAP to organize mass production of Su-12 aircraft with the ASh-82FN engine that passed tests in 1949 during 1951-52. in the amount of 185 combat and 20 combat training aircraft.

As you can see, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force gave a deadly description of the Il-2 aircraft as a reconnaissance spotter.

The lack of good spotters sharply reduced the effectiveness of the Red Army artillery during the Great Patriotic War.

During the war, the BS-3 was produced in small quantities and could not play a big role. At the final stage of the war, 98 BS-3s were given as a means of reinforcing five tank armies. The gun was in service with the light artillery brigades of the 3rd regiment.

As of January 1, 1945, the RGK artillery had 87 BS-3 guns. At the beginning of 1945, in the 9th Guards Army, as part of three rifle corps, one cannon artillery regiment of 20 BS-3s was formed.

Basically, due to the long firing range - 20650 m and a fairly effective high-explosive fragmentation grenade weighing 15.6 kg, the gun was used as a hull gun to fight enemy artillery and suppress distant targets.

The BS-3 had a number of shortcomings that made it difficult to use it as an anti-tank weapon. When firing, the gun jumped heavily, which made the gunner's work unsafe and knocked down aiming mounts, which, in turn, led to a decrease in the practical rate of aimed fire - a very important quality for a field anti-tank gun.

The presence of a powerful muzzle brake with a low line of fire and flat trajectories characteristic of firing at armored targets led to the formation of a significant smoke and dust cloud, which unmasked the position and blinded the calculation. The mobility of a gun with a mass of more than 3500 kg left much to be desired, transportation by crew forces on the battlefield was almost impossible.

After the war, the gun was in production until 1951 inclusive, a total of 3816 BS-3 field guns were produced. In the 60s, the guns underwent modernization, this concerned primarily sights and ammunition. Until the early 60s, the BS-3 could penetrate the armor of any Western tank. But with the advent of: M-48A2, Chieftain, M-60 - the situation has changed. New sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles were urgently developed. The next modernization took place in the mid-80s, when the 9M117 Bastion anti-tank guided projectile entered the BS-3 ammunition load.

This weapon was also supplied to other countries, took part in many local conflicts in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, in some of them it is still in service. In Russia, until recently, the BS-3 guns were used as coastal defense weapons in service with the 18th machine gun and artillery division stationed on the Kuril Islands, and a fairly significant number of them are also in storage.

Until the late 60s and early 70s of the last century, anti-tank guns were the main means of fighting tanks. However, with the advent of ATGMs with a semi-automatic guidance system, which only requires keeping the target in the field of view of the sight, the situation has changed in many ways. The military leadership of many countries considered metal-intensive, bulky and expensive anti-tank guns an anachronism. But not in the USSR. In our country, the development and production of anti-tank guns continued in significant numbers. And at a qualitatively new level.